TIMUR LENK’S MILITARY INVASION IN ANATOLIA IN 1402-1403 AD

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Abstract

This study explains the Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion in Anatolia in 1402 to 1403 AD. Using historical methods, the author uses various written sources. Available sources include books and scientific articles. In this study, the author analyzes the factors of Timur’s victory in war, based on the theories of war explained by Sun Tzu. The findings from this research reveal that the situation of the regions in Anatolia, politically experienced changes after the military invasion of Timur Lenk, especially after Timur’s victory over the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of Sultan Bayazid I in the battle of Ankara on July 20, 1402. The situation of the regions in Anatolia experienced changes, both in terms of government, which was shown by the return to power of the government of small kingdoms in Anatolia, after previously being under the rule of Bayazid I, the struggle for power between Ottoman Turkish princes after the capture of Bayazid I in Samarkand, and the destruction of Izmir in 1403 due to Timur Lenk’s politically motivated invasion.

Keywords: Anatolia; Timur Lenk; Bayazid I.

INTRODUCTION

Anatolia, which is known as part the Republic of Turkey nowadays, was an area administered by the Ottoman Empire in 1402. At that time, Anatolia was a region controlled by the Ottoman Turks. Sultan Bayazid I, was the Sultan who ruled the region since 1389 AD. After Bayazid I’s victory over an alliance of crusader states led by Sigismund King of Hungary and Pope Boniface IX, Bayazid I titled himself as "Roman Sultan", because he had inherited the Seljuq rule and had controlled Anatolia. This title was also confirmed through the recognition of the Abbasid Caliph, who was then in Cairo (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). At the same time, in the Central Asian region, Timur Lenk, in order to maintain his power, claimed sovereignty over the entire Anatolian emirates because he was a descendant of Genghis Khan. This claim was based on the historical fact that the Ilkhaniyah (Khanate belonging to Hulagu Khan who was one of Genghis Khan’s descendants) once ruled Asia Minor in the second half of the 13th century (Agoston & Masters, 2009). The rivalry between Bayazid I and Timur Lenk reached its peak in the battle of Ankara in 1402 AD, which marked the decline of Ottoman Turkish power and the continuation until the peak of Timur Lenk’s military invasion in Anatolia. This study focuses on discussing how was the condition of Anatolia before the arrival of Timur Lenk’s military invasion, how many factors were the background to Timur’s military invasion in Anatolia, and what was the situation of Anatolia after the arrival of Timur’s military invasion.

It is certainly possible to study Timur Lenk’s military invasion in Anatolia in 1402 to 1403 AD. The availability of written primary sources that have been translated support this reconstruction effort. The Ottoman Empire and the Timurid Empire, were great empires in the past, of course they have a lot of historical heritage, such as in the form of writing and in the form of relics. In an effort to provide a useful contribution to the development of writing on the political history of Central Asia in Indonesia, this article will use a multidimensional approach, from a political and military perspective.

The writing of the history of Timur Lenk’s military invasion in Anatolia in 1402 to 1403 AD can be categorized as war history. This study has a spatial focus on Anatolia with temporal aspects
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throughout 1402-1403 AD only. Specifically, the reason for making 1402 as the starting date for writing this study is because in that year there was a change in the political order of government in Anatolia, especially after the battle of Ankara on July 20, 1402 AD. Meanwhile, making 1403 as the final year of this writing is because it was the year when Timur Lenk returned from Anatolia to Samarkand. This study will give more explanation about Timur Lenk’s military invasion strategy in Anatolia which is reviewed through a study of Sun Tzu’s theories of war.

Many historians have written about the studies of Timur Lenk and Anatolia during the Ottoman period, either historians from Indonesia or from another countries. The historical writings about Timur Lenk which have been written in various aspects can be found in the book of Stier (Stier, 1998) and (Lamb, 1929). Journal articles and theses which discussed about Timur Lenk can be found in the work of (Siregar, 2017), (U. Hasanah, 2022) and (Masdani, 2010). The historical writings that specifically discuss about Anaytolia as an region of Ottoman Empire can be found from (Ash-Shalabi, 2003; Faroqhi, 2009; Muvid, 2022) of the many studies that have been conducted, the element of novelty that will be presented in this study is the use of the analysis of war theory studies through Sun Tzu’s art of war book. The use of war theory in this study is something different from previous research, for example, the work of (A. N. Hasanah, 2018; Masdani, 2010) who used the theory of power. This study is presented in a concise manner in a scientific journal article that has a spatial and temporal scope that has not been previously addressed by other authors. Additionally, the results of employing the literature method in this study are anticipated to elucidate the underlying factors contributing to the pervasiveness of conflict in Central Asia. Consequently, the research project entitled Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion in Anatolia in 1402-1403 AD is anticipated to be a valuable addition to the corpus of Central Asian historical literature, both within Indonesia and internationally.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research is written using the library research method, which is a form of literature study. The sources used in this research consist of textual sources. Literature study is a study of written sources in the form of manuscripts, books, and journal (Madjid & Wahyudhi, 2014). The used books include Timur Lenk: The Life of the Great Amir by Ahmad Ibn Arabshah (1389-1450), translated by J.H. Sanders in 1936, and the Diary of Clavijo Embassy to Timur Lenk by Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo (1403-1406), translated by Guy Lestrange in 1928. The following books were consulted: Trajectories of State Formation across Fifteenth-Century Islamic West-Asia (Steenbergen, 2020), Timur Lenk The Ultimate Warrior (Stier, 1998), and The Ottoman Empire A Short Story (Faroqhi, 2009). The article entitled Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion in Anatolia in 1402-1403 AD employs the descriptive narrative historiography method, which is historical writing in the form of narration without the use of historical theory and methodology. The author presents the events of the process in a chronological order (Madjid & Wahyudhi, 2014).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Anatolia on the beginning of 1402 Before Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion

Anatolia, in 1402, was an area controlled by the Ottoman Turks. Sultan Bayazid I, was the Sultan who ruled the region since 1389 AD (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). Sultan Bayazid I was known as Yildirim, which translates as "lightning," due to his reputation for swift and decisive action against his opponents (Munzir & Artianasari, 2023). Sultan Bayazid I was, according to some scholars, the first Ottoman Turkish ruler to use the title sultan ("sovereign," a ruler with supreme authority), who expanded the Ottoman Turks to control most of southeastern Europe and Asia Minor as far as the Danube and Euphrates rivers. Upon hearing the news of these remarkable Ottoman conquests, the Europeans organized a crusade to stop the Ottoman advance, but were defeated in 1396 in a battle called the Battle of Nicopolis (Agoston & Masters, 2009). Following the victory of Bayazid I over the 1396 alliance of crusader states, led by Sigismund, King of Hungary, and Pope Boniface IX, Bayazid I styled himself the "Roman Sultan." This was due to his inheritance of the Saljuk rule and
his subsequent control of Anatolia. The title was also confirmed by the recognition of the Abbasid Caliph, who was then in Cairo (Ash-Shalabi, 2003).

Bayazid I was considered the sole ally of the Mamluk Sultanate, which overshadowed the Abbasid Caliphate in preventing Timur Lenk’s invasion of the Timurid Empire based in Samarkand. After Bayazid’s victory over the Crusader alliance led by Sigismund, King of Hungary, a positive response came from the Islamic world. The Muslims rejoiced at Bayazid’s victory and moved to Anatolia in droves to serve the Ottoman Turkish government (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). After defeating the Crusader alliance at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396, Bayazid I built a vassal kingdom across Rumelia and Anatolia that was the equivalent of the Mamluk sultanate in Cairo. But in the end, Bayazid failed to capitalize on his success. Knowing that the Byzantine emperor was the architect of the Crusade, Bayazid blockaded Constantinople, but his siege weapons were ineffective (Clarke, 1664). Sultan Bayazid I made the conquest of Constantinople the main goal of his jihad program. This is evidenced by the fact that before the Ottoman Turks’ victory in the Nicopolis War, Bayazid was able to put political pressure on the Byzantines and besiege the city of Constantinople. The effects of political pressure and the siege of Constantinople by Bayazid resulted in several benefits for the Muslims, including the establishment of a Qadhi institution in Constantinople, the establishment of an Islamic court, the construction of mosques and 700 special houses for Muslims in the city, as well as an increase in the tribute to be paid to the Ottoman Turks, which was particularly beneficial to the Ottoman Turkish state (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). Although the Ottoman Turks had conquered much of Anatolia. In addition to taking control of the Balkans, Bayazid I kept Constantinople as the main focus of conquest (Arabshah, n.d.).

Ibn Arabshah, in his notes offers the following description of Sultan Bayazid:

Bayazid was so eager to engage in combat and to act with bravery that he could not restrain himself. He was a just ruler, pious, and courageous in defending religion. Once he had initiated an action, he would not cease until he had brought it to a successful conclusion. Due to his justice, he enjoyed good fortune and his power increased within the country. He had conquered the entire kingdom of Karaman and killed its king,
Sultan Ala-uddin, who also took his two sons as prisoners. He had also conquered the kingdoms of Mantasha and Sarukhan. However, Amir Jacob, the son of Alishah, the Governor of Karaman province, defected to the Timur Lenk. Furthermore, he had successfully expanded his dominion to encompass the entirety of the Christian territories, extending from the Balkan Mountains to the kingdom of Erzinjan (Arabshah, n.d.).

In this note, Bayazid was described as a just, pious, and brave Sultan. He was presented as a defender of Islam who was consistently consistent with his words until they were realized. The conqueror of Anatolia, he achieved many glorious victories. The record contains information about the areas conquered by Bayazid I, namely the Kingdom of Karaman, the Kingdoms of Mantasha and Sarukhan, and all Christian territories from the border of the Balkan Mountains to the kingdom of Erzinjan. The article also contains information regarding the rulers of the territories that Bayazid had conquered who subsequently defected to Timur Lenk. It should be noted that at the time of Bayazid’s rule, the Ottoman Turkish territory extended from Rumelia (the area of the Balkan countries) to Anatolia, also known as Asia Minor. However, at the time of Bayazid, the Byzantine Empire had not been completely conquered.

The Cause of Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion in Anatolia

Timur Lenk was regarded as the most significant Asian conqueror in history. Despite his humble origins as the son of a minor chieftain, he was renowned for his courage, wisdom, generosity, experience, and determination. These qualities, when combined, made him an exceptional leader of men and a revered figure in the realm of warfare (Marozzi, 2004). Timur Lenk, like his predecessors among the Mongol leaders, came to power in a confederation of unruly tribes whose loyalty could only be maintained through conquest (Manz, 1999). Timur Lenk was also the inheritor of a political, economic, and cultural legacy that was deeply rooted in the pastoral societies and nomadic traditions of Central Asia. He and his associates were responsible for the development of the military arts and disciplines that were later adopted by Genghis Khan.

The Timurid state was an empire built by Timur Lenk, who was the leader of a group of nomads from the steppes of Central Asia. The steppe people were mostly pastoralists and lived by raising horses and sheep. They were also organized into clans and tribes, sometimes forming large confederations. On the other hand, there were sedentary communities living mainly in the oasis regions of Transoxania, Kharizm, Farghana, and Kashgar, and in cities scattered along the trade routes between China, the Middle East, and Europe. In order to compete for a decent living space, the natural conditions of the steppes required herding communities to conquer agricultural oases and become rulers and landlords. The constant tension between pastoral society and steppe agriculture created the character of nomadic conquerors. Repeated nomadic conquests created kingdoms in the oases and settled populations (Lapidus, 2012).

Timur Lenk’s military organization was based on the system developed by Genghis Khan, and even included envoys who played important roles in Mongol wars. Timur also had a highly developed postal system using pigeons. However, there have been changes compared to the previous century. Troops from the settlements now played a more important role, and sophisticated Islamic administrative traditions, techniques, and fortifications were added to the old Mongol military tradition. The majority of military terms remained in their Mongolian forms, including ming bashi (leader of a thousand), yuz bashi (leader of a hundred), and on bashi (leader of ten). However, there were also instances of Arabic-derived military ranks, such as amir or senior officer. Other officers were designated with the Persian title sardar, while troops or bands were referred to as ordu, corps were designated as fajj, small units were designated as gehun, and auxiliary troops or lightly equipped raiding forces were designated as harsha. Support troops, such as infantry, engineers, pioneers, and regional gendarmerie police forces, exhibited a similar organizational structure. Additional details of the Eastern military system included the Three Circles emblem, which appeared on seals, coins, palaces, and perhaps some banners (Nicolle & Hook, 1998).
Like many other nomadic leaders, Timur Lenk did not establish a highly structured government. Instead, he preferred to exercise personal rule over his own followers and to exercise relatively loose control over settled territories. Timur Lenk was interested in controlling and stationing troops in the largest cities, collecting and organizing taxes through the use of bureaucrats from his settled areas, and using soldiers from those areas in later campaigns. Local rulers from the territories that Timur Lenk had conquered were able to retain their authority, which in turn encouraged them to utilize that power to rise up against Timur Lenk’s rule. However, the rebellions that did occur were easily quelled. With the large army that Timur Lenk desired to maintain, it was possible to conquer the same territory twice and collect two fines as punishment for rebellious territories. The maintenance and exercise of power entailed a constant and assiduous effort, both military and political. Consequently, Timur Lenk and his army were compelled to remain perpetually vigilant (Manz, 1999).

Timur Lenk implemented the Uymaq system, or family state, which was one of the inherited leadership structures used in Turko-Mongolian society. Uymaq was elite military formations organized as a large household under the leadership of a chief. The chief was supported by his family and other lesser chiefs and followers whose support was gained through complex negotiations and/or success in war. The uymaq chief used his military support to collect taxes from townspeople and peasants, essentially establishing a local territorial government, usually based in a fortress. A uymaq chief’s power could be enhanced by royal appointment to a position that gave him the right to run errands and oversee the bureaucracy. However, umyaqs were generally unstable because they depended on the personal skills of leaders and semi-independent warriors, clans, and subordinate groups who constantly calculated their relative advantages, fiercely competed for leadership, and often rebelled against the dominance of the great leaders. The authority of an Uymaq ruler was always challenged by lesser chieftains. The competition among all these groups made the Uymaq extremely volatile (Ira. M. Lapidus, 1999).

Timur Lenk’s Timurid dynasty was supported by Muslims because Timur Lenk paid great attention to the spread of Islam. For his devotion to the spread of Islam, it is not surprising that Timur Lenk received the support of the ulama, Shaykh al-Islam, and influential tariqah leaders. As a manifestation of this support, they participated in Timur Lenk’s government (Masdani, 2010). The reign of Timur Lenk (1370-1405), a Central Asian ruler of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, was a kind of matrix moment in the history of the great political elites of Islam in West Asia, and even more so in the fifteenth century. Timur Lenk is remembered primarily for his achievements in conquest, plunder, and terrible devastation on a Eurasian scale. Timur Lenk also stands out for his unique level of personal empowerment, cultural efflorescence, and successful state-building in a Mongol, Turkic, and Muslim context (Steenbergen, 2020).

Timur Lenk required a means of expressing his position as ruler of a vast and newly acquired territory that transcended the limitations of his formal legitimacy. He achieved this by developing a personal myth that drew upon historical precedent, portraying him as a traditional nomadic conqueror and dynasty founder, particularly Genghis Khan. Among the Steppe peoples, tradition favored the legitimization of personal power, stigmatizing the self-reliant human being and viewing a successful career of conquest and rule as evidence of God’s favor. A successful conqueror was regarded as the possessor of unique good fortune, and to reject such a person was to oppose God’s will. Consequently, anyone who rejected Timur Lenk as ruler was considered to be rejecting God’s will. Some aspects of this ideology coincide with Iranian and Islamic ideas. Both the Qur’anic idea that military and political success can prove God’s favor and the Iranian idea of charismatic royal favor had been exploited by previous rulers in the Middle East. Consequently, the East was able to adapt these ideas to its circumstances and utilize them to challenge the limitations of its official legitimacy (Manz, 1999).

In the beginning of Timur Lenk’s era, his army consisted almost entirely of nomadic Turkic and Mongol horse archers, who remained Timur Lenk’s power base throughout his reign. Even though they were mostly nomadic tribes, this did not prevent the army from being highly organized, superbly equipped, and, at least in later years, uniformed in a very modern style (Nicolle
& Hook, 1998). The elite units, including Timur Lenk's own bodyguards, were drawn from forty Mongolian Chagatai tribes and were not of Turkish origin. The Uymaq officer corps was recruited from the same source. Each tribe provided an agreed number of men according to its size. Among them were men who had not even fully converted to Islam, infidels, perhaps even witch doctors. Prominent soldiers were rewarded with promotions or the title of tarkhau. This distinction exempted a soldier from taxation, gave him the right to keep all the spoils he won in subsequent campaigns, and made him liable to prosecution only after the ninth time he committed a crime. He also enjoyed access to royal audiences without prior permission. The Tarkhau formed a kind of knightly order, which their descendants inherited for seven generations. The widows of men who died while performing honorable deeds also received favors that should have gone to their husbands (Nicolle & Hook, 1998).

In recruiting soldiers to support his invasion, Timur Lenk is strongly suspected of using the remnants of the Ilkhanate (Hulagu's Khanate) forces that still existed in the Middle East. In some cases, however, it seems that Timur Lenk simply forced the peasants along his route to be used temporarily, either for fighting or other work, as well as using simple conscription of the local population in the areas he conquered. One example is the recruitment of infantry from Rayy, Qum, Kashan, Isfahan, and Qumis to put down a rebellion in 806 AH/1403 CE. On the other hand, it was clear that not all of Timur Lenk's infantry consisted of peasants recruited for short-term service, as evidenced by the fact that Khorasan infantrymen were used in Timur Lenk's campaigns in India at considerable distances from their places of origin (Manz, 1999). Timur Lenk's army also consisted of remnants of defeated enemies as well as more exotic recruits, such as the Bavarian squire Schiltberger, who was captured by the Ottoman Turks at Nicopolis and then by Timur at Ankara and served Timur Lenk loyally before fleeing back to Europe. The army that invaded Anatolia in Timur Lenk's last major campaign was largely mixed, including men from Central Asia, Transoxiana, India, and Iran, not to mention allies from eastern Anatolia (Nicolle & Hook, 1998).

The ideology of the Timurid Empire necessitated territorial expansion. However, there was a period during which the Timurid Empire ceased its military operations. The establishment of a conditional peace agreement between the empire and the region with which it was in conflict was one of the reasons for the cessation of hostilities. In 1372, a peace treaty was negotiated between the Timurid Empire and the Sufi dynasty of Khwarezmian, just as Timur Lenk was preparing to conquer the city of Kat. The terms of the treaty between Timur Lenk and the Sufi Dynasty of Khwarezmian included the betrothal of Khan-Zada's daughter to Timur Lenk's son Jahangir, symbolizing the dynasty's submission to Timur Lenk (Marozzi, 2004).

Timur Lenk's politics of conquest not only enabled the rise to power of his family and entourage as a new trans-regional elite in Islamic West Asia, but also led to new or renewed empowerment of various local and regional elites, particularly those from Turkmen nomadic backgrounds. In this manner, Timur Lenk's political actions validated and reinforced the phenomenon of “eastward reflux,” whereby Turkic-Mongol leaders were compelled to pursue expansion in the eastward direction following the Mongolian westward expansion in Asia. This pivotal moment in West Asian history actually brought to power an entirely new, trans-regional, mobile power elite in Transoxiana, Khurasan, and Iran. This new elite consisted of two distinct groups. On the one hand were the many descendants of Timur Lenk who grew into a new dynasty of Turkish-Mongol empire known as the Timurid. On the other, there were the military leaders of the Timurid forces, who were of various Turkic-Mongol Chagatai origins (Steenbergen, 2020). The Timurid Empire, led by Timur Lenk, was centered in Samarkand. Those who observed Timur Lenk’s army describe it as a vast conglomeration comprising various nomadic and sedentary tribes, Muslims and Christians, Turks, Tajiks, Arabs, Georgians, and Indians. Timur Lenk conquered extensive territories with diverse populations and resources and rapidly mastered and optimized their utilization (Manz, 1999).

In order to expand his territory, Timur Lenk claimed control over the entire Amirs of Anatolia because he was a descendant of Genghis Khan, this claim was based on the historical fact that the Ilkhanate (Khanate of Hulagu Khan who was one of Genghis Khan’s descendants) had ruled
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Asia Minor in the second half of the 13th century (Agoston & Masters, 2009). Bayazid, on the other hand, considered himself the heir to the Seljuk Turks, the rulers of Anatolia and had been confirmed by the Abbasid Caliph as Emperor of the Romans (Ash-shalabi, 2012). From his capital in Samarkand, Timurid armies, dominated by the skilled Chaghatai cavalry archers, invaded the Golden Horde’s territories in southern Russia, northern India, Persia, Syria, and eastern Anatolia. When Bayazid extended his rule to eastern Anatolia in the late 1390s, a clash between the two rulers was inevitable (Agoston & Masters, 2009).

According from the previous discussion, it is known that the background of Timur Lenk’s expansion into Anatolia was based on his claim as the heir of Genghis Khan who had the right to lead and control the former Ilkhanate region. Timur Lenk’s motive in expanding into Anatolia was classified as the motive for claiming ancestral territory. Timur Lenk’s claim received a serious challenge from the Bayazid I Expansion movement which also occurred in Anatolia. Ibn Arabshah in his notes, in chapter XVIII, explains the contents of Timur Lenk’s letter to Bayazid I. The background to the writing of this letter is the behavior of Sultan Ahmad, the ruler of Jalayrid, and Qara Yusuf, the ruler of the Qara Qoyunlu dynasty, who defected from Timur Lenk to the protection of the Ottoman Turks. Timur Lenk, who recognized Bayazid I as the ruler of Rum, sent an intimidating letter to Bayazid asking him to arrest Sultan Ahmad and Qara Yusuf and send them back to Timur Lenk. The translated letter of Timur Lenk to Bayazid I is as follows;

Both have fled from the might of their swords and that they are the cause of calamity and the destruction of cities and the ruin of men and the harbinger of evil and bad fortune, and are worthy of Pharaoh and Haman in pride and arrogance; and that if Pharaoh and Haman and their armies go forth and bring themselves and their men to your sanctuary, wherever they come, bringing destruction and disaster, yet they will not, like these two, suffer harm under the protection of the Lord of Rum. But beware of receiving them and rather drive them out, arrest them, put them in prison and kill them, wherever you find them; and do not resist our command, for the whole force of the power we have grasped will fall on you. You have also heard the fate of our enemies and the examples shown in their cases and what befell them from us when they tried to resist and oppose and it is clear to you how we dealt with them. And you do not need much talk between us and you, let alone wars and battles, when we have given you clear arguments, and have set examples before you (Ibn Arabshah, 1936).

Timur Lenk wrote this letter as a form of threat and intimidation designed to cause fear and panic. In Ibn Arabshah’s account, Bayazid is described as being furious after reading the letter, overwhelmed with rage and anger. Bayazid wrote back to Timur Lenk, showing his greatness while at the same time showing his status as a servant of Allah, however the writing of this reply was more clearly dominated by Bayazid’s personal anger. In the end, Bayazid and Timur Lenk agreed to go to war (Arabshah, n.d.).

In summary, there were several factors behind the battle between Timur Lenk and Bayazid I. The first was that the regional leaders in Iraq, whose lands were under Timur Lenk’s rule, asked Bayazid for protection. Conversely, the regional rulers in Asia Minor asked Timur Lenk for protection. The two parties seeking protection eventually brought the forces of Bayazid and Timur Lenk into conflict. The second factor was that the Christian countries of Europe provoked Timur Lenk to attack, crush, and defeat Bayazid’s government. The third factor was the burning letters from both sides. In one of the letters that Timur Lenk sent to Bayazid, he expressed his scathing contempt for Bayazid when he questioned the obscurity of Bayazid’s lineage. He offered Bayazid forgiveness for claiming that the Ottomans were dedicated to the cause of Islam. He ended his letter by belittling Bayazid’s position. Bayazid, on the other hand, openly stated that he was ready to fight Timur Lenk, who had ambitions to usurp his sultanate. The final factor was that both leaders, Timur Lenk and Bayazid, were trying to expand their territories (Ash-Shalabi, 2003).

The preceding factors provide the context for the war between Timur Lenk and Bayazid. Bayazid, recognizing the threat posed by Timur Lenk, decided to suspend the siege of
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Constantinople and immediately mobilize an army to confront Timur Lenk (Knolles, 1603). On the way to the battle, Timur Lenk, who understood the geographical conditions of Bayazid’s territory, led a military campaign through the Taurus Mountains. Timur Lenk used the city of Caesarea as a rallying point to replenish food supplies for his troops (Stier, 1998). The climax of the battle between Timur Lenk and Bayazid took place near Ankara on July 20, 1402 (Agoston & Masters, 2009). In the lunar calendar, the battle of Ankara took place on 27 Dhul Hijjah in 804 AH, in detail Ibn Arabshah explained that the battle took place about a mile from the city of Ankara (Ibn Arabshah, 1936). Before the war started, Timur Lenk’s secret agents were sent to the Ottoman camp and urged the many soldiers of the Tartar race serving in the Ottoman camp that they should not fight against Timur Lenk, who was the real leader of all the Tartar soldiers (Lamb, 1929). What the Timur Lenk’s secret agents tried succeeded. This was confirmed by Ibn Arabshah’s note;

However, when the armies approached each other and the wild beasts raged, the plains and deserts were filled with them, and when the left wing attacked the right wing and the right wing attacked the left wing, the Tatras withdrew from Ibn Uthman’s army and joined the army of the Timurid... (Arabshah, n.d.).

Ibn Arabshah explained that the Tatras retreated from Ibn Uthman’s (Bayazid I) army and joined Timur Lenk’s army. This was the result of the hard work of Timur Lenk’s secret agents. Sun Tzu in his theory of the use of spies explains, “The wise ruler or skillful general should choose the most intelligent person to act as a spy and he will accomplish great things. This is a necessity of war, and the army depends on his actions.” (Kardjo, 2017). Timur Lenk’s deployment of secret agents showed Timur’s intelligence as a ruler who understood very well that the deployment of secret agents was a necessity of war. Timur Lenk’s move to use spies was unknown to Bayazid.

Bayazid advanced with about 120,000 men against Timur Lenk’s far superior army stationed near Sivas. Bayazid’s army consisted of Janissaries, mamluk troops and help from Christian soldiers brought by his adjutants from Serbia, and elsewhere in Europe (Clarke, 1664). Timur Lenk brought 400,000 men in this battle (Stier, 1998). Timur Lenk maneuvered in such a way as to ensure that the battle should take place in territory favorable to his cavalry and where he could make the most of his numerical advantage. By marching through Kaisyraiah and Kirschehr, he avoided Bayazid who was driving his army away into the highlands. Timur Lenk and his army finally reached the city and plains of Ankara. As he expected, Bayazid rushed to Ankara’s rescue. Despite the sheer number of Bayazid’s troops, the Mongol ruler took every military precaution (Lamb, 1929).

Bayazid seems to have lost all of his former majesty due to his failed war strategy. As can be explained, Bayazid first camped to the north of the Timurid position, and then, to show contempt for his enemy, he led his entire army to the high ground in the neighbourhood. Unfortunately, there was no water in the area where Bayazid made his last chase. Five thousand Ottoman soldiers died of thirst and exhaustion. After this act of folly, Bayazid moved back towards his enemy, only to find that the camp he had left behind was now occupied by the Tatars, and the only stream of water accessible to the Ottoman army had been taken over by order of Timur Lenk (Lamb, 1928). Sun Tzu in his theory of manoeuvre explains, “...A general must know the terrain thoroughly—mountains and forests, halts and stalemates, swamps and peat before marching his troops through it. He should use local knowledge to take advantage of the natural elements. (Kardjo, 2017). Timur Lenk’s maneuvers were carried out after understanding the battlefield with Bayazid. By understanding the natural conditions of the battlefield and organizing the combat troops properly, victory was a certainty.

Johann Schiltberger, an Austrian who was captured by Bayazid and then by Timur Lenk, stated that " Timur Lenk with his thirty-two elephants had isolated Bayazid on the side of a mountain...". Bayazid suffered far more casualties than Timur Lenk (Stier, 1998). Bayazid had to accept defeat that day, and became Timur Lenk’s prisoner of war. The Ottoman defeat was caused by Sultan Bayazid’s negligence in organizing the strategy of attacking Timur Lenk. He did not think seriously about strengthening his military ranks and did not prepare adequate forces to attack Timur Lenk. This was because Sultan Bayazid was lulled by his previous victories in Anatolia (A. N. Hasanah, 2018). The analysis of Bayazid’s defeat, when seen from Timur Lenk’s point of view, is
because Bayazid was too negligent by not properly defending the military camp close to the water source which was the basic need of his troops. Bayazid’s strategy tended to burden his own soldiers. Meanwhile, Timur Lenk, who had deployed secret agents and understood the characteristics of the battlefield, managed to take military precautions, so that victory could be achieved. The steps taken by Timur Lenk are a series of combat arts described by Sun Tzu in his book entitled The Art of War.

Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, who was Henry III of Castile’s ambassador to Timur Lenk’s court, described Timur Lenk as a warlord who won many battles, his description of Timur at the battle of Ankara is as follows:

...Once again, he invaded and destroyed various other countries. trials and kingdoms, gained many battles and the results of many conquests until finally he came up against the Turkish Sultan Bayazid nicknamed Ilderim (The Thunderbolt) who was one of the greatest and the possessor of a powerful sovereignty that the world had ever seen. In the Turkish lands he ruled Timur took him to battle near a certain castle and city called Angora. In that battle Timur conquered by taking Turkey prisoner of the Sultan, he and one of his sons... (Clavijo, 2004).

Ruy De Clavijo narrated Bayazid as one of the greatest conquerors the world has ever seen. However, Bayazid as the conqueror and ruler of Turkey had to spend the rest of his life as a prisoner of Timur Lenk, due to his defeat at the battle of Angora (the old name of Ankara) (Clavijo, 2004).

The Battle of Ankara was the most significant battle that affected most of the European population. The kings of Europe all looked to the Timur Lenk for deflecting the Ottoman Turks’ powerful ambitions. Each sent letters of thanks and peace, the latter considering turning thoughts of conquest in their direction. Timur Lenk was busy with plans in the other direction (Stier, 1998). Henry IV from England wrote to Timur Lenk to congratulate him on his victory. Charles VI, King of France, called a bishop to meet, then entrusted him with letters and gifts for Timur Lenk. The wandering Byzantine Emperor Manuel II hastened back to his city, Constantinople, with joy, and from there he sent shipments and offers to pay tribute to Timurid. The poor Emperor’s heir had found a greater patron than any European monarch. Across the Golden Horn, the Genoese flew the banner of Timurid from the tower of Pera (Lamb, 1929). Timur Lenk’s victory over Bayazid at the battle of Ankara marked a delay in the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, at least for the next 51 years. This was because Bayazid’s siege of Constantinople before the battle of Ankara had to end with his defeat at the battle of Ankara in 1402 (Ash-Shalabi, 2003).

**Timur Lenk’s Military Invasion in Anatolia**

Timur Lenk’s victory over Bayazid I, marking the era of cessation of Ottoman Turkish territorial expansion (Muvid, 2022). After defeating Bayazid’s army, Timur Lenk went on to conquer Aznq, Bursa and other cities and fortresses. Then he attacked the borders of Izmir and was able to defeat the Rhodesian horse troops. These attacks were carried out by Timur Lenk to clear his image in the eyes of the Muslims. After Timur Lenk defeated the Ottoman forces, he was criticized by many muslim figures. Because the Ottoman Turks had served the Muslims and protected them from the invasion of European Christians. The purpose of all this was to make it appear that what he is doing is Jihad Fi Sabilillah too. In fact, he also attacked Christian territories and defeated Pope John’s Rhodesian army (Ash-Shallabi, 2021). Timur Lenk did not stay in Anatolia for long. After conquering Izmir in 1403, which was still controlled by the Crusaders, he returned to Central Asia (Faroqhi, 2009). Timur Lenk’s conquest of Izmir was recorded by Ibn Arabshah as follows:

Then he laid siege to the fortress of Izmir, which was a fortress in the middle of the sea. ...a fortress that jutted out into the sea and because of the difficulty of storming it and its strong defenses could burn the heart of any man who wanted to storm it, with a castle in the mountains too inaccessible and remote to be conquered by horse and foot. But arranging affairs well to besiege it, he took it on the fourth day of the week, the 10th day of the second month of Jumada in 805, the 6th day of the first month of the Canon according to the Rum calendar; and he killed the grown men and bound the women
and children, and from the bodies of those slain built mosques and from the skulls built minarets; then he plundered the riches of the fortress and took away its treasures, emptied it, destroyed it, and plundered it and consumed all its silver and gold and made the wings of glad tidings fly with these exploits, which he thought he was sending through the world with good omens and rapid dissemination (Arabshah, n.d.).

From these records, it can be seen that the Eastern conquest of Izmir was carried out on the 10th of Jumadil Akhir in 805 AH, or when converted to the Gregorian calendar, January 13, 1403 AD. The condition of Izmir at that time was devastating. The impact of casualties can be seen from the many lives lost, both men and women, adults and children. Timur even made a tower out of the skulls of Izmir’s victims (Arabshah, n.d.). Timur Lenk plundered the treasury of Izmir, and both the gold and silver of the city were plundered by Timur Lenk’s troops. Sun Tzu in his theory of war explains, “…Supplying troops from afar is a sure way to empty the treasury and impoverish the population...” (Kardjo, 2017). Timur Lenk’s looting was a necessary step to replenish the depleted treasury and to prosper the people of the Timurid. The economic impact of this invasion was the depletion of the treasury of the city plundered by Timur Lenk.

After the destruction of Azniq, Bursa and Izmir, Timur Lenk managed to establish his influence in Anatolia. Timur Lenk left Anatolia in 1403, without leaving a permanent administrative system there (Manz, 1999). Timur Lenk quickly left Anatolia for Samarkand, to prepare an invasion plan for China (Siregar, 2017). Although he only stayed in Anatolia until 1403, the impact of Timur Lenk’s military invasion could still be felt after that year. The political impact of Timur Lenk’s military invasion can be seen in the way Timur Lenk removed Bayazid’s influence in Anatolia. Timur Lenk implemented a policy to return the rulers in Anatolia to their original positions. With this policy, the countries regained their independence after previously being under Bayazid’s rule (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). For example, the rulers who were restored to their former positions were Isfandiyar and Emperor Manuel of Trebzon (Clavijo, 2004). Furthermore, after defeating Bayazid’s army and leaving the Ottoman government in ruins. Timur Lenk tried to weaken the sultanate by creating political conflicts between Bayazid’s sons. Timur Lenk divided the Ottoman Turkish state among Bayazid’s sons. After the division, the Anatolian region had its seat of government in Bursa, while the Rumelia region had its seat of government in Edirne. This division was comparable to the settlement imposed by the Mongol Baiju Noyon on the sultanate of Konya in 1243. In the middle of his journey to China, precisely in the Otrar area, Timur Lenk suffered from illness which eventually became the cause of his death. Timur Lenk died in 1405 AD, at the age of 71. His body was taken to Samarkand to be buried there (Siregar, 2017).

It should be noted that Sultan Bayazid had five sons, all of whom were involved in every battle. His son Mushtafa, according to the Turks at the time, was killed in battle (Clarke, 1664).
Musa was taken prisoner with Bayazid in Timur Lenk’s prison in Samarkand. The other three sons survived and were on the run. Bayazid’s eldest son, Sulaiman, escaped to Adrianople (Edirne). There Sulaiman declared himself Sultan. His son Isa went to Bursa and announced to the people that he was to succeed his father. Muhammad, Bayazid’s youngest son, with some soldiers, withdrew to Amasia in northeast Asia Minor. When the conflict between Bayazid’s sons became fierce, Timur Lenk, who enjoyed the conflict immensely, deliberately released Musa, another son of Bayazid, who had been detained with his father. Of course, the conflict between the heirs to the throne became even more fierce. This conflict lasted for 10 years (806-816 AH/1403-1413 CE) (Ash-Shalabi, 2003). Thus, the son of Bayazid who held power in Anatolia was Isa with the center of government in Bursa, while Sulaiman, held power in Rumelia, which was the name of the Balkan region when it was under Ottoman Turkish control. According to Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, Isa was no longer ruling in Bursa in September 1403, as he passed away (Clavijo, 2004).

CONCLUSION

Timur Lenk’s victories in each of his military campaigns demonstrate the human qualities of nomadic conquerors formed from the harsh steppe environment of Central Asia. The rough steppe environment necessitated a high intensity of conflict in order to survive. Timur Lenk’s military invasion of Anatolia was driven by his claim to be the rightful ruler of all the Amirs of Anatolia because he was a descendant of Genghis Khan. This claim was based on the past condition of the Anatolian region, which was the former Ilkhanate region (the area governed by Hulagu Khan). The other side, Bayazid, considered himself the heir to the Seljuk Turks, the rulers of Anatolia and had been confirmed by the Abbasid Caliph as Roman Sultan. A clash between the two rulers was inevitable. The culmination of this confrontation was the battle of Ankara, July 20, 1402. After defeating Bayazid’s army and taking him as prisoner, Timur Lenk moved into western Anatolia to destroy its cities. Timur Lenk’s invasion resulted in heavy casualties, as many of the town’s inhabitants were massacred by Timur Lenk. The economic impact of Timur Lenk’s invasion was the depletion of the treasuries of cities that were destroyed and looted, such as Izmir. The political impact of Timur Lenk’s invasion of Anatolia can be seen through Timur Lenk’s policy of returning the rulers of Asia Minor to their former positions, and creating political conflicts between Bayazid’s sons. Timur Lenk pitted Bayazid’s sons against each other for power. Timur Lenk’s victory was a combination of the nomadic ruler’s brutal characteristics in war, with the application of high discipline in war using the legacy of Genghis Khan’s military system. The uymaq system that Timur Lenk applied to the conquered regions was one of the factors that led to the outbreak of conflicts in Central Asia, such as in Afghanistan, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.

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