

**BEMO REJUVENATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN JAKARTA 1995-1997****Aqila Zahra\*, Eka Yudha Wibowo**

Universitas Negeri Semarang, Indonesia

**Abstract**

This article examines the renewal policy of bemo in DKI Jakarta during 1995-1997 and its social impacts on bemo drivers and owners. It addresses two questions: how the policy was implemented and what economic, administrative, operational and social problems emerged during the transition from bemo to *Angkutan Pengganti Bemo* (APB). This study employs the historical method, consisting of heuristics, source criticism, interpretation and historiography. Primary sources consist of newspaper archives between 1995 and 1997 and photographic archives from the National Library of Indonesia, supplemented by books, theses and scholarly articles. The findings show that the policy was implemented through the replacement of registered bemo with four wheeled vehicles and the regulation APB routes. Its implementations, however, faced low compensation for old vehicles, costly down payments and installments, incomplete vehicle documents, delayed route permits, organizational levies and route conflicts. Consequently, the policy only partially replaced the old fleet and placed small scale drivers and owners in a more vulnerable economic position. The study concludes that transport modernization was not merely a technical policy but also reshaped the livelihoods of informal transport actors.

Keywords: Bemo; Transportation renewal; Social conflict; Jakarta.

**INTRODUCTION**

Urban transportation plays an important role in supporting community mobility and urban economic activities. In Jakarta, the development of transportation cannot be separated from social change and urban planning policies. Before bemo emerged, becak had already served as a means of transportation for urban residents since the 1930s because of its ability to reach residential areas at low cost (Tundjung, 2018). However, during the administration of Governor Ali Sadikin, becak began to be restricted because it was considered incompatible with the image of a modern city and was seen as contributing to traffic problems (Firdaus & Witasari, 2023). Within this context, bemo later developed as a form of neighborhood transport that supported urban mobility, particularly in densely populated residential areas. Bemo began to be used in Indonesia in the early 1960s, partly in connection with the Fourth Asian Games in 1962 and Ganefo in 1963 in Jakarta (Satria & Kurniawan, 2023). The vehicle subsequently developed from freight transport into passenger transport and became an important means of mobility for lower income urban residents.

As Jakarta developed into a metropolitan city, the presence of bemo increasingly became a matter of concern. The growing number of vehicles, traffic congestion, pollution and demands for transportation planning led bemo to be regarded as no longer compatible with a modern transportation system (Kusbiantoro, 1993; Pratama et al., 2022). In many developing cities, informal transport or paratransit is often difficult to regulate from a public policy perspective. Nevertheless, it continues to provide mobility for people who depend on public transport, create employment opportunities for low skilled workers and serve areas not yet reached by formal transport services (Cervero & Golub, 2007; Pojani & Stead, 2015). During the late New Order period, urban transportation policies were also inseparable from the character of government, which tended to be top-down and strongly directed urban development (Liddle, 1985).

\*Correspondance Author: [agilazahra.0503@gmail.com](mailto:agilazahra.0503@gmail.com)

Article History | Submitted: 2 June 2026 | Revised: 25 June 2026 | Accepted: 5 July 2026 | Publish: 16 July 2026

HOW TO CITE (APA 6<sup>th</sup> Edition):

Zahra, Aqila., Wibowo, Eka Yudha. (2026). Bemo Rejuvenation and Social Conflict in Jakarta 1995-1997. *Juspi: Jurnal Sejarah Peradaban Islam*. 10(1), page.222-232

DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.30829/juspi.v10i1.29972>

The Jakarta Provincial Government subsequently implemented a bemo renewal policy which, according to contemporary news reports, was associated with Governor's Decree No. 33 of 1996. The policy was intended to gradually phase out bemo and replace them with *Angkutan Pengganti Bemo* or APB (Media Indonesia, 1997). However, the renewal policy was not merely concern with replacing three-wheeled vehicles with four-wheeled ones. Its implementation also generated financing problems related to down payments and vehicle installments, incomplete vehicle documentation, delays in route permits and tensions among bemo owners who depended on neighborhood transport as a source of income (Suara Pembaruan, 1995b; Suara Karya, 1997b).

Previous studies on bemo and urban transportation renewal have been conducted in several cities. Augustine Wulandari examined the transition from three-wheeled bemo to mikrolet in Surabaya from 1979 to 1986, emphasizing administrative processes, the role of transport organizations, route arrangements, and the socio-economic impacts of the renewal policy (Wulandari, 2010). Mawaddah investigated the development of urban public transport in Malang, from three-wheeled bemo to mikrolet, focusing on regulatory dynamics, routes, terminals, fares, and their impacts on urban communities (Mawaddah, 2019). Meanwhile, Saputra and Wijayati discussed the transformation of transportation modes from bemo to Daihatsu vehicles in Semarang within the context of urban social history (Saputra & Wijayati, 2025). Agus Hermawan also examined the implementation of public transportation renewal policies in Malang, with emphasis on relations among actors and conflicts in public policy implementation (Hermawan, 1996).

Unlike these previous studies, this article focuses on bemo renewal in DKI Jakarta from 1995 to 1997 as part of urban transportation modernization policy during the late New Order period. The novelty of this article lies in its effort to position bemo renewal not merely as a change in transportation mode, but as an urban development policy that generated economic, administrative, operational, and social conflicts among the government, Organda (*Organisasi Angkutan Darat*), cooperatives, financial institutions, drivers, bemo owners, and other transport actors. This article addresses two main questions: how was the bemo renewal policy implemented in DKI Jakarta from 1995 to 1997, and what problems and social impacts did it generate for bemo drivers and owners? The article aims to explain the implementation process of the bemo renewal policy, the reasons behind its implementation, the planned replacement vehicles, and the socio-economic problems and impacts that emerged during the transition to APB.

## RESEARCH METHOD

Historical research requires reliable historical sources to reconstruct past events. This study employs the historical method, which consists of four stages: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Kuntowijoyo, 2013). The first stage is heuristics, in which the author collected sources relevant to the research topic, including both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of newspaper archives published between 1995 and 1997 and photographic archives from the National Library of Indonesia. The newspapers consulted include Suara Pembaruan, Suara Karya, Merdeka, Republika, Media Indonesia, and The Jakarta Post. These newspaper archives contain information on the bemo renewal policy, the responses of owners and drivers, the involvement of Organda, financing issues, route conflicts, and the social impacts of replacing bemo with APB. Secondary sources include books, theses, undergraduate theses, and scholarly articles related to transportation history, urban policy, the informal sector, and urban modernization. These sources were used to support and strengthen the analysis.

After the data had been collected, source criticism was conducted to assess the authenticity and credibility of the sources (Kuntowijoyo, 2013). External criticism involved examining the identity of the sources, dates of publication, and archival provenance. Internal criticism was carried out by comparing information across reports from different newspapers in order to assess the consistency of information concerning bemo renewal, financing, administrative issues, and routes. During the interpretation stage, the data that had undergone source criticism were analyzed using Lewis A. Coser's perspective on social conflict (Coser, 1957). This perspective was used to identify differences in interests among the government, DLLAJ (*Dinas Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan*),

Organda, cooperatives, financial institutions, bemo owners, drivers, and other transport operators during the bemo renewal process. In this study, financing problems, incomplete administrative documentation, route arrangements, and delays in APB operations are understood as conditions that contributed to tensions and conflicts among transport actors. Finally, the historiography stage involved organizing the interpreted findings into a historical narrative of the implementation of bemo renewal and the social issues that accompanied it in DKI Jakarta from 1995-1997.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Bemo Renewal in DKI Jakarta 1995-1997

Before the renewal policy was introduced, bemo had been one of the neighborhood transport services operating in Jakarta since the early 1960s. This three-wheeled motor vehicle was introduced prior to the Fourth Asian Games in 1962 and later supported mobility during the GANEFO event in 1963 (Satria & Kurniawan, 2023; Istianto, 2019). Originating from Japan, bemo was initially used for transporting goods before developing into a passenger transport service. It was also expected to replace becak, which was considered less humane because it relied on human labor as its source of propulsion (Ilham, 2021). Over time, bemo became part of the informal transport sector and supported community mobility, particularly in residential areas that were not yet fully served by formal public transportation (Nugroho & Zusman, 2018).

Following the elimination of becak, bemo became increasingly relied upon as a neighborhood transport service alongside bajaj and motorcycle taxis, while also serving as a source of livelihood for drivers and vehicle owners (Suara Pembaruan, 1995a). Its relatively affordable fares and ability to reach densely populated residential areas made bemo widely used by various groups, including students and small-scale traders (Suara Karya, 1995a; Suara Karya, 1995b). However, by the mid-1990s, the existence of bemo had become increasingly questioned because some vehicles were considered unroadworthy, lacked complete vehicle documentation, and operated illegally (Suara Pembaruan, 1995a). Amid Jakarta's development as a metropolitan city, which was accompanied by an increasing number of motor vehicles, traffic congestion, and more complex spatial arrangements, bemo was increasingly seen as incompatible with the direction of urban transportation modernization (Nur et al., 2024; Pratama et al., 2022).

In 1995, discussions on bemo renewal intensified alongside growing concerns over administrative issues and fleet operational feasibility. Organda DKI stated that, of the 1,796 bemo operating in Jakarta, approximately 750 operated illegally without official vehicle documents (Suara Pembaruan, 1995a). These issues were also reflected in the enforcement against unlicensed bemo, including dozens of vehicles impounded at the DLLAJ towing pool in East Jakarta in April 1995. This condition indicates that bemo renewal was not initially directed solely toward replacing old vehicles, but also formed part of the government's effort to regulate neighborhood transport operating outside the state's administrative control. The enforcement process was subsequently carried out through coordination between Organda DKI and DLLAJ, including the apprehension of several bemo lacking complete vehicle documentation (Suara Pembaruan, 1995).



Figure 1. "Rumpun: 70 bemo operating without permits and impounded at the DLLAJR Towing Pool on Jl. Pemuda, East Jakarta

Source: National Library of Indonesia Photographic Archive (8 April 1995)

The photographic archive shows dozens of unlicensed bemo impounded at the DLLAJR Towing Pool in East Jakarta in 1995. This documentation reinforces the view that bemo renewal began with the enforcement and regulation of vehicles considered non-compliant with administrative requirements. Thus, the bemo renewal policy can be understood as part of the Jakarta Provincial Government's effort to reorganize urban transportation and reduce the presence of neighborhood transport services considered inconsistent with the direction of modern urban development.

Following the emergence of these administrative issues, the renewal concept was directed toward replacing bemo with four-wheeled vehicles. Organda proposed a scheme in which one bemo would be replaced by one minibus, while cooperatives or public transport companies were prepared to manage the routes of the replacement vehicles (Suara Pembaruan, 1995a). By mid-1995, the Jakarta Provincial Government began refining the plan after Governor Surjadi Soedirdja approved the renewal proposal submitted by the Jakarta DLLAJ (Merdeka, 1995b). Under this policy, only officially registered bemo affiliated with Organda were eligible for renewal, while unlicensed bemo were excluded from the fleet replacement program (Merdeka, 1995b).

The replacement vehicles were subsequently planned as short-distance transport services similar to KWK (*Koperasi Wahana Kalpika*), serving routes previously operated by bemo (Merdeka, 1995b). By late June 1995, Organda DKI stated that bemo would be replaced by KWK-type vehicles with an engine capacity of approximately 1,000 cc (Merdeka, 1995b). The operational pattern of the replacement vehicles was also formulated as neighborhood transport serving residential areas, with routes ranging from approximately 8 to 15 kilometers and prohibited from operating on major arterial roads (Suara Karya, 1995c). These provisions indicate that the replacement vehicles were not intended to function as Jakarta's main urban transport service, but rather as part of the reorganization of neighborhood transport within the city's transportation system.



Figure 2. "To Be Phased Out: A bemo vehicle, which the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government planned to remove from Jakarta, is seen on Jalan Matraman Raya."

Source: National Library of Indonesia Photographic Archive (5 April 1996)

This archival documentation shows a bemo on Jalan Matraman Raya in 1996, when the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government had begun to consider phasing out the bemo fleet. The archival caption reflects an effort to modernize urban transportation through the replacement of older vehicles that were considered no longer compatible with Jakarta's image as a metropolitan city.

In 1997, the implementation of the renewal program became visible through the replacement of bemo with *Angkutan Pengganti Bemo* (APB). Organda DKI Jakarta stated that more than half of the bemo fleet had been registered for the program. The APB vehicles included Suzuki, Mitsubishi, and Daihatsu models, whose sizes were adjusted to serve residential areas and narrow streets in Jakarta (Merdeka, 1997c). In its implementation, the government applied a credit scheme with a down payment of approximately 10 percent so that former bemo owners could still obtain replacement vehicles. In addition, APB routes were planned to be longer than the previous bemo routes in order to provide drivers with sufficient income to pay the vehicle installments (Merdeka, 1997).

## Problems and Conflicts in Bemo Renewal

The bemo renewal policy implemented by the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government was not fully accepted by bemo owners and drivers. Although the policy was intended to reorganize urban transportation, its implementation generated anxiety because it affected the livelihoods of lower-income groups who depended on neighborhood transport services (Suara Karya, 1995a). Several members of the DKI Jakarta Regional House of Representatives warned that the elimination of bemo should not be carried out abruptly without preparing replacement vehicles that matched the needs of the community and urban environmental conditions (Suara Karya, 1995a). These concerns became more evident during the implementation of the renewal policy in 1997, when the phasing out of bemo faced resistance from owners who considered it a threat to their livelihoods (Suara Karya, 1997b). Thus, bemo renewal was not merely a technical transportation issue, but also one closely related to the economic sustainability of bemo owners and drivers.

Economic conflict was the most prominent issue in the implementation of bemo renewal. Bemo owners in East Jakarta expressed objections because compensation for their old vehicles was offered at only approximately IDR 500,000 to IDR 1 million, while the market value of a bemo could still reach IDR 5 million per unit (Suara Pembaruan, 1995b). Similar resistance was reported by The Jakarta Post, which noted that representatives of bemo owners in East Jakarta rejected the elimination plan because they considered the pollution argument unfair, while compensation of approximately IDR 500,000 was regarded as too low compared with the market value of bemo, which could still reach IDR 6 million to IDR 7 million (The Jakarta Post, 1995). In addition, the required down payments and installments for replacement vehicles were considered too high compared with the daily income generated from bemo operations. Similar complaints appeared in Suara Karya, which reported objections from owners and drivers regarding a down payment of IDR 5 million and monthly installments of approximately IDR 700,000 for replacement vehicles (Suara Karya, 1995c). This situation did not necessarily lead all bemo owners to reject fleet improvement; rather, they demanded that the renewal scheme be made more affordable for small-scale transport operators (Suara Pembaruan, 1995b).

These economic pressures continued during the implementation of APB in 1997. Replacement vehicles such as the Suzuki Carry reportedly cost more than IDR 22 million, with installments of approximately IDR 700,000 per month for four years. For small-scale bemo owners, this credit scheme became a heavy burden because the old vehicles that were withdrawn did not always receive adequate compensation (Republika, 1997d). The burden became even more apparent when APB credit requirements through banks required bemo owners to prepare down payments of approximately IDR 4.5 million to IDR 5 million. As a result, some owners chose leasing schemes with lower down payments but riskier installment obligations (Suara Karya, 1997c). Consequently, some owners struggled to pay the down payment, several APB vehicles were repossessed due to installment arrears, and some owners were forced to sell land or personal assets to obtain replacement vehicles (Merdeka, 1997g). This situation indicates that bemo renewal created a process of economic selection, as only owners with sufficient capital were more likely to remain in the new transportation system.

The economic burden was also experienced by bemo drivers. Some drivers considered bemo operations more profitable than the replacement vehicles because maintenance and operating costs were lower. In the context of informal transport or paratransit, drivers' decisions to shift to new vehicles are strongly influenced by costs, subsidy support, and the possibility of increased income. Therefore, vehicle replacement programs are not easily accepted when they are perceived as adding to drivers' economic burdens (Nugroho & Zusman, 2018). Daily earnings from bemo were even considered capable of exceeding the income earned from other transport services, leading drivers to doubt whether APB could provide a better livelihood (Merdeka, 1997d). A 1995 photograph of bemo at the Mini Terminal of Klender Station, showing the obligation to pay "timer fees" to brokers, also indicates that bemo drivers had already faced economic pressures before the renewal program was introduced. Thus, the renewal policy was implemented amid the already vulnerable economic conditions of bemo drivers.



Figure 3. Timer Fees: Bemo at the Mini Terminal of Klender Station were required to pay daily “timer fees” of IDR 1,200 to brokers, plus IDR 200 per trip.

Source: National Library of Indonesia Photographic Archive (18 April 1995)

In addition to economic issues, conflicts also emerged in administrative matters. Bemo owners and drivers felt that they had not been involved in the registration process for vehicles scheduled for renewal. Some owners stated that their vehicles had been registered by Organda without their prior consent (Suara Pembaruan, 1995b). This situation generated distrust toward a renewal mechanism that was perceived as being implemented unilaterally. Tensions intensified because Organda was regarded as having intervened too extensively in the renewal process before an official decision had been issued by the provincial government (Merdeka, 1995a).

Administrative problems became more complex because not all bemo had complete vehicle documentation. Some owners experienced difficulties in participating in the APB credit program because their bemo had changed hands several times, resulting in incomplete documents (Merdeka, 1997d). In 1997, many bemo were still categorized as undocumented vehicles or operated without official registration papers (Merdeka, 1997e). This condition demonstrates that the renewal policy could not easily be implemented comprehensively, as the government had to confront the reality of neighborhood transport services that had largely developed within the informal sector and were not fully recorded administratively.

Administrative obstacles also emerged through complaints from APB drivers regarding levies and organizational obligations. Several APB drivers complained about a daily levy of IDR 3,500 imposed by Organda for administrative purposes and the processing of vehicle documents (Republika, 1997a). This levy was considered to lack clear regulatory grounds and to impose an additional burden on drivers. Moreover, the requirement to join particular organizations discouraged some bemo owners from participating in the APB program and led them to continue operating their old bemo (Republika, 1997e). This indicates that bemo renewal encountered not only economic obstacles, but also bureaucratic and organizational problems within the urban transport sector.

Further conflicts emerged in relation to operations and routes. Some APB vehicles that had already been purchased could not immediately begin operating because the inauguration of their routes was delayed by the Jakarta DLLAJ. As a result, owners and drivers lost their source of income while remaining obligated to pay monthly vehicle installments. Some APB owners even threatened to stage a protest at the DKI Jakarta Regional House of Representatives because they felt harmed by the repeated delays in the operation of replacement vehicles (Suara Karya, 1997a). This issue demonstrates that the renewal program required not only new vehicles but also the readiness of permits, routes, and a clear operational system. Other reports attributed the delayed operation of APB to technical issues, including unprepared route corridors and the need for coordination among DLLAJ, Organda, and APB owners (Suara Karya, 1997b).

The implementation of APB also generated route conflicts with other transport services. Overlapping routes between APB and KWK triggered competition for passengers and tensions among drivers (Suara Karya, 1997b). Similar issues were reported by Merdeka, which stated that APB operations were disrupted by drivers of bemo that had not yet been renewed and by so-called

“tuyul” bemo. APB route JP 04 was also contested because it entered the Cikini area, overlapping with the route of Metro Mini P 17 (Merdeka, 1997f). In Olimo, Mangga Besar, bemo drivers opposed the entry of APB because they believed it threatened their operating areas and reduced their income. They felt excluded from the fleet transition process and considered that the replacement vehicles were instead operated by other parties (Merdeka, 1997e). This competition indicates that conflicts surrounding bemo renewal occurred not only between drivers and the government, but also among neighborhood transport actors competing for economic space in urban areas.

Meanwhile, a report in *Republika* stated that the government maintained the use of “short-nosed” replacement vehicles, which was associated with Governor’s Decree No. 33 of 1996 (Republika, 1997a). This position was retained despite proposals from some bemo owners for alternative vehicles, such as the Kijang, which they considered more durable and capable of carrying more passengers (Suara Pembaruan, 1997). Furthermore, the slow realization of APB operations, despite the fact that some owners had already paid the down payment, indicates that the renewal process did not proceed in accordance with the expectations of bemo owners (Republika, 1997b). This condition suggests that the renewal program was implemented in a top-down manner. In this situation, bemo owners and drivers occupied a weak position because they were required to adjust to vehicle types, credit schemes, and routes determined by the government.

The social impacts of these conflicts were reflected in the weakening economic position of small-scale bemo drivers and owners. Many APB vehicles that had already been purchased could not immediately operate due to route conflicts and delayed permits, while installment payments remained due (Merdeka, 1997g). Some drivers lost their jobs, experienced declining incomes, or had to take turns driving a single vehicle in order to sustain household earnings. In the context of urban transportation in Jakarta, changes in transport systems may place conventional transport drivers in a vulnerable position because not all drivers are able to adapt to a new system shaped by regulatory barriers, incentives, and distrust of operators (Wildan Fido Ramadhan et al., 2024). Thus, transportation modernization through bemo renewal did not fully guarantee the welfare of existing operators; instead, it risked marginalizing lower-income groups that had previously depended on bemo as a source of livelihood.

Ultimately, bemo renewal reflected a dilemma between the agenda of urban modernization and the sustainability of the informal sector among lower-income groups. On the one hand, bemo was considered incompatible with Jakarta’s image as a metropolitan city because it was regarded as slow, polluting, and unsuitable for the development of road infrastructure (Merdeka, 1997a). On the other hand, bemo remained necessary for residents in residential areas and served as a source of livelihood for its drivers (Merdeka, 1997b; Uteng & Turner, 2019). Studies of the informal sector show that formalization or regulation can directly affect small-scale operators because it relates to their economic capacity, access to legal status, and the continuity of their work (Sururi, 2019). Therefore, the social conflicts arising from the renewal process demonstrate that transportation policy cannot be viewed solely as an effort to reorganize the city, but must also consider economic capacity, administrative status, and the livelihoods of lower-income groups.

Based on these various issues, the bemo renewal policy can be considered only partially successful in encouraging the replacement of some old vehicles with APB. However, it was not fully effective as a transportation transition program because it was not accompanied by adequate social, economic, administrative, and operational preparedness. The high cost of replacement vehicles, unclear registration mechanisms, administrative levies, delayed operations, and route conflicts indicate that bemo renewal functioned more strongly as an urban restructuring project than as a policy designed to protect lower-income groups in the neighborhood transport sector.

The effects of these problems were most strongly experienced by small-scale bemo drivers and owners. The renewal program, initially intended to replace old vehicles, did not automatically ensure that all existing operators could enter the APB system. Bemo owners who lacked sufficient capital, were unable to pay the down payment, or did not possess complete vehicle documentation became the groups most vulnerable to exclusion from the renewal program. Thus, the policy

created a process of economic and administrative selection, in which only owners with adequate capital and complete documents were more likely to survive within the new transportation system.

For bemo drivers, the renewal process also resulted in uncertainty regarding employment and income. Some APB vehicles that had already been purchased could not operate immediately because of delayed permits and route-related problems, while installment obligations continued. This situation caused some drivers to lose their source of income, experience declining earnings, or take turns driving a single vehicle in order to maintain an income (Merdeka, 1997g). A study of urban transport drivers in Surabaya likewise shows that changes in transportation systems can affect the incomes of conventional transport drivers, particularly when they must confront new systems that alter work patterns and competition for passengers (Pratiwi & Pratomo, 2020). Some bemo owners were even forced to sell land or personal assets to pay the down payment for replacement vehicles, while several APB vehicles were repossessed due to installment arrears (Merdeka, 1997a; Republika, 1997d).

Other social impacts were reflected in unemployment and the inability of some drivers to transition to the APB system. Drivers who had previously depended on bemo for their livelihoods were not all able to meet the new requirements for capital, administration, and compliance with designated routes. As a result, transportation modernization through bemo renewal did not merely replace one type of vehicle with another, but also changed the socio-economic position of existing operators. Those who had previously been able to survive within the informal neighborhood transport system became increasingly marginalized when required to enter a transportation system that was more expensive, more bureaucratic, and more strongly controlled by the government and transport organizations.

Thus, the social conflicts resulting from bemo renewal did not emerge only in the form of opposition to replacement vehicles, but also through disruptions to the livelihoods of lower-income groups. The renewal policy demonstrates that urban transportation modernization can produce marginalization when it is not accompanied by protection for affected groups. In the case of bemo, small-scale drivers and owners bore the greatest burden because they had to confront credit costs, income loss, uncertainty over routes, and the risk of being excluded from the neighborhood transport business.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the findings, the bemo renewal policy in DKI Jakarta from 1995 to 1997 formed part of the government's effort to reorganize urban transportation during the late New Order period. Bemo were renewed because they were considered no longer compatible with Jakarta's development as a metropolitan city, particularly due to concerns over fleet roadworthiness, administrative irregularities, the large number of bemo without official documents, and the government's intention to replace three-wheeled vehicles with more modern four-wheeled vehicles. The policy was implemented gradually through the replacement of bemo with *Angkutan Pengganti Bemo* (APB), involving the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government, DLLAJ, Organda, cooperatives, financial institutions, and bemo owners. In practice, only officially registered bemo were eligible for the renewal program, while unlicensed bemo or those with incomplete administrative documents were excluded from the replacement scheme. However, the process was not straightforward because renewal depended not only on the availability of replacement vehicles, but also on the readiness of registration procedures, financing, operational permits, route arrangements, and coordination among institutions. Thus, the implementation of the bemo renewal policy proceeded gradually but was not yet fully developed as an urban transportation transition policy.

The implementation of bemo renewal generated social impacts and conflicts for bemo drivers and owners. These conflicts took economic, administrative, and operational forms. Economically, bemo owners objected to low compensation values, high down payments, expensive APB installments, limited bank financing support, and the risk of vehicle repossession due to payment arrears. Administratively, distrust emerged as a result of unilateral registration by

Organda, the presence of undocumented bemo, administrative levies, and the obligation to join particular organizations. Operationally, delays in APB operations, overlapping routes, and conflicts with KWK and other transport services occurred. Resistance from drivers of older bemo to APB further demonstrated that the vehicle transition did not proceed smoothly. Consequently, some drivers and owners experienced declining incomes, loss of employment, difficulties in paying installments, and failure to transition into the APB system. Therefore, the bemo renewal policy was only partially successful in replacing some older vehicles and did not fully function as a policy that protected the affected groups. The case of bemo renewal shows that urban transportation modernization during the late New Order period was not merely a technical matter of transport reorganization, but also generated socio-economic marginalization among drivers and owners who depended on the informal transport sector.

This study contributes to the study of urban transportation history and social history in Indonesia by demonstrating that transportation modernization during the late New Order period involved not only vehicle replacement but also changes in the socio-economic position of informal transport actors. This study is limited by its primary reliance on newspaper and photographic archives; therefore, it has not fully captured the direct experiences of drivers, bemo owners, DLLAJ officials, and Organda administrators. Future research may use local government policy documents, transport organization archives, and oral history sources to provide a more comprehensive account of the implementation of bemo renewal in Jakarta.

## REFERENCES

- Cervero, R., & Golub, A. (2007). Informal transport: A global perspective. *Transport Policy*, 14(6), 445–457. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2007.04.011>
- Firdaus, M. K., & Witasari, N. (2023). Penarik Becak Indramayu di Jakarta tahun 1970-1990. *Journal of Indonesian History*, 36.
- Hermawan, A. (1996). *Implementasi Kebijakan Publik: Peremajaan Transportasi Umum di Kotamadya Malang*. Universitas Airlangga.
- Ilham, C. I. (2021). Integration of Land Transportation. *KnE Social Sciences*, 334. <https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v5i1.8296>
- Istianto, B. (2019). *Transportasi Jalan di Indonesia Sejarah dan Perkembangannya*. 15–59.
- Coser, L. A. (1957). *Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change*. 8(3).
- Kuntowijoyo. (2013). *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana.
- Kusbiantoro, B. (1993). Masalah Transportasi Perkotaan. *Jurnal PWK*, (8), 1.
- Liddle, R. W. (1985). Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions. *Pacific Affairs*, 58(1), 81–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2758010>
- Mawaddah. (2019). *Bemo di Kota Malang 1968-1997: Suatu Kajian Sejarah Tentang Perkembangan Angkutan Umum Dalam Kota*. Universitas Airlangga.
- Media Indonesia. (1997, March). Terus Berlanjut, Penghapusan Bemo di Jakarta. *Media Indonesia*.
- Merdeka. (1995a, June 3). Para Pengemudi Resah Cicilan Mobil Angkutan Pengganti bemo Terlalu Tinggi. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1995b, June 27). Bemo Akan Diganti Angkutan Sejenis KWK. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997a, July 31). Tak Sedap Dipandang. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997b, August 1). Bemo, Sampai Kapan Bisa Bertahan? (2-Habis) Memang Agak Dilematis. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997c, August 1). Di Jakarta Sekitar 500 Buah. *Merdeka*.

- Merdeka. (1997d, August 1). Disepelekan, tapi Hasilnya Lebih Besar. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997e, September 7). 800 Unit Berstatus Bodong. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997f, September 7). Setelah Dicek, Tak Ada Anak Buah Saya yang Menjual. *Merdeka*.
- Merdeka. (1997g, September 7). Soal Peremajaan Bemo Kok Malah Membuat Kami Sengsara. *Merdeka*.
- Nugroho, S. B., & Zusman, E. (2018). Low carbon paratransit in Jakarta, Indonesia: Using econometric models to improve the enabling environment. *Case Studies on Transport Policy*, 6(33).
- Nur, A., Isak, Y. J., Adyatma, M. E., Ryandhika, R., & Ajiansyah, M. R. (2024). Peranan Transportasi Publik dalam Pengurangan Kemacetan di Jakarta. *Journal of Informatics and Business*, 2(3).
- Pojani, D., & Stead, D. (2015). Sustainable urban transport in the developing world: Beyond megacities. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 7(6), 7784–7805. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su7067784>
- Pratama, A. P., Yudhistira, M. H., & Koomen, E. (2022). Highway expansion and urban sprawl in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. *Land Use Policy*, 112.
- Pratiwi, R. K. H., & Pratomo, G. (2020). Analisis Dampak Keberadaan Angkutan Daring Terhadap Perubahan Pendapatan Sopir Angkutan Kota di Kota Surabaya (Studi Kasus Pendapatan Sopir Angkutan Kota di Terminal Dukuh Kupang Surabaya). *Economie Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi*, (2).
- Republika. (1997a, April 17). Pengganti Bemo tak Berhidung Panjang. *Republika*.
- Republika. (1997b, April 25). Ada Rekayasa Dalam Penggantian Bemo. *Republika*.
- Republika. (1997c, May 27). Angkutan Pengganti Bemo Dipungli Organda. *Republika*.
- Republika. (1997d, June 3). Harga Angkutan Pengganti Bemo Dikeluhkan. *Republika*.
- Republika. (1997e, June 10). Supir Bemo, Riwayatmu Kini. *Republika*.
- Saputra, H. R., & Wijayati, P. A. (2025). Jejak Roda Tiga Ke Roda Empat: Perubahan Moda Transportasi Semarang 1962-1983. *Jurnal Pemikiran Pendidikan Dan Penelitian Kesejarahan*, 12(2), 187–190.
- Satria, G., & Kurniawan, A. (2023, November 24). *Menganal Sejarah Bemo di Indonesia, Berasal dari Daihatsu Midget*. Kompas.Com.
- Suara Karya. (1995a, March 13). Bemo Dihapus, Apa Penggantinya? *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Karya. (1995b, June 7). Ketika Bemo Tergusur. *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Karya. (1995c, June 30). Uang Muka Pengganti Bemo Supaya Ditekan. *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Karya. (1997a, September 13). Pemilik Resah, Mobil Angkutan Pengganti Bemo Ditarik. *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Karya. (1997b, September 20). Pengoperasian Angkutan Pengganti Bemo Masih Tersendat. *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Karya. (1997c, September 20). Peremajaan Bemo Perlu Dukungan Bank. *Suara Karya*.
- Suara Pembaruan. (1995a, April 26). Organda DKI: Bemo Perlu Diremajakan. *Suara Pembaruan*.
- Suara Pembaruan. (1995b, June 3). Isu Penawaran Bemo-bemo Bekas Meresahkan Pemiliknya. *Suara Pembaruan*.
- Suara Pembaruan. (1997, April 26). Pemilik Bemo Minta Keleluasan Memilih Kendaraan Pengganti. *Suara Pembaruan*.
- Sururi, A. (2019). Kinerja Implementasi dan Inovasi Kebijakan Penataan dan Pemberdayaan Pedagang Kaki Lima Di Kawasan Pasar Royal Kota Serang. *Jurnal Wacana Kinerja: Kajian Praktis-Akademis Kinerja Dan Administrasi Pelayanan Publik*, 22(2).

<https://doi.org/10.31845/jwk.v22i2.154>

The Jakarta Post. (1995, June 3). Plan to abolish bemo gets strong response. *The Jakarta Post*.

Tundjung. (2018). Akhirnya Roda Berhenti Berputar: Sekilas Riwayat Becak di Jakarta 1930-1970. *Alur Sejarah Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah*, 2(2), 2.

Uteng, T. P., & Turner, J. (2019). Addressing the linkages between gender and transport in low- and middle-income countries. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 11(17).  
<https://doi.org/10.3390/su11174555>

Wildan Fido Ramadhan, Abdul Haris Fatgehipon, & Nandi Kurniawan. (2024). Analisis Adaptasi Sopir Angkutan Kota Konvensional Di Jakarta Dalam Menghadapi Dampak Kehadiran Mikrotrans Jak Lingko. *Wissen: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Humaniora*, 2(2), 87-99.  
<https://doi.org/10.62383/wissen.v2i2.99>

Wulandari, A. (2010). *Peralihan Bemo Roda ke Mikrolet di Surabaya 1979-1986*. Universitas Airlangga.