

Analysis of the Potential of New Post - Abolition Election Systems and Regulations *Presidential Threshold*

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the system of changes to the election and its impact after the abolition of the parliamentary threshold (PT) in Indonesia in accordance with Law No. 7 of 2017. The research approach used is descriptive qualitative, namely observing the general election process carried out using data analysis by Miles and Huberman. The results of the study indicate that the abolition of the parliamentary threshold provides an opportunity for political parties with small votes to nominate presidential candidates or candidates for members of the regional representative council. However, there is an impact caused by the abolition of this PT where the opportunity to become a presidential candidate is numerous opportunities so that people through political parties can nominate themselves. Thus necessitating a second round. The implementation of the second round has an impact on the implementation of the election policy, especially in terms of increasing the budget which significantly drains the state budget which should only be one round. This problem not only impacts the state budget but also influences the emergence of divisions among the community due to political differences.

Keywords: Regulation, post, election, parliamentary threshold.

Introduction

General elections in Indonesia are a mandatory requirement stipulated in law. Elections are held every five years, both for the House of Representatives and the President. The design of the electoral system is one of the most crucial factors in maintaining the quality of democracy in developing countries. Amendments to Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning the abolition of the 4% Parliamentary Threshold (PT) are declared null and void. The abolition of the PT provides an opportunity for political parties with low voter turnout to run for president. In determining the presidential candidate selection, many factors influence public opinion, including media exposure. The media plays a crucial role in the decision-making process, which allows voters to choose the candidate most in line with their conscience (Ólafsson & Einarsson, 2026). Many global studies emphasize that an open electoral system can increase political representation, but at the same time, it poses the risk of fragmentation and instability (Norris, 2020). Indonesia, as the world's third-largest democracy, has long used a presidential threshold (PT) of 20% of DPR seats or 25% of the national valid vote to regulate presidential nominations. This policy limits the number of candidate pairs, as evidenced by the 2014 and 2019 elections, which only presented two candidates, thus narrowing the public's political choices and strengthening polarization (KPU, 2019). The Constitutional Court's ruling in early 2025, which abolished the PT (Perseroan Perseroan Terbatas), marked a significant turning point, as the electoral system now faces new challenges in balancing democratic openness with the need to maintain government stability. Policies regarding the political system have been evolving consistently over the past decade. New political policies will impact the election results.

The abolition of the PT implies an increased likelihood of numerous competing presidential candidates, which on the one hand opens up free space for everyone to participate in a freer and more controlled political arena. This also broadens political participation. However, on the other hand, the results of an election with many candidates will result in a fragmented vote, necessitating a second runoff. Furthermore, repeated campaigning will incur significant costs.

Furthermore, there are concerns about the emergence of black campaigning against a single candidate through the mass media. Social media significantly determines the public's perception of a candidate. (Daniel & Obholzer, 2025) Furthermore, religion and organizational affiliation also influence political choices. (Harahap et al., 2024) This will undoubtedly impact the state budget and government policy in the second runoff election. This could result in a president with low legitimacy if the popular vote is divided. This fragmentation also has the potential to complicate the formation of a stable coalition in parliament. The main problem that arises is how to design new regulations that do not close off the space for democratization, while still maintaining the effectiveness of the presidential system. The KPU also faces technical challenges in preparing mechanisms for verifying candidacy, transparency of candidate track records, and strengthening institutional capacity in facing multipolar competition. Several previous studies have examined the impact from PT. Mujani & Liddle (2019) assessed that PT narrows the space for political competition (Afif, 2025) and emphasizes oligarchic dominance in the nomination process. Warburton (2021) highlighted that PT strengthens identity polarization, and Buehler (2022) pointed to weak representation due to high thresholds. Pamungkas' (2023) research assessed that the abolition of PT opens opportunities for broader democratization but also carries the risk of political instability if not accompanied by adequate regulations. Thus, academic discourse has revealed the pros and cons (Angulo Moncayo et al., 2025) of PT, but there has been little systematic discussion of alternative post-PT regulations. The limitation of previous research lies in the dominance of quantitative approaches that only assess the effect of PT on the number of candidates or political polarization, without in-depth exploration of how new regulations should be formulated. There has been no comprehensive study that examines candidate screening mechanisms, strengthening candidacy integrity, and post-PT institutional reform through qualitative approaches and comparative literature reviews. This is an important gap that this research seeks to address.

This study aims to analyze the potential needs for a new system and regulations for Indonesian elections following the abolition of the PT, with a focus on candidate selection design, strengthening election management institutions, and regulatory mechanisms that maintain a balance between democratic openness and government stability. Theoretically, this study expands the literature on democratic institutional design in developing countries. Practically, the results can provide evidence-based recommendations for policymakers, political parties, and election organizers in developing new regulations that are inclusive, adaptive, and oriented towards strengthening Indonesian democracy. The Constitutional Court's decision regarding the non-binding presidential threshold provides an opportunity for all political parties to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates without the requirement of a previous seat/vote threshold. This decision has the potential to change the dynamics of access to nominations, coalition configurations, and the candidate selection process leading up to the 2029 elections. Identifying option system as well as proper regulation For manage the nomination and competition process post-removal of the presidential threshold becomes step important For ensure elections still ongoing in a way orderly and structured. Every formulated options need assessed from side impact political, administrative, and constitutional (Girardi, 2024), so that can seen how each option influence stability government, burden organizer elections, as well as suitability with principles the basis of the 1945 Constitution. Based on evaluation mentioned, it is necessary compilation recommendation comprehensive policy as well as clear monitoring indicators For ensure implementation ongoing in a way democratic, inclusive, and stable. These indicators can covers effectiveness of the nomination process, transparency party politics, involvement public, efficiency administration, as well as the impact to consolidation democracy. With Thus, system reform nomination president post-dissolution of PT can walk in a way measurable and fixed guard quality Indonesian democracy

Deletion *presidential threshold* (PT) by the Court The Constitution in 2025 marks fundamental changes in system Indonesian elections. PT previously considered as instrument simplification amount candidate , but also seen close room competition political in a way fair According to Pamungkas (2023), the disappearance this threshold open opportunity greater democratization wide , although on the other hand it increases risk fragmentation political if No followed

regulations adequate new. In conceptually, PT has two functions main: ensure stability government with limit amount candidates, as well as strengthen legitimacy president selected through a relatively large support base large (Mujani & Liddle, 2019). However, research latest show that restrictions the precisely narrow down room competition politics and strengthening oligarchy party (Aspinall, 2020). This impact on increasing polarization identity politics, such as noted by Warburton (2021), as well as decline quality representation of the people (Buehler, 2022).

Irawan (2022) highlights the dominant role of party elites in the selection process candidates, especially in the PDI Perjuangan. Conditions This show that even though PT was abolished, the internal oligarchy of the party still influential in determine who is worthy proceed as candidate president. With thus, without regulations that encourage transparency and accountability, the elimination of PT is at risk only move problem from the inter-party level to in body party That Alone.

Implications more carry on seen in the aspect stability government. The elected president with a sound basis relatively small possibility face difficulty build coalition majority in parliament, so that effectiveness system presidential can eroded (Prasetyo, 2021). In the long term length, fragmentation political kind of This potential cause crisis legitimacy government. Therefore that, a number of expert propose mechanism alternatives, such as verification minimum public support of 1–3% of the voter list or strengthening rule transparency finance party (Pamungkas, 2023).

With Thus, the discussion academic contemporary confirm that the elimination of PT is not final solution. Institutional and regulatory reform addition required For balance openness democratic with need stability political approach qualitative through studies literature This show that choice policy post -PT must focus on three thing: mechanism filtering transparent candidates, strengthening institution organizer elections, as well as regulations finance accountable politics.

Literature Review

Literature review is part important in study scientific Because give description about runway theory, direction research, as well as the gap you want filled in by researchers. According to Creswell (2018), the study library functioning as map conceptual linking study new with tradition academics who have there is. In context democracy, literature about system elections, representation politics and stability governance is very relevant.

In discourse elections, there are two approaches big often become debate. First, the approach stability, which emphasizes importance simplification candidates for the sake of achieving effective governance. Second, the approach inclusivity, which emphasizes importance open room competition political as widely as possible so that democracy the more substantive (Norris, 2020). Literature review This show that deletion *presidential threshold* (PT) puts Indonesia at a critical point cross between need stability and demands openness democratic.

Object study This is phenomenon elimination of PT through decision Court The Constitution in 2025 and its implications to system elections. Previous PT arranged in Law no. 7 of 2017 with condition party must have 20% of the DPR seats or 25% of the votes legitimate national For nominate president. The main goal is prevent too Lots candidate, so that the president selected own legitimacy big.

Post- abolition of PT, all party entitled nominate partner president and vice president without limitations. Pamungkas (2023) mentions This as the “era of openness” democratization”, although he also emphasized the need regulations new For prevent fragmentation. In other words, the object study This at a crossroads between opportunity democratization and threats instability politics.

Framework study This arranged for explain connection between variables elimination of PT with consequence politics, law, and institutions. First, from side theory democracy, openness nomination president believed strengthen representation and participation politics (Norris, 2020). Second, the theory system presidential show that stability government is greatly influenced by power coalition in parliament (Prasetyo, 2021). Third, the theory institutional emphasize that quality democracy depending on capacity institution organizer elections in

manage increasing competition complex (Buehler, 2022).

Research Methods

This research uses a qualitative method with a literature review approach. The data used comes from books, journals, and previous research results. and regulatory documents relevant to the presidential threshold and the electoral system in Indonesia. This method was chosen because it is the simplest, requires no field data collection, and can provide in-depth understanding of various academic perspectives. The analysis was conducted by comparing the findings of previous research and then drawing conclusions relevant to the post-removal of the presidential threshold.

This research uses a qualitative approach with a literature review method. This approach was chosen because it is able to deeply explore concepts, theories, and previous research results that are relevant to the issue of eliminating the presidential threshold. The data sources for this research consist of secondary data obtained through books, scientific journals, Research articles, legal documents, and regulations related to the election system in Indonesia. In addition, the results of studies were also used. academic from institution study Which Credible I. Data collection techniques were conducted through library research by searching for literature, analyzing regulatory documents, and reviewing relevant previous research results. The literature was obtained from national and international journals, academic databases, and official online sources such as Constitutional Court decisions and KPU regulations.

The data were analyzed using descriptive qualitative analysis according to Miles and Huberman, namely data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusions. The analysis process was carried out by classifying findings from various literature. comparing the results of previous studies and drawing systematic conclusions. This analysis aims to formulate recommendations for new regulations following the abolition of the presidential election. threshold that is able to maintain a balance between openness and democracy data

Results

Post- abolition of PT, opportunities party medium and small For nominate candidate president increase significant . Norris (2020) emphasized that openness system more elections inclusive can increase legitimacy democracy , but also gives rise to challenge in the form of governance complexity elections . In the Indonesian context , the Commission General Election (KPU) faces burden addition in do verification candidate , printing letter voice with more many names, as well as supervision to funding the campaign is getting bigger diverse . Deletion *presidential threshold* (PT) brings change big to system elections and dynamics nomination president in Indonesia. Without existence threshold of 20% of DPR seats or 25% of the vote national , every party politics , including party small or party new , have equal opportunities For carry candidate president and vice president . This make system elections more open , competitive and inclusive Because No Again dominated by parties big . Configuration the coalition also changed in a way significant ; coalition No Again nature mandatory , so that party more free determine direction politics and candidacy strategies , and the coalitions formed tend more ideological than just fulfil condition administrative . With loss of PT, number of candidate president potential increase , give rise to more Lots figure national and area For fight in contestation , so that influence campaign strategy , mobilization voters , and competition between political elites . For need campaign among student not like that influence student in take decision choose candidate president and vice president. Viewed from convenience access information with objective make decisions for student matter That of course make things easier but in access information is not only AI they use, students also take advantage of use social media. This No become factor main they decide For take decision to choose (Afrilia1, Geraldine, 2024). However, a number of study show that PT is more Lots bring impact negative Mujani & Liddle (2019). assessed that PT did not relevant in context multiparty Indonesia because reduce representation of the people. Aspinall (2020) argues that

PT strengthens oligarchy party big and close room for party small. Meanwhile that, Warburton (2021) saw that PT deepens polarization identity political Because contestation become fight interblock big that relies on political symbolic .

From the side technical elections, increasing amount partner candidate make organization elections more complex, especially in matter logistics, debate public, and counting sound, and increase possibility ongoing elections in two rounds Because voice voters split to more Lots candidate. Although Thus, the elimination of PT also reduces political transactional (Syari'ah & Hukum, 2022) which during This often happen in formation coalition big to fulfill nomination threshold. Party big lost position dominant, while party small own Power bid more high . However, the increase too much competition crowded also has potential bring up instability politics and difficulties in build strong government if president selected No own support adequate legislative. In Overall , the elimination of PT strengthens formal democracy because give freedom more wide for parties and voters, but at a time demand governance design elections and systems more government adaptive For guard effectiveness and stability political national .

From the side administrative , no the existence of PT makes organization elections become more complex . Commission General Elections Commission (KPU) must prepare logistics , forms calculation sound , schedule campaign , as well as debate format For more Lots partner candidate . This is increase burden Work organizers and enlarge cost election . Addition amount candidates also demand readiness system information , mechanism socialization , and more detailed supervision so that the implementation still walk transparent and accountable . In addition , the possibility increasing two- round elections will extend cycle elections so that need budget addition as well as source Power more human big.

From the perspective constitutional, the abolition of PT can strengthen principle democracy substantive Because give chance more equivalent for all party political For nominate president. This is the more get closer system elections to the mandate of the 1945 Constitution which guarantees equality political citizens and the sovereignty of the people. However, at the same time, there appears challenge constitutional related stability government post election. With many candidate, winner elections Can get relative sound small and potential No own support majority in the DPR. Conditions This can weaken effectiveness government and open risk occurrence government minority, which is constitutional Still valid, but in a way practice can trigger tension between executive and legislative. Therefore that, although elimination of PT in accordance with with principle openness democratic, the state must ensure existence mechanism other constitutionally capable guard sustainability governance and national political stability.

Discussion

Deletion *presidential threshold* require formulation systems and regulations new capable balance openness democracy with stability government. For guard openness, the state can give chance to all party nominate president through condition proportional administrative, such as collection minimum support or nomination deposit, so that No happen restrictions that are not democratic (Iswandari, 2019) However still prevent emergence candidate No serious . On the other hand, to ensure stability government , mechanism two- round elections need maintained so that the president selected get legitimacy majority. After elections, regulations can arrange obligation president selected build support legislative beginning or coalition formal government so that the government agenda No hampered by fragmentation politics . In addition , transparency funding campaign, restrictions cost politics, as well as strengthening the role of the KPU and Bawaslu required For guard quality elections in the middle increasing amount candidate. With combination mechanism strong administrative, institutional and supervisory systems, Indonesia can maintain openness nomination at a time ensure government still effective and stable.

Implementation two- loop system : if No There is pair that gets >50% of the votes in the first round first , two couples top proceed to round second in range clear time (e.g. 2–4 weeks). Two - round system increase legitimacy winner and suppress fragmentation voice although Lots candidate appear . Benefits mechanism This supported practice international For ensure formal

majority for head of state. Instead DPR threshold/vote For carry, use condition proportional and transparent administrative : for example, deposits that can be returned If get percentage voice certain , or collection sign hand support from the representative region / province minimum percentage of voters (e.g. 1–3% spread across X provinces). Rules This pressing candidate No Serious at a time guard access for party small and figures independent. Administrative requirements proportional nomination — limiting 'frivolous' candidate without reduce right party. Steps This in line with other countries' efforts to use it criteria administrative For manage access to paper voice .

mechanisms that require candidate president selected For get form support legislative basis (e.g. statement) support coalition or a confidence test /investiture in the DPR within 60 days) before inauguration or in period short post-election For ensure ability form cabinet and complete the government agenda . The mechanism This keep the president No end as government crippled minority , without must return power pre-election to party big . In many system , legitimacy effective executive depends on the mechanism support legislative kind of This .

Legal incentives for coalition stable and consolidated party without coercion opening threshold opportunity big for party party small matter This push formation coalition stable : for example , rights initiative more budget fast for government with formal coalition ; allocation chair DPR commission considering coalition government ; or access funding public campaign more tall for registered coalition before round second . Incentives kind of This minimize formation coalition opportunistic solely to fulfill threshold legislative and encourage Work The same policy post-election .

Beside it is also a limitation campaigns and elections that are not repetitive will reduce expenditure campaign , and increase transparency donation as well as avoid black campaigns against One candidate to other candidates are good through mass media and individual . (Widholm & Ekman, 2024). In addition to reducing opportunity candidate extreme utilize unused funds obviously , this lower cost enter candidate so that the deposit is not become barrier for party legitimate minor . Strengthening supervision of the KPU and Bawaslu required For uphold rules This

To maintain a balance between openness and stability, it is best to implement a two-round general election system to ensure majority legitimacy and proportional administrative requirements for nominations. This will give the public the freedom to make a choice that aligns with their conscience. Failure to choose a candidate will result in five years of misery for the people.

Conclusion

The elimination of the presidential threshold will bring significant changes to the electoral system and the dynamics of presidential nominations in Indonesia. Without a nomination threshold, political parties have a greater opportunity to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates independently, thus making the competition more open and inclusive. However, this situation also has the potential to cause political, administrative, and constitutional impacts, such as an increase in the number of candidate pairs that can lead to vote fragmentation, more complex election budget and management requirements, and legitimacy challenges if the elected president only receives a minority of the vote. Therefore, after the threshold is eliminated, new systems and regulations are needed to maintain a balance between democratic openness and government stability. These regulations could include strengthening political party verification, restructuring the two-round election mechanism, improving ethical standards and transparency in nominations, and supporting party consolidation to maintain healthy competition without compromising government effectiveness. In this way, democratic openness is guaranteed, while maintaining national political stability.

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