

## #ReformasiDikorupsi: Emergence and Failure

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### Abstrak

September 2019 menandai protes besar terhadap negara di Indonesia dan sering disebut sebagai protes terbesar sejak Reformasi, dari protes tersebut muncul #ReformasiDikorupsi, tetapi mereka gagal untuk mempertahankan resiliensi terhadap negara. Tulisan ini mencoba menjawab dua pertanyaan, pertama bagaimana dan mengapa #ReformasiDikorupsi muncul, kedua mengapa #ReformasiDikorupsi gagal mempertahankan resiliensinya di hadapan negara. Tulisan ini akan menggunakan perspektif Teori Diskursus Politik dan Analisis Diskursus untuk menganalisa data guna menjawab dua pertanyaan di atas. Tulisan ini berargumen bahwa #ReformasiDikorupsi muncul dari tuntutan-tuntutan yang diabaikan oleh negara dan konstruksi #ReformasiDikorupsi dimungkinkan oleh satu kejadian dislokasi yang dapat dilihat sebagai upaya pelemahan KPK oleh negara dan rencana merevisi RKUHP yang secara langsung “mengancam” berbagai identitas. Kemudian, tulisan ini juga berargumen bahwa #ReformasiDikorupsi gagal mempertahankan resiliensinya karena hubungan mereka yang tidak jelas dan ambigu pada negara, atau hubungan antagonisme semu terhadap negara.

**Keywords:** Agonisme; Antagonisme; Dislokasi; Diskursus Mistik

### Abstract

*September 2019 marks a large mass protest towards the state in Indonesia and is often referred to as the largest mass protest since the Reformasi, from that mass protest #ReformasiDikorupsi emerges, yet it failed to maintain its resiliency to oppose the state. This article seeks to answer two questions, first how and why #ReformasiDikorupsi emerges, second why #ReformasiDikorupsi failed to maintain their resiliency towards the state. This article utilized the perspective of Political Discourse Theory and Discourse Analysis to analyze the data to answer those questions. This article argued that #ReformasiDikorupsi emerged from the demands that had been ignored by the state and the construction of #ReformasiDikorupsi made possible by a dislocation event which can be seen as an attempt to weaken KPK by the state and a plan to revise the criminal codebook which directly “threaten” vast amount of identity. Furthermore, this article also argued that #ReformasiDikorupsi failed to maintain their resiliency towards the state due to their unclear and ambiguous relation towards the state, or pseudo-antagonistic relationship towards the state.*

**Keywords:** Agonism; Antagonism; Dislocation; Mythical Discourse

### Introduction

In September 2019, Indonesia was shocked by #ReformasiDikorupsi mass protest which took place in many cities, mainly in Jakarta. Everyone referred #ReformasiDikorupsi protest as the “biggest mass protest after Reformasi.” Yet everyone, including former Minister of Law and Human Rights questioned where does this comes from? Why did such a massive protest emerge in Indonesia? As he puts it in a television show, Indonesia Lawyers Club: “an undetected lump of emotional dissent suddenly explodes” There have been two attempts to explain why this mass protest occurred, Wasisto and Prayudi (2019) argued that this protest

was rooted in miscommunication and misinterpretation and failure of information channel between citizens and house of representative. Warburton (2019) saw that the mass protest is caused by Indonesia's trust in KPK and she argued that whether pro-Prabowo and Pro-Jokowi camp trusted KPK as an institution, as the result when there's an attempt to weaken KPK it mobilized a mass protest. Yet these two explanations do not give any clear reasoning of why #ReformasiDikorupsi emerged.

The focus of #ReformasiDikorupsi research had been highlighting the effectiveness of social media utilized by #ReformasiDikorupsi or another movement that identifies themselves with #ReformasiDikorupsi. Such as Fuadi (2020), highlights how #GejayanMemanggil used social media to convey policy reform or injustice ideas. Norifma et al (2020), also highlight how #GejayanMemanggil was used by activists to mobilize and interpellate more masses to protest. Despite those social media highlights, Robet (2020) argues that #ReformasiDikorupsi was an attempt to interpellate and rebuild a demarcation line between state and civil society which had been fragmented after Reformasi, yet he noted that #ReformasiDikorupsi did not affect anything in terms of the structure of political power.

Almost all works aforementioned above put students as #ReformasiDikorupsi's main actor. Only Robet and Warburton acknowledge the part of other elements aside from students. Furthermore, despite the quantity achievement, the protest did not bring many results to the Indonesian political landscape, nor the demand that #ReformasiDikorupsi wanted. #ReformasiDikorupsi demanded the new KPK bill be canceled with lieu of law, because the new bill was seen as an attempt to weaken the corruption eradication institution, furthermore, they demanded to cancel and re-evaluate many bill drafts such as Minerba (mineral and coal); Pertanahan (agrarian law); Ketenagakerjaan (employment); Sumber Daya Air (water resources). #ReformasiDikorupsi also demanded that Sexual Eradication Law be passed. After two years, these demands never came into fruition. Employment law passed included in omnibus law and Minerba both passed in 2020. In other words, failed to maintain its resilience towards the state. The answer to this question was not elaborated clearly from those works I have mentioned.

Thus, this article is written to answer those two questions. First, why and how #ReformasiDikorupsi emerged in the Indonesian political landscape? Second, why #ReformasiDikorupsi failed to maintain its resilience towards the state? To answer these questions, we will use Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Political Discourse Theory which is rooted in the post-structuralist school of thought. This article argues that #ReformasiDikorupsi emerged from various demands that already had their own antagonistic

relationship towards the state, done by logics of equivalence operated within the social realm. Yet after the dislocation that brought them together as a single identity through the operation of logics of equivalence, they vaguely put their antagonistic towards the state, and merely attempted to influence it. Thus, #ReformasiDikorupsi failed to maintain its resilience.

The key concepts used in this article are myth, dislocation, antagonistic and agonistic relationships. The first is referred to a symbol used to suture the structure (Laclau, 2015, p. 46), in other words how a group would fix a dislocated situation. Dislocation means an event that shows the failure of “fullness” in a system, this could mean regime or hegemony. Dislocation is the limitation of a system and gave space for the construction of a new identity (Grosso, 2009, pp. 38-39). One of many responses to dislocation is public contestation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 111). An antagonistic relationship occurred between two identities when an identity could not reach its fullness (Howarth, Norval, & Stravrakakis, 2000, p. 11), thus making a demarcation between “we” versus “them.” As Laclau and Mouffe put it with an example: when a farmer can’t be a farmer anymore because their land has been seized (Laclau & Mouffe, 2008, p. 188). Whereas agonistic relation is an antagonistic relation which had been facilitated by democratic institution, agonistic relations still have the idea of “we” versus “them” but they acknowledge each other legitimation that every identity is in the same political association through democratic means (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20).

## **Methods**

This article followed the tradition of the post-structuralist school of thought, we will lean on logics of critical explanation as to the method. In this method, there are three areas of analysis, namely: social logics, political logics, and fantasmatic logics. Due to the focus of this article are #ReformasiDikorupsi and their articulation, thus this article would only use political logics as an area of analysis because political logics unfold the explanation of social practices institutionalized or deemed worthy of public contestation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, pp. 106-107). In order to do this, we will use Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis or to be precise, logics of equivalence and logics of difference. The aim of Laclau and Mouffe’s method of discourse analysis is not to find “truth” or “reality” yet to provide an explanation of how discursive struggle constructs reality (Rear, 2013). In order to do so, Laclau provides two steps of analysis, first “read” the reality as it is, and second “read” the reality and group those realities to be validated. “Reading” in discourse theory is a generation of meaning (Raffiudin, 2014). Logics of critical explanation, however, are not bounded by the means of collecting data, such as hermeneutics or positivist approach ways of collecting data (Howarth, et al., 2021). Thus,

this article needs data from in-depth interviews with those who were involved with #ReformasiDikospsi such as the administrator of @AksiLangsung, Aliansi Rakyat Bergerak, Bhagavad Sambhada, and BEM-SI Coordinator, Muhammad Nurdiansyah. To enrich and validate those data we also collect data from media reports of #ReformasiDikorupsi and data from social media such as Youtube, Instagram, and Twitter.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **Construction of #ReformasiDikorupsi**

#ReformasiDikorupsi was the result of how the state did not respond to an array of demands. Following Laclau, a movement will likely occur when the power doesn't respond to many demands and put themselves as "the same" or looking to operate logics of equivalence and form what is called the chain of equivalence, which would be represented by one of the demands to lead an uprising or contest the hegemony. At the same time, those demands would operate logics of difference to differentiate itself from the outside, thus forming a political frontier which could be seen as when two major opposing camps against each other in the discursive struggle (Laclau, 2005). This had been done by Jokowi's Administration. Ekayanta (2019) explained through deconstruction how Jokowi Administration create antagonism in a wide range of front through their developmentalist hegemony of economics. These demands would later reflect themselves in #ReformasiDikorupsi 7 demands to the state. There are several demands that are worth noting, namely: agrarian conflict, ecology, corruption eradication, women's safety, worker, and lastly human rights and democracy.

The first demand, agrarian conflict stems from Jokowi's vision of Nawacita, and later Jokowi Administration manifest it in RPJMN. In that document, the Jokowi Administration touch on the protection of the marginalized group, one of those is the plan to improve the disparity of the Indonesian agrarian situation. From that idea, came a plan of agrarian reform, which later came into fruition with Presidential Decree No.86/2018 about agrarian reform. Yet, in practice, the Presidential Decree did not give any solution to the agrarian conflict in Indonesia. Compared to the SBY administration, in Jokowi's Administration, there are 2.050 conflicts as for the former 1.308 conflicts occurred (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2019). Jokowi Administration also failed to eradicate violence done by state apparatus as the military and police each year of his first administration always took part in the violence. Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria noted that from Jokowi's rise to power and at the end of his first period there are approximately 203 cases of violence done by either the military or police in agrarian conflict (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019). Setyawati in

Ekayanta (2019) said that Jokowi Administration often uses land compensation as a mechanism to ease the burden of the people affected by development projects, yet that did not enough to compensate their loss.

The ecological problem is often caused by Jokowi's Administration's attempts to develop Indonesia, in a developmentalist fashion, and Jokowi's Administration rather slow to respond to tackle ecological issues. In 2016, a citizen lawsuit filed against Jokowi's Administration due to their slow response to tackle forest and land fires in Central Kalimantan. The citizen won the case, and despite Jokowi Administration's attempts to appeal the lawsuit to the higher court, they lost. The court obliged Jokowi Administration to pass a derivative rule from Law No.32 the Year 2009 about Protection and Management of Environment (Alaidrus, 2019). Almost at the same time, a case of forest and land fires occurred in Kalimantan and Sumatra as Jokowi Administration failed appeal in 2019. The police assessed that this is the practice of land clearing taking advantage of hot weather (Idhom, 2019). As for the 2019 forest and land fire, Jokowi Administration was demanded to announce the name of the companies responsible for that fire. Furthermore, Forest Watch Indonesia stated that deforestation in Indonesia escalated in the 2013-2017 period with 1,47 million hectares per year compared to the 2009-2013 period with 1,1 million hectares per year, FWI elaborated that this escalation was caused by the normalization of deforestation in the name of development (Pebrianto, 2019). The normalization, however, cannot be separated from the "development" hegemony practiced by SBY Administration and Jokowi Administration.

The corruption issue is one of the most important demands which came from Reformasi in 1998. An NGO focused on corruption eradication, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) published its annual report in a grim fashion from 2015 to 2017. In their 2015 annual report ICW accounted there's criminalization and threat to the leaders and staff of KPK, Judicial Committee, and Indonesian Republic Ombudsman. In the same year, ICW stated that there was an attempt to revise the KPK bill. In their view, such an attempt "is reflecting political ambition" to make anti-corruption institution impotent. For ICW 2015 was the year of terror for corruption eradication in Indonesia (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2016). In the following year ICW reported that they succeed in failing the attempts to revise the KPK bill which occurred several times in 2015, they saw 17 articles that would make KPK impotent (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2017). In 2017, ICW reported that Jokowi Administration was pragmatic in utilizing the good governance concept, because Jokowi Administration just using the concept in economic problems, and they saw Jokowi Administration was not prioritizing corruption eradication agenda, because the National Strategy Program of Corruption

Eradication not yet passed as a regulation aturan (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2018). Zaenur Rohman, a Researcher also stated that Jokowi doesn't serious about his promise related to corruption eradication because there's no new regulation to support the corruption eradication issue.

As for the women's protection problem, for years Indonesia did not have a specific rule to sexual harassment. Women's Commission (Komnas Perempuan) has been established, yet it doesn't enough to tackle this problem. Women's Commission noted that in 2018 there had been 348.466 violence cases towards women, even they also stated that the necessity to pass the Eradication of Sexual Violence draft bill (Komnas Perempuan, 2019). The debate of the bill had been done in many years. Even there are suggestions for the draft, such as Rahmawati and Eddyono's which stated that the regulation should also include the fulfillment of the rights of the victim (Rahmawati & Eddyono, 2017). But the draft has never been passed due to its controversy. The debate was always done in the spectrum of morality and the possibility that it would legalize free sex. In this context, the long response without regulation can be counted as slow or no response.

Jokowi promised to improve the worker's welfare in his campaign. When he rose to power, his administration passed the fourth economic policy package. In that policy package, Jokowi aim to improve the worker's welfare by changing the formula to ensure that workers would never fall into cheap wage (Bappenas Republik Indonesia, 2015). Yet with the passing of Presidential Decree No. 70 the Year 2015, that promise was questioned. Said Iqbal, the leader of KSPI stated that the policy package is just aimed to protect businessmen and investment in Indonesia. He elaborated further that the presidential decree above removed the worker's right to discuss wages in a tripartite discussion between the government, businessmen, and the workers. The presidential decree would make the workers fall into a regime of cheap labor (CNN Indonesia, 2016).

Those issues stated above could be ended in the democracy and human rights issues. But no dislocation would bring together these demands just yet. We could see how Jokowi's Administration turns its back from democracy after Aksi Bela Islam in 2017 (Fealy, 2016). This turn made Jokowi fight the opposition with repression or criminalization (Mietzner, 2019; Power, 2018; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). But to put it into the context, Jokowi in his campaign promised he would resolve past human rights cases, even he promised that his administration would put human rights into the middle school curriculum and revise the Military Justice bill (Tempo, 2017). In 2014 there are many activists and intellectuals revered Jokowi as the manifestation of the Reformation Era. Yet the Jokowi appointed Wiranto as his

Coordinating Minister of Law, Politics and Human Rights, Wiranto is one of the persons which often referred to as “human rights criminal” due to his involvement in the abduction, torture, and deportation of activists at the end of New Order (CNN Indonesia, 2019). The Jokowi Administration also often gives space and even violates democracy, for instance, the case of racism in Surabaya; activist criminalization; and Papua internet throttling. Also, there was a fear that the military dual function would return with the passing of Presidential Decree No. 37 the Year 2019 about TNI Functional Position (Bernie, 2019).

With those demands not responded to. In September 2019 occurred a dislocation which brings those demands into one identity, #ReformasiDikorupsi. This dislocation can be traced to when the house of representatives appointed Firli Bahuri as the new leader of KPK on 13 September 2019. Firli Bahuri appointment was questioned due to his bad reputation and yet he passed all the tests given by the selection committee. On 16 September 2019, the house of representatives announced that they finished their discussion of the new criminal codebook and that the criminal codebook was deemed as “regulating the private life” along with several weird articles such as black magic. And 17 September 2019. The Government and house of representatives passed the new KPK bill which was never entered the priority of the house of representatives (Budiartie, 2019). Those events were the dislocation that allows #ReformasiDikorupsi to emerge.

The protest had been mobilized to reject the revision of the new KPK bill by Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia. On the following day, students from various universities also protested the new KPK bill. These students consolidated themselves and agreed to use #TuntaskanReformasi as their symbol of resistance. There was also an attempt to symbolize the movement with #ReformasiDikorupsi by various NGOs and other civilian elements. Between those two symbols, #ReformasiDikorupsi resonates faster and stronger within discourse than #TuntaskanReformasi. As the result #ReformasiDikorupsi, was also taken by the student agreed to take #ReformasiDikorupsi as their symbol of resistance due to their similar ideas, even though there was a debate on how to respond Eradication of Sexual Violence draft bill – one of the student alliances, namely as BEM-SI rejected that (Interview with Muhammad Nurdiansyah, 24 November 2021). Thus #ReformasiDikorupsi could be seen as an empty signifier that united and signified the movement, also gave fullness to their identity. This series of events could be seen as a process of constructing a new identity made possible by dislocation. This argumentation was based on the transcendental process of those issues, from NGO and media demands to public demand with the involvement of the students. This process is also derived from the role that the student took along the history of Indonesian

political transition: Old Order to New Order; New Order to Reformasi. The identity constructed in Indonesian political history could be seen as “change agent” or “young intellectual group” that always intervene with politics. This signal was captured by students and other civil society elements in various cities. In Yogyakarta, for instance, there is a mobilization of the #GejayanMemanggil movement that identifies themselves as part of #ReformasiDikorupsi. This massive interpellation made possible with two of the demands, first, the new KPK bill was seen as an attempt to weaken that institution and a violation of the Reformasi vision in general, and the draft of the new criminal codebook directly “threatened” citizens. This criminal codebook also played a large role to interpellate a large number of masses which positioned themselves as an opposition. Without this criminal codebook which directly “threaten” vast majority of identity, maybe the mobilization was not as high as occurred.

#ReformasiDikorupsi was taken to symbolize the movement of a wide range of elements of society because those two words resonate with the core idea to answer the question of why there are such attempts by the power, for #ReformasiDikorupsi they saw it as deviance from Reformasi’s vision or social imaginary, as the result of the aforementioned vision had been corrupted by the oligarchs (Interview with Bhagavad Sambhada, 5 October 2021). The same idea developed in the student alliances which at first symbolize their movement with #TuntaskanReformasi, they saw #ReformasiDikorupsi as a kindred spirit that want to intervene with the practices of power that exercised within the state, and that is the reason the student alliances identify themselves with #ReformasiDikorupsi (Interview with Muhammad Nurdiansyah, 24 November 2021). Those identification made possible due to both #TuntaskanReformasi and #ReformasiDikorupsi recalled Reformasi vision as the ideal way to fix all of Indonesia’s problems, and the recalling of Reformasi vision, also related with the historical mark of Indonesian political transition.

#ReformasiDikorupsi chose to enforce a leaderless system of a movement that occurred in Hong Kong in the same year. The idea of leaderless movement is to make co-optation harder to be done. Yet, there’s another reason, which is due to their wide array of identity it was hard to represent fully those movement and there was a fear when #ReformasiDikorupsi is represented by a leader that #ReformasiDikorupsi would split due to different interests (Interview with Bhagavad Sambhada, 5 October 2021). But, in reality, the big representation of #ReformasiDikorupsi was taken by the student, there are several reasons to support this claim: first, the identity of Indonesian students was constructed along with the political transition in Indonesia, thus many referred to #ReformasiDikorupsi as student movement or protest. Second, the transcendental process from particular to universal was made possible by




the intervention of the student, as mentioned above: NGOs and media issue to public issue. The third reason was obvious, it is related to the quantity of the masses the student mobilized and interpellated.

The joint communique announced by #ReformasiDikorupsi further explains what identity tried to be constructed. The “people” (rakyat) or “citizen” (warga negara) was called in the communique, these naming can be described as an attempt to construct a popular movement or populist movement. Such attempt could be traced to who #ReformasiDikorupsi was calling: student, worker, fishermen, farmer, and women. Thus, we can conclude that the construction of #ReformasiDikorupsi is an attempt to unite many demands that are isolated in their particularity. This unity was made possible by the dislocation that occurred in September 2019. Despite the leaderless movement, the student was taking the role of the representation of #ReformasiDikorupsi due to the abstract nature of an empty signifier, namely #ReformasiDikorupsi. An empty signifier is abstract and with no concrete meaning because an empty signifier emerges to unite various demands.

As for the demands aforementioned above, this would reflect themselves in #ReformasiDikorupsi’s 7 demands to the state, namely: 1. Rejecting the draft of the new criminal codebook, the draft of Mineral and Coal bill, the draft of Agrarian bill; draft of Correctional bill, demands that the new KPK and Water Resource bill canceled; Pass the Eradication of Sexual Violence and Protection of Houseworker; 2. Cancel the problematic new KPK leader appointed by the house of representatives; 3. Rejecting the military and police occupying civilian positions; 4. Stop militarism in Papua and other regions also free the Papuan political prisoner; 5. Stop criminalization of activists; 6. Stop the forest fire in Kalimantan and Sumatera done by corporations, persecute those corporations, and revoke their license; 7. Finish human rights violations and bring justice for human rights criminals, including those who sit within the power.

The corruption eradication demand reflected from the demand to cancel the new KPK bill and Firli Bahuri as new KPK leader; the women’s demand could be seen in the demand to pass the Eradication of Sexual Violence and Protection of Houseworker; agrarian conflict problem is reflected from the rejection of the new draft of Agrarian bill; ecological demand can be seen in the demand to finish the forest and land fire; and lastly, the demand of human rights and democracy could be seen in the rejection of the returning dual function, stop militarism in Papua, activist criminalization of activist, and liberation of Papuan political prisoner. We can illustrate the chain of equivalence of the demands with this figure:

**Figure 1: Illustration of #ReformasiDikorupsi chain of equivalence**

Source: (Laclau, 2005, p. 130)

However, this illustration does not final, we believe that there are other demands that figure above could illustrate the #ReformasiDikorupsi condensed demand. Yet, we also believe that there's wide array of demands that identify themselves with #ReformasiDikorupsi. Nevertheless, that illustration was made to inform that #ReformasiDikorupsi was constructed with various demands and identities which reflected in the demands themselves. The aim of the illustration is also to further elaborate Ekayanta's (2019) argument that the Jokowi Administration made various antagonistic relationships in their articulation of development hegemony. Thus, #ReformasiDikorupsi could not be reduced to just student protest even stating that this dissent was undetected, the atom which construct #ReformasiDikorupsi was always there due to how the state exercises its power.

### **How #ReformasiDikorupsi sees The State and Their Myth**

#ReformasiDikorupsi sees the state has been controlled by the oligarch. These oligarchs utilize the state institutions as the enabler of the power exercise that puts misery on the people. #ReformasiDikorupsi referred to the oligarchs as the one percent of Indonesian that control the majority of the wealth in Indonesia. They saw corruption as the root for all the wrongdoings in the exercise of power and opening path to the oligarchs to accumulate wealth from the people (Interview with @AksiLangsung, 07 November 2021). #ReformasiDikorupsi saw corruption as a legacy that New Order left for Reformasi. The weakening of KPK was regarded as how the state allowed the oligarchs to treat the people in a despotic fashion by leaving what

Reformasi had envisioned. Oligarchs and the weakening of KPK is the key point for the construction of #ReformasiDikorupsi as “the people” versus “the oligarchs” which tried to damage the state by making the law for taking advantage of the people. Yet they never put their antagonistic side concretely with the state or the Jokowi Administration, the opt to put it in an abstract way, namely “the practices of state management and power exercise which gradually deviate from Reformasi vision in the last two decades.”

In the explanation above, we can see what mystical discourse that articulated by #ReformasiDikorupsi. With emphasizing the missing of Reformasi vision in the power exercise and management of the state which is seen to serve the oligarchs, the myth that #ReformasiDikorupsi articulate to suture the system is to return the what Reformasi envisioned in the power exercise of the state. From that, they try to derive that the management of the state has to be siding with the people and protecting the people from various threats, and giving the people opportunity and protection towards the people’s welfare. This mystical discourse cannot be separated from the idea that corrupt practices are New Order’s characteristic. Furthermore, they conclude that the weakening of KPK is a regression. Thus, this concludes that #ReformasiDikorupsi seeks to reactivate and reinforce the old social imaginary which had triumphed over the New Order’s social imaginary marked with Reformasi in 1998. #ReformasiDikorupsi still believed that this social imaginary is still in the Indonesian political discourse structure. This, however, would bring #ReformasiDikorupsi in an unclear relationship with the state and would explain their failure.

### **#ReformasiDikorupsi’s Articulation and Their Position**

In September 2019, #ReformasiDikorupsi rely heavily on Twitter for their articulation, due to twitter’s community guidelines that don’t follow the regulating country. The utilization of Twitter also made #ReformasiDikorupsi mobilize and call for a wider and larger quantity of masses. Aliansi Rakyat Bergerak, for instance, mobilizes the masses via Twitter, despite they don’t have an official Twitter account, they still tweet #GejayanMemanggil to further mobilize the masses (Interview with Aliansi Rakyat Bergerak, 18 September 2021). Quickly #ReformasiDikorupsi tactically creating new hashtags to help the protesters such as #MedisAksi; #HukumAksi; #HilangAksi; and #LogistikAksi, these hashtags could be used in every city which a mass protest occurred. Furthermore, there is an attempt to strengthen the resources and support the logistics of #ReformasiDikorupsi by fundraising by #ReformasiDikorupsi, specifically by Ananda Badudu through kitabisa.com which led to his apprehension by the police. Quickly #ReformasiDikorupsi gained support from various

elements in social media. There are #DiperkosaNegara which was started by K-pop fanbases account and #STMBergerak which marks the middle vocational school involvement in the #ReformasiDikorupsi protest. Chronologically, the protest started with #MahasiswaBergerak and #GejayanMemanggil, which later identify themselves with #ReformasiDikorupsi. The utilization of social media is one of the characteristics of Indonesian middle-class ways of protest (Jati, 2017). Prior to this event, Suwana (2018) had elaborated on several cases of social media activism done by the Indonesian middle-class.

As discussed before, there were attempts to create a political frontier with the naming of “the people” or “citizens.” Yet the movement could be seen as a liberal critic towards the management of the state, we can see how #ReformasiDikorupsi contest the idea of criminal codebook draft which saw as an attempt by the state to intervene in private life – for instance, in the draft, there is an article which regulates co-habitation. The state was also seen as a protector of citizens’ rights. #ReformasiDikorupsi’s belief towards democracy in September 2019 was quite high, despite the state’s response to repress the protest yet they still believed that Jokowi have goodwill to cancel all the problematic exercise of power (Interview with @AksiLangsung, 07 November 2021). Thus, despite their obvious attempt to contest the exercise of power, #ReformasiDikorupsi never wanted any radical or contested the legitimization of state officials. Their relation with the state cannot per se be translated as an attempt to contest the legitimacy of Jokowi or the new house of representatives. Instead of contesting or questioning the legitimacy of state officials, #ReformasiDikorupsi saw the 2019 General Election as their base reasoning on why they were protesting. The reason for this is that #ReformasiDikorupsi believed the 2019 General Election was legitimate and had acquired the mandate of the people. Thus, with that democratic mandate #ReformasiDikorupsi seeks to reactivate that “people” mandate by those 7 demands. #ReformasiDikorupsi tried to play in a democratic arena by trying to demand that the state officials should do as the mandate of the people, not captured by the oligarch (Interview with Bhagavad Sambhada, 5 October 2021).

The result of this belief was how #ReformasiDikorupsi articulation of demands tends to “requesting” rather than “urging.” We could see how #ReformasiDikorupsi still leaned on Jokowi’s goodwill to cancel the new KPK bill which had been passed. Despite the usage of the “urging” (*mendesak*) word. #ReformasiDikorupsi still tends to request aid from state officials. This was the result of their antagonism only towards the oligarchs which control the system and the state and concretely with the power exercise of the state, they never put antagonistic relation towards the state officials such as Jokowi’s Administration nor the house of representatives. This idea is influenced by the belief that the residue of Reformasi vision is still

embedded in the Indonesian political system and the emphasis on the actors in the Indonesian political system was high.

Therefore, their articulation through protest against the state can be seen as ambiguous and unclear. On one hand, they had cast a vote of no confidence as a symbolic stance of protest towards the house of representative as their disappointment toward the house of representatives that promise to hold an audience with #ReformasiDikorupsi, which had been organized by the general secretary of the house of representatives, yet there was no such meeting (Ristiano, 2019). But, on the other hand, #ReformasiDikorupsi further articulates their demands to the house of representatives and the Jokowi Administration until October 2019. On this matter, we argue that #ReformasiDikorupsi tried to play in a democratic arena. Yet, on the other side they also notice that the Indonesian democratic arena had stagnated in SBY Administration (Mietzner, 2012) and even regressed in Jokowi Administration (Mietzner, 2019; Power, 2018; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). This belief to play in the democratic arena, however, gradually shattered as they were repressed by the state and giving #ReformasiDikorupsi a shock with several death that marks the protest (Interview with @AksiLangsung, 07 November 2021). But in 2019, that belief was still high and clear.

The belief towards the democratic arena puts #ReformasiDikorupsi in a unique relation towards the state. On one hand, the demands that construct #ReformasiDikorupsi have been ignored by the state, and further saw the Jokowi Administration and the house of representative does not give any positive effect towards those demands they articulated and even they saw the democratic institution had lost its integrity and porous. Yet #ReformasiDikorupsi still leaned on the legitimacy of the 2019 General Election as a means of democracy in Indonesia and the winner of that election were justified the claim to rule Indonesia. This relation could be seen as half antagonistic and half agonistic because they put the oligarchs as an adversary to influence the exercise of power. This view we believe stems from how #ReformasiDikorupsi saw the state as a neutral entity. Furthermore, their idea of popular movement is can be seen as the taking of state influence and culminated in the belief of there was no need to intervene in the state radically. This could be seen as a fantasy or an enjoyment (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 107), but this article would not discuss this further due to the focus of political logics as an area of analysis, fantasy would fall into the fantasmatic logics area of analysis.

This belief is rooted in liberal ideas. NGOs as one of the atoms of #ReformasiDikorupsi influenced heavily by liberal ideas such as freedom and minimal state role, the state is just a watchdog (Robet, 2008). As for the student, there is a doctrine called “moral movement” this doctrine was embedded in the student identity in the political area. To put it simply, this “moral

movement” said that a student had to be involved with politics as a student. In other words, does not advocate any interest, but shows which is right and which is wrong (Lazarus, 2021). These two beliefs are inherited within #ReformasiDikorupsi, the emphasis on minimal state and tend to make a distance towards the power, they opt to influence it. Mudhoffir (2021) even stated that #ReformasiDikorupsi is liberal activism which reactionary. For him, this was due to the dominance of the Weberian approach as the result of the 1965 genocide. This position made #ReformasiDikorupsi did not have a clear agenda or aim. The clearest agenda and aims, however, were to influence the state officials, due to their belief in its neutrality. This position was brought failure to #ReformasiDikorupsi maintaining their resilience towards the state, due to its unclear position in the political discursive struggle as they put themselves as a half antagonistic and half agonistic which still held democratic beliefs, #ReformasiDikorupsi agenda was just influencing the state officials by articulating their demands through the mobilization of serial mass protest. Yet, there are no aims towards a radical intervention nor any attempt to redefine the hegemonic meaning of power exercise. To put it simply, #ReformasiDikorupsi believed that their mythical discourse is still the social imaginary of the state, yet they saw the other way around as they mobilize and contest the state’s power exercise, they found problematic.

## **Conclusion**

This article shows that #ReformasiDikorupsi was constructed based from various demands that the state ignored or even detrimental to those demands. The construction of #ReformasiDikorupsi was possible by a dislocation that threatened their identity as a citizen of Indonesia, and the state act to weaken the KPK as it is embedded as one of the Reformasi Vision. However, this dislocation puts #ReformasiDikorupsi with an unclear position of half antagonistic and half agonistic, or to put it simply pseudo-antagonistic, as this was the result of logics of difference and equivalence, #ReformasiDikorupsi just differentiates themselves with the oligarchs, yet they put the state in a neutral position, this position brought themselves in a discursive struggle that saw themselves and the oligarchs attempted to influences the state. That pseudo-antagonistic position was derived from their belief that what Reformasi was envisioned is still a social imaginary within the Indonesian political arena. Thus, brings a failure to maintain its resilience towards the state, because their agenda is just to influence the state officials.

Despite the discussion above, this article was limited to the area analysis of political logics which seek to explain why the system was deemed worthy of public contestation, or in other words when the political is moving. Yet the root that caused why #ReformasiDikorupsi believed in such democratic values could be related to the fantasmatic logics area of analysis, as it seeks to explain why a subject gripped or maintain an ideological belief or why some practices maintained or changed. Future research should elaborate on how this fantasy occurred in the first place or even utilize social logics as an area of analysis which could explain why the state exercises the power in such a fashion. Or could also examine the cohesion of #ReformasiDikorupsi as an entity itself

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