

CORRUPTION AND CONFLICT IN MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRIES: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis

Fiya Ainur Rohmatika & Surwandono

Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Jl. Brawijaya, Geblagan, Tamantirto, Kabupaten Bantul, Yogyakarta 55183, Indonesia
e-mail: fiya.ainur.psc24@mail.umy.ac.id, surwandono@umy.ac.id

Abstract: Corruption and socio-political conflict remain major challenges in many Muslim-majority societies. This study examines the relationship between corruption and conflict intensity through a cross-national empirical analysis of 20 Muslim-majority countries. Using data from the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Global Peace Index (GPI), Pearson's correlation analysis identifies a strong negative association ($r = -0.769$), indicating that higher perceived corruption is closely linked to greater conflict intensity. The findings suggest that corruption undermines institutional legitimacy, weakens governance capacity, and intensifies structural vulnerabilities that fuel instability. Despite Islamic normative frameworks emphasizing justice and accountability, persistent corruption reflects a significant gap between ethical ideals and institutional practice across diverse contexts. This study conceptualizes corruption not merely as an administrative failure but as a central driver of conflict dynamics. Addressing the corruption–conflict nexus requires integrated strategies that combine institutional reform, strengthened governance accountability, and context-sensitive ethical approaches to enhance political stability in contemporary Muslim societies.

Keywords: Corruption, Conflict, Muslim-Majority Societies, Governance, Political Stability

Corresponding Author	Fiya Ainur Rohmatika			
Article history	Submitted: July 13, 2025	Revision: September 20, 2025	Accepted : December 13, 2025	Published : December 19, 2025
How to cite article	Rohmatika, Fiya Ainur and Surwandono. "CORRUPTION AND CONFLICT IN MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRIES: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis." <i>Journal of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Societies</i> 9, no. 2 (2025): 290 - 322. http://dx.doi.org/10.30821/jcims.v9i2.25435			

Introduction

Corruption and conflict are deeply interwoven global phenomena that collectively pose serious threats to a country's socio-political stability and long-term development.¹ Rather than existing in isolation, these two dynamics are frequently locked in a mutually reinforcing and symbiotic relationship.² Corruption undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions by eroding public trust, distorting resource allocation, and perpetuating systemic inequality.³ These structural injustices create fertile ground for social grievances, marginalization, and political disillusionment, which, in turn, can escalate into various forms of conflict, including civil unrest, insurgencies, and state failure.⁴ Conversely, the onset of conflict, particularly in fragile or post-conflict states often creates conditions in which oversight mechanisms are weakened, rule of law is suspended, and elite capture intensifies, thereby enabling and entrenching corrupt practices.⁵ In the context of global security, this vicious cycle not only impedes peacebuilding efforts but also destabilizes regional and international security architectures.⁶ Over the past decade, the majority of Arab countries have exhibited a troubling stagnation in their efforts to combat corruption, reflecting deep-seated structural and political challenges that continue to undermine transparency and good governance⁷. This persistent inertia is starkly reaffirmed by the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which indicates that most countries in the region have failed to achieve meaningful progress in reducing perceived levels of public sector corruption.⁸ Despite increased international attention, civil society activism, and policy discourse around anti-corruption reforms, the region remains hindered by entrenched authoritarianism, weak rule of law, limited institutional accountability, and the pervasive influence of patronage networks.⁹ In many cases, anti-corruption measures are either symbolic or selectively enforced,¹⁰ further eroding

public trust and reinforcing perceptions of impunity among political elites.¹¹ The absence of political will, coupled with the marginalization of independent oversight bodies and media freedoms, has contributed to the continued ineffectiveness of reform initiatives.¹² As such, the lack of improvement highlighted by the 2024 CPI reflects not only the failure of policy implementation but also a broader crisis of governance and legitimacy across much of the Arab world.¹³ The high level of political corruption is the main factor that weakens the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies, both in the legislative, executive, and judicial spheres.¹⁴ Political corruption not only creates impunity and undermines governance,¹⁵ but also directly limits people's access to essential public services such as health and education.¹⁶ In extreme cases, corruption even implicates violations of the right to life, as has happened in conflict countries such as Syria and Yemen.¹⁷

Furthermore, this reality poses serious challenges to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly goal 16, which emphasizes the importance of peace, justice, and resilient institutions.¹⁸ With seven years left to the 2030 target, Arab countries face major obstacles in the form of a lack of governance infrastructure and weak national integrity systems.¹⁹ The Arab region's average CPI score of only 34 out of 100 points reflects a systemic state of weak accountability and transparency, creating a crisis of institutional legitimacy and fading hopes for structural reform. The difference in performance between Arab countries also indicates a large disparity in governance. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, the region's highest-scoring countries (68 and 58, respectively), have been relatively successful in establishing more stable oversight and law enforcement mechanisms. In contrast, countries such as Libya (18), Yemen (16), Syria (13), and Somalia (11) are stuck in a cycle of prolonged conflicts that exacerbate corrupt practices and weaken the foundations

of the state.²⁰ This situation suggests a strong correlation between conflict, institutional weakness, and the prevalence of corruption²¹, which collectively impede social, economic, and political progress in the region.²²

Corruption in post-conflict contexts has even become a major obstacle in peacebuilding and state reconstruction efforts.²³ Studies conducted by the World Bank show that unfair resource allocation and corrupt practices in the distribution of humanitarian aid in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan have deepened social fragmentation and triggered new conflicts.²⁴ This finding is in line with Zaum and Cheng's opinion that corruption in post-conflict processes not only weakens the legitimacy of state institutions but also becomes a tool of political compromise that risks creating fragile pseudo-peace. In their follow-up study, *Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?*, Cheng and Zaum show how local and international elites often "sell" peace through compromises that enable corruption as a form of short-term political stabilization, albeit at the expense of long-term sustainable development.²⁵

This condition becomes even more ironic when viewed from the perspective of Islamic values.²⁶ In Islamic teachings, corruption whether in the form of *ghulûl* (embezzlement) or *risywah* (bribery) constitutes a serious violation of the principles of justice ('adl) and trust. The Qur'an explicitly condemns embezzlement in Q.S. 3:161, while a hadith in Sahih Bukhari underscores the strict prohibition of bribery and the abuse of power. Islam provides a strong normative framework for combating corruption through mechanisms such as *hisbah* (public oversight), *zakat* (equitable wealth distribution), and the principle of *mashlahah* (public good). However, political reality shows that these principles are often undermined in practice, due to weak institutional accountability and the politicization of religion by the ruling

elite.²⁷ As pointed out by Er, many Muslim countries fail to harness the power of Islamic values in creating clean and inclusive governance.²⁸ Even in supposedly Shariah-based sectors such as Islamic banking, Arshad and Rizvi found a positive correlation between the profitability of Islamic banks and the level of state corruption, signaling a compromise of Islamic ethical values in economic practice.²⁹

The dynamics of globalization have not been able to fully suppress corruption in low-income Muslim countries. Lalountas et al. show that globalization tends to be effective in reducing corruption levels only in middle and high-income countries, while in poor countries, the effect is limited and can even exacerbate inequality if not accompanied by institutional reform and redistribution of resources.³⁰ In this context, the study of the relationship between corruption and conflict in the Muslim world is highly relevant, not only to understand the cycle of violence and governance weaknesses, but also to formulate contextualized intervention strategies that combine global security approaches with Islamic ethics and values.

Based on this background, this article aims to analyze the correlation between corruption and conflict in Muslim-majority countries using a multidisciplinary approach. Through quantitative correlational methods, this research will test the hypothesis that corruption is not only positively correlated with conflict escalation but also serves as a mediator between governance failure and political instability. This research will address the main question to examine the complex relationship between corruption and conflict in Muslim countries, namely how the correlation between the level of corruption (as measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index/CPI) and the intensity of conflict (as measured by the Global Peace Index/GPI) in these countries. This question aims to examine the statistical relationship between

the two variables, as well as identify empirical patterns that support the theoretical claim of their linkage. Based on these questions, this study contributes to the international security literature, particularly in the context of Muslim countries, but also opens a space for critical dialogue on the integration of religious approaches in anti-corruption reform and sustainable peace efforts. The study also invites deeper reflection on how Islamic values can be operationalized to strengthen governance, reduce conflict vulnerability, and address the challenges of globalization that often exacerbate inequality.

The relationship between corruption and conflict is one of the central issues in global development, security, and governance studies. In Muslim countries, this dynamic is all the more complex as it is influenced by socio-political structures, religious legitimacy, state capacity, and global pressures. Corruption, as a form of abuse of power for personal or group gain, has long been identified as one of the main factors that undermine socio-political stability and trigger internal conflict.³¹ Conversely, conflict, especially of a prolonged nature, also creates fertile conditions for the development of structural corruption practices. This phenomenon creates a mutually reinforcing cycle that is difficult to break.³²

In Muslim countries, such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, corruption perception indices show very low scores, reflecting weak governance capacity.³³ Corruption in these countries is not only administrative, but also systemic, penetrating vital sectors such as security, bureaucracy, and public finance. In the context of Muslim countries, Ko and Moon criticize the relationship between religion and corruption. They emphasize that while religion is often positioned as a deterrent to corruption, in practice, hierarchical religious social structures (such as Islam and Catholicism) correlate with higher levels of corruption.

However, they also warn against the ecological fallacy of generalizing country data to the individual level, as well as the importance of accounting for the level of religious commitment in the analysis.³⁴

From a theological perspective, Jabbar explains that Islam unequivocally condemns corruption, as affirmed in the Qur'an and Hadith. However, many Muslim-majority countries continue to experience high levels of corruption.³⁵ This suggests a gap between religious values and actual political behavior, referred to as moral dissonance. This phenomenon was also highlighted by Khoirin and Junaedi who observed a mismatch between individual religiosity levels and anti-corruption attitudes, particularly among Muslim politicians in Indonesia.³⁶

Furthermore, Karakaya examines why Muslim-majority countries tend to be more prone to internal conflict. He found that variables such as poverty, authoritarianism, youth bulge, and petroleum dependency are strongly correlated with civil conflict, while religious factors do not play a significant role in predicting conflict when these structural variables are taken into account. These findings are relevant for looking at the correlation between structural corruption and protracted conflict conditions.³⁷ Hudaib explained that neoliberalism and the personalization of power in many Islamic countries have weakened state oversight and accountability structures, creating fertile conditions for systemic corruption. Corruption in this context is not only administrative, but also political and ideological, deepening the gap of public distrust in state institutions and becoming one of the causes of social conflict.³⁸

Farzanegan and Zamani provide empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and internal conflict in Iran by constructing a news-based corruption reflection index. Their vector autoregression analysis reveals that shocks in corruption

significantly increase the incidence of protests, with economic stagnation and military spending acting as key transmission channels. These findings underscore corruption's structural role in lowering opportunity costs of mobilization and perpetuating instability in resource-dependent political economies.³⁹

Complementing this empirical perspective, Ceva and Ferretti advance a normative account of political corruption as a constitutive, rather than merely causal, driver of conflict. They conceptualize corruption as a deficit of office accountability that disrupts institutional interactions and undermines public trust, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction. Rejecting externally imposed, legalistic anti-corruption frameworks, they advocate an inward approach that mobilizes institutions' internal resources of self-correction and officeholders' interrelated responsibility to safeguard institutional resilience.⁴⁰

At the policy level, Wedha, Wijaya, Mukti, and Turymshayeva analyze conflicts of interest as a critical source of criminal corruption in Indonesia. Despite extensive regulatory frameworks, weak enforcement, fragmented institutions, and cultural permissiveness, undermine effectiveness. Their comparative study with Kazakhstan demonstrates that stringent sanctions and centralized enforcement improve deterrence, but they argue that sustainable reform requires integrating socio-cultural dimensions beyond formal legal provisions. This highlights the embeddedness of corruption within institutional, structural, and cultural contexts that legal regulation alone cannot resolve.⁴¹

Research on the link between corruption and conflict shows that these two phenomena influence each other and form a vicious cycle that is difficult to break. Corruption weakens the legitimacy of the state and undermines public trust in institutions, thereby triggering domestic conflict⁴², especially in developing countries with Muslim-majority populations. Although religion

is often seen as a moral bulwark, hierarchical religious structures can be associated with high levels of corruption because religious values are not always reflected in ethical, political, or bureaucratic practices.⁴³ Normatively, Islamic teachings condemn corruption as a major sin, but the level of religiosity does not guarantee that a person is free from corrupt behavior, as seen in various studies of Muslim political actors.

On the other hand, civil conflicts in Muslim countries are more often triggered by structural factors such as poverty, political repression, and economic dependence, rather than solely by religious aspects. In a broader context, neoliberal dynamics and the centralization of power in many Muslim countries weaken public accountability mechanisms and reinforce systemic corruption. Corruption shocks have been shown to increase the level of public protest, demonstrating their significant role in maintaining internal tensions and conflicts. In addition, corruption is understood as a form of accountability deficit that erodes public trust and institutional resilience. Weak law enforcement and a permissive culture also perpetuate corrupt practices, so that improvement requires a combination of tougher sanctions and more fundamental socio-cultural changes.⁴⁴ Therefore, corruption and conflict cannot be narrowly understood as a moral or religious issue, but must be seen as the result of complex interactions between mutually reinforcing political, economic, cultural, and institutional factors.

While a number of studies have addressed the link between corruption and conflict, most of them are descriptive, focus on one specific country or region, and have not systematically integrated cross-country correlational quantitative approaches in the context of Muslim countries. In this regard, this study fills the research gap by analyzing 20 Muslim countries as the unit of analysis to examine the extent to which corruption contributes to conflict, as well as how other socio-political variables

can strengthen or weaken the relationship. Through a comparative correlation approach based on secondary data, this study not only provides a strong empirical foundation but also broadens the understanding of the complexity of global security from the perspective of Muslim countries.

Method

This study uses correlational research design and quantitative methods to analyze the relationship between the level of corruption and conflict in Muslim countries from twenty Muslim countries in the world which include Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkiye, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia. The data used in this study are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global Peace Index (GPI) data. The CPI measures perceptions of corruption in the public sector on a scale of 0-100, where higher scores indicate lower levels of corruption. Meanwhile, the GPI measures the level of peace and conflict in a country on a scale of 1-4, where a lower score indicates a higher level of peace.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) score, which initially used a scale of 1-4, was converted to a scale of 0-100 through multiplication by a factor of 25. This conversion was done to facilitate correlation analysis between the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the GPI, as well as to ensure equality of measurement scales between the two variables. A GPI score of 1 is equivalent to 25, while a score of 4 is equivalent to 100 after multiplying by 25. CPI data was obtained from Transparency International, while GPI data was sourced from the Institute for Economics and Peace. Both institutions are trusted data providers in their fields. The research sample includes 20 Muslim countries selected based on data availability and diverse geographical representation.

The correlation between the two indices was found using the Pearson formula, and a correlation coefficient of -0.769 was found. The formula can be broken down into several components as follows:

1. Decomposing the mean: $(x - \bar{x})$ represents the deviation of each individual data point X from the mean X, and $(y - \bar{y})$ represents the deviation of each individual data point Y from the mean Y
2. Multiplying the intersection: $(x - \bar{x}) * (y - \bar{y})$ expresses the product of the deviation of each data point X and Y from their respective averages
3. Standardization of Deviation (Standardization of Crosses). To normalize the results of the correlation calculation, the standard deviation of each variable is used.
The notation $\sigma_x = \sqrt{\sum (x - \bar{x})^2}$ Represents the standard deviation of variable X, while $\sigma_y = \sqrt{\sum (y - \bar{y})^2}$ is the standard deviation of variable Y. By dividing the sum of the product of the deviations of the product of the standard deviations of the two variables, a statistical measure called the correlation coefficient is obtained, whose value is in the range between -1 and 1.⁴⁵
4. Correlation Coefficient (R) Calculation: Using the Pearson correlation formula to calculate the correlation coefficient (R) between the CPI and GPI. The formula used is:

$$R = \frac{\text{Covariance}(X, Y)}{\sqrt{\text{Variance}(X) \times \text{Variance}(Y)}}$$

$$R = \frac{-131,377125}{\sqrt{11,9 \times 14,35}}$$

$$R = -0,76934$$

The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r Pearson) is generally used to assess the linear relationship between two

quantitative variables. This correlation value ranges from -1 to 1.⁴⁶ Where the correlation result reflects the strength and/or direction of the relationship between two or more variables.

1. A positive correlation indicates that both variables move in the same direction (if one increases, the other also increases).
2. A negative correlation indicates that the two variables move in opposite directions (if one increases, the other decreases).
3. A correlation of zero (0) indicates that there is no linear relationship between the two variables.⁴⁷

To understand the strength of the linear relationship between two quantitative variables, the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) can be used as a reference. The r value, which ranges from -1 to 1, not only indicates the direction of the relationship (positive or negative), but also indicates how strong the relationship between the variables as seen in the Table 1 below.⁴⁸

Table 1. Indicates the direction of the relationship (positive or negative)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Correlation Value Range</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
1.	1.00 or (-1.00)	Perfect positive/negative correlation
2.	0.91- 0.99 or (-0.91) - (-0.99)	Very high positive/negative correlation
3.	0.71-0.90 or (-0.71) - (-0.90)	High positive/negative correlation
4.	0.51-0.70 or (-0.51) - (-0.70)	Moderate positive/negative correlation
5.	0.31-0.50 or (-0.31) - (-0.50)	Low positive/negative correlation
6.	0.01-0.30 or (-0.01) - (-0.30)	Very weak or negligibl correlation
7.	0.00	No correlation

Results And Discussion

Global Peace Index (GPI) and Corruption Perceptions Index (GPI) data

Data collection comes from Global Peace Index (GPI) and Corruption Perceptions Index (GPI) data in 2024 from 20 Muslim countries as shown in Table 2 related to the following Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

Table 2. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Data for 2024

No.	Country	Corruption Perceptions Index - Score (X)
1	Indonesia	37
2	Pakistan	27
3	Bangladesh	23
4	Türkiye	34
5	Iran	23
6	Egypt	30
7	Saudi Arabia	59
8	Algeria	34
9	Sudan	15
10	Iraq	26
11	Afghanistan	17
12	Morocco	37
13	Uzbekistan	32
14	Yemen	13
15	Syria	12
16	Malaysia	50
17	Nigeria	26
18	Mali	27
19	Senegal	45
20	Tunisia	39

Source: Transparency International (2024)

Based on Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) data collected from 20 countries, a variety of scores are obtained that reflect the level of perception of public sector corruption in each country. CPI scores range from 12 to 59, with the highest values indicating lower perceptions of corruption (relatively clean government), and the lowest values indicating higher perceptions of corruption (alarming levels of corruption). From the overall data, Saudi Arabia ranks highest with a score of 59, followed by Malaysia (50) and Senegal (45), indicating relatively low levels of perceived corruption compared to other countries on the list. Meanwhile, the countries with the lowest CPI scores are Syria (12), Yemen (13) and Sudan (15), indicating a perception of high corruption in their public sectors. Countries such as Indonesia (37), Turkey and Algeria (34 each), and Uzbekistan (32) are in the medium category, reflecting that corrupt practices remain a significant challenge that requires institutional reforms and stronger law enforcement.

Scores below 30 by countries such as Pakistan (27), Nigeria (26) and Afghanistan (17) indicate a crisis of public confidence in clean and transparent governance systems. This situation also has an impact on political stability, bureaucratic effectiveness, and the investment climate in these countries. Conversely, countries with CPI scores above 40 can be considered to have better governance and more effective corruption eradication efforts. Overall, this analysis shows that corruption remains a serious problem in most developing countries and requires a multidimensional approach that includes institutional reforms, increased transparency, public participation, and strengthened legal systems to promote cleaner and more accountable governance. The data related to the Global Peace Index (GPI) can be seen in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Global Peace Index (GPI)

No.	Country	Global Peace Index	Global Peace Index - Score (Y)*25
1	Indonesia	1,857	46,425
2	Pakistan	2,783	69,575
3	Bangladesh	2,126	53,15
4	Turkiye	1,937	48,425
5	Iran	2,682	67,05
6	Egypt	2,212	55,3
7	Saudi Arabia	2,206	55,15
8	Algeria	2,036	50,9
9	Sudan	3,327	83,175
10	Iraq	3,045	76,125
11	Afghanistan	2,5	62,5
12	Morocco	2,054	51,35
13	Uzbekistan	2,167	54,175
14	Yemen	3,397	84,925
15	Syria	3,173	79,325
16	Malaysia	1,427	35,675
17	Nigeria	2,907	72,675
18	Mali	3,095	77,375
19	Senegal	1,554	38,85
20	Tunisia	2,044	51,1

Source: Global Peace Index (2024).

Based on the Global Peace Index (GPI) data from 20 countries, there are variations in scores that reflect the level of peace and stability of a country. The lower the GPI score, the higher the level of peace in the country. The GPI score includes various indicators, such as the level of domestic and international violence, military spending, and civilian security. In this data, the scores range from 35,675 to 84,925, indicating significant disparities in global peace conditions among the countries analyzed.

Among the Muslim-majority countries analyzed, Malaysia emerges as the most peaceful, with a Global Peace Index (GPI) score of 35.675, followed by Senegal (38.85) and Indonesia (46.425). These relatively low scores suggest a stable socio-political environment characterized by effective governance, functioning legal institutions, and a comparatively low incidence of violent conflict or organized crime. The presence of coherent state authority, investment in social services, and mechanisms for political participation contribute to these nations' ability to manage tensions and maintain internal order.

Additionally, their moderate levels of militarization and public trust in institutions appear to correlate with sustained peace and social resilience. In stark contrast, countries such as Yemen (84.925), Sudan (83.175), and Syria (79.325) rank among the least peaceful, reflecting the profound impacts of protracted armed conflicts, deep political fragmentation, and near-total collapse of central governance in some cases. These high GPI scores signify environments where violence is both widespread and institutionalized, with widespread human rights violations, large-scale displacement, and the breakdown of civil infrastructure. In these contexts, state incapacity to monopolize the use of force, the proliferation of armed groups, and ongoing foreign interventions further entrench instability.

The stark disparity between the most and least peaceful countries illustrates the complex and uneven nature of peace across the Muslim world. It highlights the importance of a multidimensional peacebuilding framework one that not only addresses conflict cessation but also strengthens democratic institutions, promotes inclusive development, and fosters a culture of accountability and rule of law. Ultimately, peace must be pursued not merely as the absence of violence, but as the presence of justice, good governance, and equitable opportunity for all citizens.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) scores reveal that countries such as Pakistan (69.575), Nigeria (72.675), and Mali (77.375) fall within the high-risk category for conflict and violence. These elevated scores reflect the persistent challenges these nations face, including internal armed conflict, terrorism, political instability, weak governance, and socio-economic disparities that fuel cycles of unrest and insecurity. Such conditions often result in fragile state capacity, disrupted public services, and diminished trust in political and legal institutions. In contrast, countries like Türkiye (48.425), Algeria (50.9), Morocco (51.35), and Tunisia (51.1) are positioned within a medium-risk category.

While these nations are not classified as highly peaceful, their comparatively lower GPI scores indicate relatively greater stability and incremental progress in mitigating conflict-related risks. These countries often benefit from more robust state institutions, moderate levels of social cohesion, and active efforts toward conflict management or political reform. However, the medium category also implies latent vulnerabilities, such as political polarization, economic inequality, or contested governance that could escalate under certain conditions if not addressed proactively. This divergence in peace trajectories among Muslim-majority countries points to the importance of context-specific analysis and policy design. It underscores the need for differentiated peacebuilding strategies that not only respond to immediate security concerns but also strengthen institutional resilience, promote inclusive governance, and address the structural drivers of violence. Accordingly, international cooperation, regional diplomacy, and locally grounded reform agendas are crucial in supporting these nations' efforts to move toward more sustainable peace and stability.

The results of the data analysis reveal a pronounced disparity in the global distribution of peace, with significant regional inequalities persisting across the Muslim world. Countries in the Middle East,

parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia consistently exhibit high Global Peace Index (GPI) scores, signifying elevated levels of conflict, political instability, and societal unrest. In contrast, several countries in Southeast Asia and West Africa demonstrate comparatively lower GPI scores, reflecting more favorable peace and security conditions. This uneven landscape underscores the multifaceted nature of peace and its dependence on structural, institutional, and socio-political variables. The findings highlight the urgent need for holistic and sustainable policy interventions that address the root causes of instability. Key among these are the promotion of inclusive and equitable development, effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, the strengthening of civil and security institutions, and the restoration of public confidence in legal and judicial systems. Enhancing the legitimacy, responsiveness, and transparency of governance structures is particularly critical in conflict-prone contexts, where weak institutions often exacerbate violence and erode social cohesion. In this regard, fostering long-term peace requires not only addressing immediate security concerns but also investing in structural reforms that promote justice, accountability, and inclusive socio-economic progress. These insights reinforce the imperative for policymakers and scholars to adopt a context-sensitive, interdisciplinary approach to peacebuilding that integrates development, governance, and human security dimensions in a coherent and sustainable manner.

Correlation Analysis between Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global Peace Index (GPI) in Muslim countries

The results of data analysis in this study reveal patterns related to the relationship between corruption and conflict in Muslim countries. The statistical findings indicate a significant relationship between the two variables, with specific characteristics that are relevant in the context of global security. The detailed results of

the correlational analysis conducted on the corruption and conflict perception indices can be seen in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Correlation Calculation Results between Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global Peace Index (GPI) in 20 Muslim countries

Country	X (CPI)	Y (GPI)	x-Mx	y-My	(x-Mx) ²	(y-My) ²	(x-Mx)(y-My)
Indonesia	37	46,425	6,7	-14,2363	44,89	202,67224	-95,38321
Pakistan	27	69,575	-3,3	8,9137	10,89	79,454048	-29,41521
Bangladesh	23	53,15	-7,3	-7,5113	53,29	56,419628	54,83249
Türkiye	34	48,425	3,7	-12,2363	13,69	149,72704	-45,27431
Iran	23	67,05	-7,3	6,3887	53,29	40,815488	-46,63751
Egypt	30	55,3	-0,3	-5,3613	0,09	28,743538	1,60839
Saudi Arabia	59	55,15	28,7	-5,5113	823,69	30,374428	-158,17431
Algeria	34	50,9	3,7	-9,7613	13,69	95,282978	-36,11681
Sudan	15	83,175	-15,3	22,5137	234,09	506,86669	-344,45961
Iraq	26	76,125	-4,3	15,4637	18,49	239,12602	-66,49391
Afghanistan	17	62,5	-13,3	1,8387	176,89	3,3808177	-24,45471
Morocco	37	51,35	6,7	-9,3113	44,89	86,700308	-62,38571
Uzbekistan	32	54,175	1,7	-6,4863	2,89	42,072088	-11,02671
Yemen	13	84,925	-17,3	24,2637	299,29	588,72714	-419,76201
Syria	12	79,325	-18,3	18,6637	334,89	348,3337	-341,54571
Malaysia	50	35,675	19,7	-24,9863	388,09	624,31519	-492,23011
Nigeria	26	72,675	-4,3	12,0137	18,49	144,32899	-51,65891
Mali	27	77,375	-3,3	16,7137	10,89	279,34777	-55,15521
Senegal	45	38,85	14,7	-21,8113	216,09	475,73281	-320,62611
Tunisia	39	51,1	8,7	-9,5613	75,69	91,418458	-83,18331

The results of the Pearson Product Moment correlation analysis between the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Global Peace Index (GPI) in 20 Muslim countries show a correlation coefficient (R) of -0.769. This value indicates a strong negative relationship between the level of corruption and the level of peace. That is, the higher the CPI score (which means lower corruption), the lower the GPI score (which means less conflict), and vice versa. This result is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$), so the null hypothesis (H0) that there is no relationship between corruption and conflict is rejected, while the alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. Descriptive statistical calculations showed an average CPI score (Mx) of 30.3 (from a 0-100 scale) and an average GPI score (My) of 60.66 (after converting to a 0-100 scale). The variance of the CPI (Dx) is 141.71, while the variance of the GPI (Dy) stands at 205.69, indicating higher data dispersion in the conflict variable. The covariance between the CPI and GPI is negative (-131.38), reinforcing the finding that the two variables tend to move in opposite directions.

The statistical analysis reveals a strong negative correlation ($R = -0.769$) between corruption and conflict in Muslim-majority countries, suggesting a substantial and inverse relationship between the two variables. A correlation coefficient approaching -1 indicates that higher levels of corruption are consistently associated with greater conflict intensity. This is exemplified by cases such as Syria and Yemen, where Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores are alarmingly low 12 and 13, respectively, while their Global Peace Index (GPI) scores are among the highest, at 79.33 and 84.93, reflecting extreme conflict and insecurity. Conversely, countries such as Malaysia (CPI 50) and Senegal (CPI 45) exhibit lower GPI scores of 35.68 and 38.85, pointing toward comparatively more stable socio-political conditions. These empirical patterns align with Islamic ethical teachings, where corruption conceptualized as *ghulûl* is categorically condemned for violating foundational

values such as justice (*‘adl*) and trust worthiness (*amânah*). The erosion of these principles in highly corrupt states often correlates with institutional fragility and societal unrest. Nonetheless, the findings also point to the nuanced and multifaceted nature of this relationship. For instance, Indonesia despite its strong Islamic identity and normative religious frameworks, continues to grapple with a high level of corruption (CPI 37). This anomaly underscores the necessity of adopting a multidimensional analytical lens that considers not only religious ethics but also structural, political, and socio-economic factors that influence governance and conflict dynamics. Accordingly, effective policy interventions must integrate ethical, institutional, and systemic reforms tailored to the specific contexts of each nation.

This analysis affirms a significant and complex interrelationship between corruption and conflict in Muslim-majority countries. The findings underscore the critical need for an integrated approach that simultaneously addresses governance reform, enhances global and regional security frameworks, and incorporates religious and cultural values as potential tools for promoting social cohesion and political stability. Such an approach is essential to disrupt the cyclical pattern of institutional weakness, societal fragmentation, and persistent instability. Moreover, this study highlights the necessity of further empirical investigation to unpack the underlying causal mechanisms that link corruption and conflict. In particular, future research should examine the influence of mediating variables such as socioeconomic inequality, political polarization, identity-based grievances, and weak rule of law, all of which may exacerbate or mitigate the observed dynamics. A deeper understanding of these mediators will be instrumental in designing more effective, context-sensitive interventions for peacebuilding and anti-corruption efforts in the Muslim world.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that corruption and conflict in Muslim-majority societies are interconnected phenomena that mutually reinforce one another within a persistent structural cycle. Through a cross-national empirical analysis of 20 Muslim-majority countries, the research confirms a strong negative correlation ($r = -0.769$) between corruption levels and conflict intensity, indicating that higher corruption is consistently associated with heightened instability and violence. This statistical relationship reflects deeper governance vulnerabilities, where weak institutions, ineffective rule of law, and fragile accountability mechanisms create conditions conducive to prolonged conflict. Countries with low CPI scores such as Syria and Yemen exhibit severe conflict intensity, whereas states such as Malaysia and Senegal with relatively higher CPI scores demonstrate greater socio-political stability.

The findings also illuminate a significant normative gap between Islamic ethical principles which clearly prohibit corruption as a betrayal of trust and justice (*'adl*) and the empirical reality of political governance in many Muslim-majority societies. Although Islamic teachings provide a comprehensive moral framework through mechanisms such as *hisbah*, *zakat*, and *mashlahah*, these values are often compromised by political elites pursuing short-term power consolidation, thereby perpetuating institutional dysfunction and undermining public trust. In post-conflict settings, corruption further obstructs peacebuilding by fostering clientelism, unfair resource distribution, and fragile, unsustainable peace arrangements.

This research contributes theoretically and practically to the broader understanding of corruption-conflict dynamics, particularly within the unique religio-political contexts of Muslim-majority countries. It offers an interdisciplinary perspective

that integrates political, economic, and religious dimensions to explain why governance failures persist under the pressures of globalization and internal socio-political fragmentation. The results underscore the need for holistic and context-sensitive interventions that strengthen institutions, promote value-based political education, and enhance cooperation between the state and civil society.

The central conclusion is that breaking the corruption-conflict cycle requires a dual-track approach: structural reforms oriented toward legal enforcement, accountability, and inclusive governance, alongside the internalization of Islamic ethical values such as *'adl* (justice), *amânah* (trustworthiness), and *syûra* (consultation). Integrating these elements can cultivate a governance model that addresses not only the observable symptoms of instability but also their underlying moral and institutional roots. This study thus provides both empirical evidence and normative insights, while encouraging further scholarship and policy innovation aimed at achieving long-term peace, justice, and resilience in Muslim-majority societies.

References

Abdelbary, Islam. "From Revolutions to Institutions: The Experience of Arab Reform." *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 16, no. 3 (2023): 593–620. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-12-2020-0614>.

Abdurrahman, Zahron. "Islamic Ethical Governance: An Integrated Model for Corruption Prevention." *Kurva: Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Keuangan Dan Bisnis* 2, no. 1 (2025): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.53088/kurva.v2i2.2245>.

Al-Jundi, Salem A., Ahmed Shuhaiber, and Shaban S. Al-

Emara. "The Effect of Political Instability and Institutional Weakness on Administrative Corruption." *Contemporary Economics* 16, no. 2 (2022): 168–81. <https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.475>.

Alda Sanchez, Erik, David Andersson, Kenneth N Anye, Holly Welborn Benner, Natalia Cieslik, Sarah F Cliffe, Ivan Crouzel, et al. "World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development," 2011.

Alfada, Anisah. "The Destructive Effect of Corruption on Economic Growth in Indonesia: A Threshold Model." *Heliyon* 5, no. 10 (2019): 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2019.e02649>.

Arshad, Shaista, and Syed Aun R. Rizvi. "Impact of Corruption on Bank Profitability: An Analysis of Islamic Banks." *International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics* 8, no. 3 (2013): 195–209. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBGE.2013.057375>.

Azizah, Noor, Muhammad Syahnan, and Zulkarnain. "Approach Restorative In Loss Recovery Caused by Criminal Acts of Corruption." *[PENA JUSTISIA: MEDIA KOMUNIKASI DAN KAJIAN HUKUM]* 24, no. 1 (2025): 3277–3307. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31941/pj.v24i2.6552>.

Boateng, Agyenim, Yan Wang, Collins G. Ntim, and Mohamed Elmagrhi. "Institutions and Corruption Relationship: Evidence from African Countries." *Journal of International Management* 30, no. 3 (2024): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2024.101136>.

Ceva, Emanuela, and Maria Paola Ferretti. "Upholding Public Institutions in the Midst of Conflicts: The Threat of Political Corruption." *Ethics and Global Politics* 14, no. 3 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1961379>.

Cheng, CS, and D Zaum. "Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?" *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies* 43, no. 2 (2015): 1–3. <https://doi.org/10.5787/43-2-1134>.

Clausen, Bianca, Aart Kraay, and Zsolt Nyiri. "Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey." *World Bank Economic Review* 25, no. 2 (2011): 212-49. <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhr018>.

Dincă, Gheorghia, and Christian Gabriel Stempel. "Perceptions of Corruption, Inequality, and the Fragility of Prosperity in Europe." *Economies* 13, no. 10 (2025): 1-27. <https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13100296>.

Djailani, Syahla Aurelya, and Surwandono. "The Wealth-Peace Connection: Human Development Index and Global Peace Index in Middle Eastern Nations." *Jurnal Politik Profetik* 11, no. 1 (2023): 72-86. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v11i1a5>.

Er, Mevliyar. "Corruption from the Islamic Perspective: Some Recommendations for the MENA Region." *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 1, no. 1 (2008): 31-51. <https://doi.org/10.1108/17538390810864241>.

Ezeudu, Tochukwu S. "The Impact of Political Corruption on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria." *Journal of Public Administration and Government* 5, no. 2 (2023): 161-76.

Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza, and Reza Zamani. "The Effect of Corruption on Internal Conflict in Iran Using Newspaper Coverage." *Defence and Peace Economics* 35, no. 1 (2022): 24-43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2108571>.

Gebrihet, Hafte Gebreselassie. "The Effects of the Perception of Corruption on Public Trust in Government in Africa: A Comparative Analysis." *Politikon* 51, no. 1-2 (2024): 18-39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2024.2344276>.

Gillies, Hjallis Häkkänen, Jussi Haavisto Chan, and Pekka Tavio Parenti. "Analyzing the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Measures and Their Impact on Governance in Helsinki, Finland." *Journal Public Policy and Governance* 7, no. 2 (2023): 37-45.

<https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t5188>.

Handoyo, Sofik, and Fury Khristianty Fitriyah. "Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability and Environmental Sustainability: A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Accounting Auditing and Business* 1, no. 2 (2018): 28–38. <https://doi.org/10.24198/jaab.v1i2.18344>.

Hariyani, Happy Febrina, Dominicus Savio Priyarsono, and Alla Asmara. "Analysis of Factors That Affecting Corruption in Asia-Pacific Region." *Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Kebijakan Pembangunan*, 5, no. 2 (2016): 32–44.

Hassoun, Abdo, Carlos Parra-López, Tarek Ben Hassen, Saker Ben Abdallah, Lana Shehadeh, Claudia Terezia Socol, Abderrahman Rajeb, et al. "The Gaza Conflict and Its Implications for the Sustainable Development Goals: A Comprehensive Analysis." *Environment, Development and Sustainability* 7, no. 2 (2025): 1–33. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-025-06763-7>.

Hattar, Kinda. "CPI 2023 for Middle East and North Africa: Dysfunctional Approach to Fighting Corruption Undermines Progress." transparency.org, 2024.

Headrick, Todd Christopher. "A Note on the Relationship Between the Pearson Product-Moment and the Spearman Rank-Based Coefficients of Correlation." *Open Journal of Statistics* 06, no. 06 (2016): 1025–28. <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojs.2016.66082>.

Hudaib, Mohammad. "Accounting for Corruption within Islamic Countries." *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research* 11, no. 4 (2020): 741–43. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIABR-11-2017-0166>.

Humphreys, Rosalind K., Marie Therese Puth, Markus Neuhauser, and Graeme D. Ruxton. "Underestimation of Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Statistic." *Oecologia* 189, no. 1 (2019): 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-018-4233-0>.

Jabbar, Siti Faridah Abdul. "Corruption: Delving into the Muddy Water Through the Lens of Islam." *Journal of Financial Crime* 20, no. 2 (2013): 139–47. <https://doi.org/10.1108/13590791311322337>.

Jaber, Anees Majeed, and Salah Kadhim Jaber. "The Effect of Patterns of Administrative Corruption on the Development Process." *RGSA - Revista de Gestao Social e Ambiental* 18, no. 4 (2024): 1–13.

Karakaya, Süveyda. "Religion and Conflict: Explaining the Puzzling Case of 'Islamic Violence.'" *International Interactions* 41, no. 3 (2015): 509–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016158>.

Kartiko, Nafis Dwi. "Does Government Effectiveness and Corruption Control Support Political Stability?" *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 10, no. 1 (2024): 81–94. <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v10i1.1209>.

Khan, Rana Ejaz Ali, and Sarwat Farooq. "Corruption, Political Instability and Sustainable Development: The Interlinkages." *Journal of Quantitative Methods* 3, no. 1 (2019): 56–83. <https://doi.org/10.29145/2019/jqm/030104>.

Khoirin, Nur, and Mahfudz Junaedi. "Religious Inconsistency on Corruption Behaviour Among Muslim Politicians in Indonesia." *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 78, no. 1 (2022): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7361>.

Ko, Kilkon, and Seong Gin Moon. "The Relationship Between Religion and Corruption: Are the Proposed Causal Links Empirically Valid?" *International Review of Public Administration* 19, no. 1 (2014): 44–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2014.887353>.

Lalountas, Dionisios A., George A. Manolas, and Ioannis S. Vavouras. "Corruption, Globalization and Development: How Are These Three Phenomena Related?" *Journal of Policy Modeling* 33, no. 4 (2011): 636–48. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.02.001>.

Liu, Yongsuo, Qinghua Meng, Rong Chen, Jiansong Wang, Shumin Jiang, and Yuzhu Hu. "A New Method to Evaluate the Similarity of Chromatographic Fingerprints: Weighted Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient." *Journal of Chromatographic Science* 42, no. 10 (2004): 1-8. <https://doi.org/10.1093/chromsci/42.10.545>.

Milton, Sansom, and Mohammad Alhamawi. "Peace-Centred Sustainable Development: An Analysis of SDG 16 in the Arab States." *World Development Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2024): 1-5. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2024.100587>.

Mkhize, Nkosingiphile, and Danielle Nel-Sanders. "Corruption Risk as a Structural Driver of State Fragility: Examining the Governance Crisis in South Africa." *Frontiers in Political Science* 7, no. 2 (2025): 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1575693>.

Osuma, Godswill, and Ntokozo Nzimande. "Examining the Misery Index and Its Effects on Economic Inequality and Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Moderating Role of Corruption." *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 17, no. 6 (2025): 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17062522>.

Paredes, Cristian L., and Jorge C. Derpic. "Perception of Civil Service Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions in Brazil." *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 2 (2025): 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.13057>.

Rontos, Kostas, Ioannis Vavouras, Maria Teresa Ciommi, and Luca Salvati. "Two Faces of the Same Coin? A Comparative, Global Approach to Corruption and Socioeconomic Development." *Quality and Quantity* 53, no. 4 (2019): 1875-94. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00846-0>.

Sumpf, Denise, Salim Araji, and Rebecca Crompton. "Governance in the Arab Region: Addressing Challenges and Envisaging the Future." *Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and*

Institutions 6, no. 3 (2016): 65–86. <https://doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i3c1art8>.

Sylvester, Motadi Masa, and Stewart Lee Kugara. “The Impact of Political Corruption on Governance in Africa: A Qualitative Analysis.” *African Renaissance* 2025, no. 1 (2025): 211–37. <https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2025/sin1a9>.

Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index,” 2023.

Tutuncu, Asiye, and Yasar Bayraktar. “The Effect of Democracy and Corruption Paradox on Economic Growth: MINT Countries.” *Economic Change and Restructuring* 57, no. 4 (2024): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-024-09726-6>.

Wedha, Yogi Yasa, I. Made Hendra Wijaya, Hudali Mukti, and Arida Turymshayeva. “Unraveling the Complex Policies Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Criminal Corruption.” *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System* 5, no. 1 (2025): 33–59. <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v5i1.486>.

Yusuf Maolani, Dedeng. “Governance and Corruption: Evaluating Anti-Corruption Policies and Their Effectiveness in Strengthening Institutional Integrity.” *International Journal of Science and Society* 6, no. 3 (2024): 54–70.

Endnotes:

¹ Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay, and Zsolt Nyiri, "Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey," *World Bank Economic Review* 25, no. 2 (2011): 212-49, <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhr018>.

² Salem A. Al-Jundi, Ahmed Shuhaiber, and Shaban S. Al-Emara, "The Effect of Political Instability and Institutional Weakness on Administrative Corruption," *Contemporary Economics* 16, no. 2 (2022): 168-81, <https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.475>.

³ Anisah Alfada, "The Destructive Effect of Corruption on Economic Growth in Indonesia: A Threshold Model," *Heliyon* 5, no. 10 (2019): 1-14, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2019.e02649>.

⁴ Sofik Handoyo and Fury Khristianty Fitriyah, "Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability and Environmental Sustainability: A Cross-National Analysis," *Journal of Accounting Auditing and Business* 1, no. 2 (2018): 28-38, <https://doi.org/10.24198/jaab.v1i2.18344>.

⁵ Motadi Masa Sylvester and Stewart Lee Kugara, "The Impact of Political Corruption on Governance in Africa: A Qualitative Analysis," *African Renaissance* 2025, no. 1 (2025): 211-37, <https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2025/sin1a9>.

⁶ Rana Ejaz Ali Khan and Sarwat Farooq, "Corruption, Political Instability and Sustainable Development: The Interlinkages," *Journal of Quantitative Methods* 3, no. 1 (2019): 56-83, <https://doi.org/10.29145/2019/jqm/030104>.

⁷ Denise Sumpf, Salim Araj, and Rebecca Crompton, "Governance in the Arab Region: Addressing Challenges and Envisaging the Future," *Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions* 6, no. 3 (2016): 65-86, <https://doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i3c1art8>.

⁸ Dedeng Yusuf Maolani, "Governance and Corruption: Evaluating Anti-Corruption Policies and Their Effectiveness in Strengthening Institutional Integrity," *International Journal of Science and Society* 6, no. 3 (2024): 54-70.

⁹ Nafis Dwi Kartiko, "Does Government Effectiveness and Corruption Control Support Political Stability?," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 10, no. 1 (2024): 81-94, <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v10i1.1209>.

¹⁰ Anees Majeed Jaber and Salah Kadhim Jaber, "The Effect of Patterns of Administrative Corruption on the Development Process," *RGSA - Revista de Gestao Social e Ambiental* 18, no. 4 (2024): 1-13.

¹¹ Agyenim Boateng et al., "Institutions and Corruption Relationship: Evidence from African Countries," *Journal of International Management* 30, no. 3 (2024): 1-18, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2024.101136>.

¹² Islam Abdelbary, "From Revolutions to Institutions: The Experience of Arab Reform," *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 16, no. 3 (2023): 593-620, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-12-2020-0614>.

¹³ Godswill Osuma and Ntokozo Nzimande, "Examining the Misery Index and Its Effects on Economic Inequality and Social Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Moderating Role of Corruption," *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 17, no. 6 (2025): 1-18, <https://doi.org/10.3390/su17062522>.

¹⁴ Tochukwu S Ezeudu, "The Impact of Political Corruption on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria," *Journal of Public Administration and Government* 5, no. 2 (2023): 161-76.

¹⁵ Nkosingiphile Mkhize and Danielle Nel-Sanders, "Corruption Risk as a Structural Driver of State Fragility: Examining the Governance Crisis in South Africa," *Frontiers in Political Science* 7, no. 2 (2025): 1-10, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1575693>.

¹⁶ Asiye Tutuncu and Yasar Bayraktar, "The Effect of Democracy and Corruption Paradox on Economic Growth: MINT Countries," *Economic Change and Restructuring* 57, no. 4 (2024): 1-25, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-024-09726-6>.

¹⁷ Kinda Hattar, "CPI 2023 for Middle East and North Africa: Dysfunctional Approach to Fighting Corruption Undermines Progress," transparency.org, 2024, <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-middle-east-north-africa-dysfunctional-approach-fighting-corruption?utm>

¹⁸ Sansom Milton and Mohammad Alhamawi, "Peace-Centred Sustainable Development: An Analysis of SDG 16 in the Arab States," *World Development Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2024): 1-5, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2024.100587>.

¹⁹ Abdo Hassoun et al., "The Gaza Conflict and Its Implications for the Sustainable Development Goals: A Comprehensive Analysis," *Environment, Development and Sustainability* 7, no. 2 (2025): 1-33, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-025-06763-7>.

²⁰ Kinda Hattar, "CPI 2023 for Middle East and North Africa: Dysfunctional Approach to Fighting Corruption Undermines Progress," transparency.org, 2024, <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-middle-east-north-africa-dysfunctional-approach-fighting-corruption?utm>

²¹ Gheorghia Dincă and Christian Gabriel Stempel, "Perceptions of Corruption, Inequality, and the Fragility of Prosperity in Europe," *Economies* 13, no. 10 (2025): 1-27, <https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13100296>.

²² Kostas Rontos et al., "Two Faces of the Same Coin? A Comparative, Global Approach to Corruption and Socioeconomic Development," *Quality and Quantity* 53, no. 4 (2019): 1875-94, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00846-0>; Sylvester and Kugara, "The Impact of Political Corruption on Governance in Africa: A Qualitative Analysis."

²³ Mkhize and Nel-Sanders, "Corruption Risk as a Structural Driver of State Fragility: Examining the Governance Crisis in South Africa."

²⁴ Erik Alda Sanchez et al., "World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development," 2011.

²⁵ CS Cheng and D Zaum, "Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?," *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies* 43,

no. 2 (2015): 1–3, <https://doi.org/10.5787/43-2-1134>.

²⁶ Zahron Abdurrahman, “Islamic Ethical Governance: An Integrated Model for Corruption Prevention,” *Kurva: Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Keuangan Dan Bisnis* 2, no. 1 (2025): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.53088/kurva.v2i2.2245>.

²⁷ Noor Azizah, Muhammad Syahnun, and Zulkarnain, “Approach Restorative In Loss Recovery Caused by Criminal Acts of Corruption,” *[PENA JUSTISIA: MEDIA KOMUNIKASI DAN KAJIAN HUKUM]* 24, no. 1 (2025): 3277–3307, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31941/pj.v24i2.6552>.

²⁸ Mevliyar Er, “Corruption from the Islamic Perspective: Some Recommendations for the MENA Region,” *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 1, no. 1 (2008): 31–51, <https://doi.org/10.1108/17538390810864241>.

²⁹ Shaista Arshad and Syed Aun R. Rizvi, “Impact of Corruption on Bank Profitability: An Analysis of Islamic Banks,” *International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics* 8, no. 3 (2013): 195–209, <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBGE.2013.057375>.

³⁰ Dionisios A. Lalountas, George A. Manolas, and Ioannis S. Vavouras, “Corruption, Globalization and Development: How Are These Three Phenomena Related?,” *Journal of Policy Modeling* 33, no. 4 (2011): 636–48, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.02.001>.

³¹ Happy Febrina Hariyani, Dominicus Savio Priyarsono, and Alla Asmara, “Analysis of Factors That Affecting Corruption in Asia-Pacific Region,” *Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Kebijakan Pembangunan*, 5, no. 2 (2016): 32–44.

³² Mohammad Hudaib, “Accounting for Corruption within Islamic Countries,” *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research* 11, no. 4 (2020): 741–43, <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIABR-11-2017-0166>.

³³ Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” 2023.

³⁴ Killkon Ko and Seong Gin Moon, “The Relationship Between Religion and Corruption: Are the Proposed Causal Links Empirically Valid?,” *International Review of Public Administration* 19, no. 1 (2014): 44–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2014.887353>.

³⁵ Siti Faridah Abdul Jabbar, “Corruption: Delving into the Muddy Water Through the Lens of Islam,” *Journal of Financial Crime* 20, no. 2 (2013): 139–47, <https://doi.org/10.1108/13590791311322337>.

³⁶ Nur Khoirin and Mahfudz Junaedi, “Religious Inconsistency on Corruption Behaviour Among Muslim Politicians in Indonesia,” *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 78, no. 1 (2022): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7361>.

³⁷ Süveyda Karakaya, “Religion and Conflict: Explaining the Puzzling Case of ‘Islamic Violence,’” *International Interactions* 41, no. 3 (2015): 509–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016158>.

³⁸ Hudaib, “Accounting for Corruption within Islamic Countries.”

³⁹ Mohammad Reza Farzanegan and Reza Zamani, “The Effect of Corruption on Internal Conflict in Iran Using Newspaper Coverage,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 35, no. 1 (2022): 24–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2108571>.

⁴⁰ Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti, “Upholding Public Institutions in the Midst of Conflicts: The Threat of Political Corruption,” *Ethics and Global*

Politics 14, no. 3 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1961379>.

⁴¹ Yogi Yasa Wedha et al., "Unraveling the Complex Policies Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Criminal Corruption," *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System* 5, no. 1 (2025): 33-59, <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v5i1.486>.

⁴² Cristian L. Paredes and Jorge C. Derpic, "Perception of Civil Service Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions in Brazil," *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 2 (2025): 1-21, <https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.13057>.

⁴³ Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet, "The Effects of the Perception of Corruption on Public Trust in Government in Africa: A Comparative Analysis," *Politikon* 51, no. 1-2 (2024): 18-39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2024.2344276>.

⁴⁴ Hjallis Häkkänen Gillies, Jussi Haavisto Chan, and Pekka Tavio Parenti, "Analyzing the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Measures and Their Impact on Governance in Helsinki, Finland," *Journal Public Policy and Governance* 7, no. 2 (2023): 37-45, <https://doi.org/10.53819/81018102t5188>.

⁴⁵ Yongsuo Liu et al., "A New Method to Evaluate the Similarity of Chromatographic Fingerprints: Weighted Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient," *Journal of Chromatographic Science* 42, no. 10 (2004): 1-8, <https://doi.org/10.1093/chromsci/42.10.545>.

⁴⁶ Syahla Aurelya Djailani and Surwandono, "The Wealth-Peace Connection: Human Development Index and Global Peace Index in Middle Eastern Nations," *Jurnal Politik Profetik* 11, no. 1 (2023): 72-86, <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v11i1a5>.

⁴⁷ Todd Christopher Headrick, "A Note on the Relationship Between the Pearson Product-Moment and the Spearman Rank-Based Coefficients of Correlation," *Open Journal of Statistics* 06, no. 06 (2016): 1025-28, <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojs.2016.66082>.

⁴⁸ Rosalind K. Humphreys et al., "Underestimation of Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Statistic," *Oecologia* 189, no. 1 (2019): 1-7, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-018-4233-0>.