

THE EMERGENCE OF DEWAN SYARIAH KOTA SURAKARTA: A Precondition

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Abstract: This study analyses the social, intellectual, and political history of Dewan Syariah Kota Surakarta (DSKS, The Surakarta Sharia Council), the group that is a forum for many smaller Islamist groups in Solo. Formed in 2013, this group suddenly organized many mass rallies with negative campaigns and radical notions. This study investigates the factors that contributed to the emergence of the DSKS by integrating both theoretical and empirical approaches. One of the most significant is the materials published by DSKS, encompassing website articles, pamphlets, and content on social media platforms. Many factors contributed to the emergence. First, many Islamist figures in Solo such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, Muinudinillah Basri, Tengku Azhar, and Syihabuddin Abdul Muiz. Second, the role and support of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Third, the existence of various Salafi movements. Last, Solo is a city that is closely linked to terrorist activities. This study makes an important contribution to the literature on social movements, particularly in the context of Islamic movements in Indonesia.

Keywords: DSKS, Solo, Islamist Groups

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Introduction

The origins of modern notions of Islamist groups date back more than a thousand years. The *ulama*, an identifiable class of religious authorities, emerged from more general inchoate groupings of religious specialists who grounded their arguments in various types of religious knowledge.¹ There are many studies about the development of Islamist groups in Indonesia, from Independence Day to these days. Bruinessen (2002), for instance, showed that the roots of radical Muslim groups could be traced back to the Darul Islam (DI) movement and the Masyumi party during the 1940s. The evolution of both movements continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Subsequently, the ‘campus Islam’ phenomenon emerged, bearing an association with the later HTI movement. The strengthening of Islamic influence occurred in the final years of the New Order regime with ICMI. Last, the post-New Order era saw the proliferation of vigilante groups.²

Fealy (2005) stated further that the genealogy of this notion could be traced to the ‘Padri’ in West Sumatra since the 18th century led by Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Bonjol, an official national hero in Indonesia, played a central role in that war which was a bitter civil war between reformists and traditionalists in West Sumatra.³ According to Fealy, DI and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the most significant and militant movements have emerged in the last fifty-five years. DI, in particular, has had a lasting impact on Indonesian history and has caused more damage to life and property than any other vigilante group.⁴

There is a quite massive movement from noisy small radicalist communities after the Post-Soeharto era. Sometimes, they are backed by certain governmental alliances. By using the rhetoric of harmony and stability, they justify the oppression of some minority sects alleged by insulting Islam. Their target is not

only minority Muslims but also other small non-Muslim communities.⁵

In another essay, Fealy stated that in 2012, many Islamist groups targeted Ahmadiyah and Christian worship buildings, and both of those groups continued to face ongoing condemnation and occasional physical assault. These phenomena took place in West Java, Banten, Aceh, and West Nusa Tenggara. In Aceh, for instance, local governments closed nine churches because of lack of approval, including many churches that had been standing for many decades and had large congregations.⁶

In the Shi'a case, the persecution has ranged from 2000 to now. The condemnation started in April 2000 with enhancing incidents since 2006. Myriad housings and schools were burnt down and the inhabitants were thrown at them. Their events, needless to say, were disbanded.⁷ A well-known prosecution took place near Pekalongan, Central Java in 2000. The mobs destroyed allegedly Shi'a Pesantren on April 14th, 2020, one day before Ashura Day. Sampang, Madura witnessed much worse prosecution. The Shi'i teaching was banned and Shi'i adherences were transmigrated to another island by the government because of the pressure from majority Muslim groups such as NU and MUI.⁸ Until now, many cases of persecution against Shi'a still occur. In Solo, a group of people holding a pre-wedding event, in Javanese it is called *midodareni*, were beaten by hundreds of people, August 2020. Some of them were injured because they were beaten by the crowd and had to be treated in hospital. The police could not do much but only secured the victim, and unfortunately, the victim was still injured even though he was escorted by the police. In this case, the government appears powerless against pressure from extremist groups.⁹

However, radicalism is a complex phenomenon in modern society, characterized by a focus on radical transformation and commitment to decisive measures for change.¹⁰ Radical movements

use the potential of human resources to mobilize members, create networks, coordinate activities, and motivate people to create conflict and confrontation,¹¹ sometimes influenced by economic difficulties and contentious political activism.¹² To be declared as a radical, a person shall have met the elements of radicalism set out in the regulations, for example, intolerant, fanatical, exclusive, and revolutionary.¹³

The research specifically conducted in Solo was Erich Kolig's (2005) research. Kolig highlighted Solo as a hub of religious and political dynamics of a fairly radical nature. JI, an al-Qaida-connected network, was the form of the Pondok Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki, Sukoharjo. Sukoharjo was regent near Surakarta city, Central Java, Indonesia. Solo has two meanings. First, as a city, Solo is another name for Surakarta. Surakarta is the formal name of Solo, but Solo is more popular among Indonesians. The second meaning is Solo as a residency. Usually known as 'Solo Raya', it contains one city, Surakarta, and six regencies: Sukoharjo, Klaten, Wonogiri, Sragen, Boyolali, and Karanganyar. Three men involved in recent terrorist attacks were reportedly educated in Al Mukmin Ngruki. Two of the Bali bombers and the suicide bomber of the Marriott Hotel.¹⁴

All activities carried out by a group of people or individuals are inseparably related to the authority and power they have, the process of how they are formed and have followers is closely related in this regard. All activities carried out by a group of people or individuals are inseparably related to the authority and power they have, the process of how they are formed and have followers is closely related in this regard. According to Hannah Arendt, authority is a hierarchical relationship that binds a group of people to a shared past that they acknowledge as fundamental, giving those in positions of power the ability to pass along and change that history into models for the

present.¹⁵ According to Marc Gaborieau, this term also pertains to religious authority, but it also includes elements of the divine and the law “... the right to impose rules which are deemed to be in consonance with the will of God”.¹⁶

Regarding religious authority, DSKS is the organization that has listed itself. Within DSKS, the term “religious authority” alone is insufficient; in addition, the word “Dewan Syariah” is added, referring to part of religious authority. This research offers strong novelty as there is no research on DSKS yet. This organization was founded in 2013 and strengthened after 2015, while myriad research regarding the Islamic political movement was conducted before that year. Zuly Qodir, for instance, wrote *Gerakan Salafi Radikal dalam Konteks Islam Indonesia: Tinjauan Sejarah* (Radical Salafi Movement within Indonesian Islam Context: A Historical Approach) in 2008.¹⁷ Bruinessen released a theory regarding conservative turn in 2013, before the emergence of DSKS,¹⁸ and much of the research I mentioned before also came before DSKS’s emergence. Due to this gap, this research would make enormous contributions to the scholarly political and Islamist movements debate. It is also useful for the stakeholder to see the movement in more detail.

However, the study of DSKS is pivotal due to various reasons. First, this organization is claimed to unify numerous elements of the Islamist movement, even the biggest ones such as Muhammadiyah and NU. Indeed, the involvement of Muhammadiyah and NU is different from the involvement of other movements, particularly right-wing groups, and needs different research. While this unification has resulted in changing DSKS into the biggest organization among the right-wing movements, this is not a new phenomenon. The previous fusion took place during the Moluccas and Poso conflict in 1998-2001. Edi Lukito, Salman al-Farisi, Hendro Sudarsono (Laskar Mujahidin), Jayendra Dewa, Yusuf Suparna, Muhammad Kalono (FKAM/Laskar Jundullah), Yani Rahmanto (Hizbullah), Khairul

(FPIS, Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta), Heru Prayetno (Majelis Tafsir al-Qur'an) and Sriyadi (Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah, Muhammadiyah's Security command) gathered at Sriyadi's house in Pajang, Solo to establish Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (LUIS).¹⁹ The establishment was departed from at least four factors. The first factor was the overthrow of Soeharto which opened the wave of democratization.²⁰ The second was the Moluccas conflict in 1999, then followed by the Solo conflict (attack on *Pesantren* Darus Syahadah Boyolali) in the same year and the Poso conflict in the following year.²¹

The next reason why this study is crucial is that the support from MUI also plays an important role in the DSKS journey. At that time, MUI Solo was close to the right-wing movement. Needless to say, this relationship is understandable because of the sharing mission in both organizations. There was a shift within MUI in post-New Order to be more conservative. During the New-Order era, the main role of MUI was to gather Muslim support for the nation's development and policies of the government. Subsequently, after Soeharto's fall, the intention was more Islam-oriented and opposed either local or national government.²² This support gave stronger legitimation which was crucial for societies to join many rallies. Third, DSKS is a new face of political identity in Solo which plays a different role in regional and national elections, particularly the Surakarta regional election 2016 and the presidential election 2019.

This study argues that the emergence of the DSKS is the result of a combination of complex political, social, and religious factors, including the emergence of Islamic figures and their respective organizations, which, although small but noisy, support from the MUI and its tendency towards right-wing groups, and political conditions dominated by the PDI-P with its anti-Islam stigma.

Methodology

This research integrates both theoretical and empirical approaches. The data for these investigations are gathered through a literature review and on-site research. The literature review is complemented by examining documents and media, especially online sources. One of the most significant is the materials published by DSKS, encompassing website articles, pamphlets, and content on social media platforms. This research design encompasses a theoretical framework from recent literature on radicalism, extremism, and social conditions. By mixing both theoretical discussion and field data collection, the study tries to understand the complex network of factors that exist as preconditions for the emergence of this institution. Through a rigorous research methodology, this research goal is to show the dynamics surrounding the emergence and contribute to a deeper understanding of the contextual factors.

Results and Discussion

Solo: A Precondition

Despite the stigma of Islam in Indonesia as a smiling face of Islam,²³ Solo has received a stigma as a terrorist city. This city is popular because of its movements and actors of radicalism. Many terrorism cases took place in the city, such as Gereja Kepunten Solo bombing (2011), the attack of *pos pengamanan lebaran* Gemblegan (2012), Mapolresta Solo bombing (2016),²⁴ Kartasura bombing (2019),²⁵ the Shi'i persecution and terror (2000),²⁶ and many more. Linked to all Indonesian terrorism, the Solo terrorism network is the largest terrorist network in Indonesia, with connections to other nations. In the period 2008-2013, for instance, there were 35 cases of terrorism recorded.²⁷ It takes serious effort to look at the background that underlies

the establishment of an organization, including DSKS. There have been hitherto unpublished stories about the DSKS development. At least, we can look at three sides, which are the social historical and political condition of Solo, the main figure, and Islamic movements around the founding.

Solo was founded more than two centuries ago. Since the 18th century, Islam has been a pivotal religion in the region. Susuhunan Pakubuwono II (1726-49), King of the Kingdom of Surakarta, deeply concerned about religious issues. Numerous member of royal families sent their children to a *pesantren* in Ponorogo, East Java. One of them was Ranggawarsita, a very prominent figure in Javanese poems. The Kingdom had a very crucial role in spreading Islam and mixed it with Javanese values that a handful of scholars called syncretism. The mixing between Islamic values and Javanese values led to the existence of *abangan* Muslim majority until these days. However, individuals with *abangan* ideology are not necessarily immune from radicalism.

The arrival of Chinese descendants has been playing a crucial role in societies. This would clearly be seen later in DSKS movements. While their presence is not a new phenomenon, this started to be a problem during the nineteenth century, under colonialization. At that time, the colonial government split the societies into three classes, which were Westerners as the first class, Eastern foreigners as the second class, and native people or inlanders as the lowest class. Chinese descendants were classified as the third class at first, but even later they got various privileges due to their skills and abilities in running business. Nowadays, it can be clearly seen that the Chinese have higher financial and social levels than the majority of indigenous.²⁸

Main Figures

During Soeharto's presidency, some of *Pesantren Al-Mu'min Ngruki* leaders challenged the state and voiced their willingness to erect an Islamic state. The most prominent leaders were Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. In the 1980s, they fled to Malaysia. After Soeharto's era, Ba'asyir established Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and became an *amir* (commander)²⁹, the embryo of Laskar Jihad that mobilized many Indonesian youths to fight in the Moluccas.³⁰ However, the establishment of MMI was a clear sign that the power of Darul Islam was re-emergence. In addition, the strongest bases for this movement were Solo and Yogyakarta.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is the most prominent figure in this school. As the leader of Southeast Asian JI, he fought to defend Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. Following the fall of Soeharto, he extended his network in Malaysia and trained many students in Afghanistan and the Philippines, effectively expanding JI's reach throughout Southeast Asia. In his leadership, JI adopted many key aspects of al-Qaeda ideology, including targeting the interests of the far enemy, the US, and its allies with suicide bombings. This ideology manifested in the Bali bombing, JW Marriot Jakarta bombing, and Australian Embassy bombing as a support for global jihad.³¹ He is an Arab-Javanese descendant. It is clearly seen that Arab descendant have historically enjoyed a high position in society due to their close blood, cultural ties to the Middle East,³² and the increasing importance of transnational communication.³³

Another main figure in Solo was Muinudinillah Basri (1966-2020). He was the founder of DSKS. He was born in Solo on June, 15th 1966, and died on December, 8th 2020 thought to be due to covid-19. His fathers, a prominent preacher, died when Muin was an elementary student. He was a descendant of

Kiai Imam Rozi, the founder of Pesantren Singo Manjat, Klaten. Imam Rozi is son of *Kiai* Maryani b. *Kiai* Ageng Kenongo. In 24, *Kiai* Imam Rozi fought with Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch. *Kiai* Rozi was then appointed as Manggala Yudha or the Warlord.³⁴ Muinudinillah got an undergraduate degree from LIPIA, a Jakarta-based institute of higher learning directly sponsored by Saudi Arabia to spread its Wahhabi influence.³⁵ Then he continued his master's and doctoral degrees in King Ibnu Saud University.³⁶

The next utmost important figure is Tengku Azhar. He is a prominent ulama in Solo. He played a significant role in the emergence of ANNAS (Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah, National Anti-Shia Alliance) and has been the chairman of ANNAS Central Java Region. He is synonymous with hostility towards Shia ideology. In DSKS, he occupied the position of secretary general.

ANNAS was declared at Masjid Al-Fajr, Bandung, West Java on 20 April 2014. This movement was led by Athian Ali, a prominent conservative preacher from West Java who ties across the Islamic organizational spectrum and close relations with local politicians. Nahdlatul Ulama to some extent had a role in establishing this movement through Hamid Baidlowi. Habib Ahmad bin Zein Al Kaff, NU prominent figure from East Java also joined several region ANNAS declarations. Even, lately, the responses to this movement have been different. In Cirebon, 2015, NU's young wing Ansor, and its paramilitary wing, Banser, demanded that district police prevent the launching of ANNAS Cirebon. On the declaration day, Banser mobilized hundreds of people to stop ANNAS sympathizers from entering the venue. The declaration in Bandung was also followed by Maman Abdurrahman from Persis, Muhammad Al-Khaththath (Forum Umat Islam, FUI), and Cholil Ridwan (MUI).³⁷

In Solo, the ANNAS declaration was presented by Muinudinillah Basri and Zainal Arifin Adnan, the then-head of MUI Solo. MUI Solo, under the leadership of Zainal, together with DSKS organized many rallies, including the biggest rally, Parade Tauhid which we will discuss later on. The event was held at Masjid Jami MUI Semanggi on January 1st, 2017. Athian Ali and Habib Ahmad joined this event.³⁸ In this city, MUI Solo has a close relationship with Islamist groups. This proves the research carried out by Mun'im Sirry. He wrote, "After the collapse of the Suharto regime, MUI has frequently supported the interests of exclusivist elements within Indonesian Islam."³⁹ In further discussion, John Olle stated that MUI has approached radical Muslim groups in order to promote an anti-heresy agenda. He connected MUI fatwas with attacks on 'heretics' because the attackers justified their attack by referring to a fatwa by MUI⁴⁰ as what took place in the case of Ahok in Jakarta.

After Tengku Azhar, a key figure in this movement is Syihabuddin Abdul Muiz, the DSKS chairman who was elected after Muin's death. He was the Director of Isykarima Boarding School. Isykarima is one of the most prominent boarding schools in Solo. This educational institution teaches its students to memorize the Qur'ân (*tahfidz*). In the first era, Isykarima was erected by DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation).⁴¹ DDII was the most prominent case of the transition from political party to *dakwah* movement⁴² and one of Indonesia's leading organizations for reformist Islam.⁴³ DDII plays a very big role in helping Indonesian student to study in Saudi and then propagate the notion of Salafism in Indonesia after their study.⁴⁴ Currently, This Islamic boarding school has separated itself from the DDII organization.

Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid is the next prominent local figure. This person is well known because of his monthly magazine,

An-Najah (Victory). He was born in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, on October 2nd, 1984. He pursued his basic education in his hometown. After graduating from junior high school, he moved to Boyolali to learn at Pesantren Darus Syahadah. He graduated from this pesantren in 2004 and continued his studies in Ma'had Aly An-Nur, Sukoharjo. In these boardings, he got myriad teachings about Islam.

He is a chief editor and corporate leader at An-Najah. An-Najah is a popular magazine within right-wing movements. This magazine has been circulated in communities, mosques, and boardings around Solo. In 2020, the number of consumers of this magazine was about ten thousand. Densus 88, the special force of police to prevent radicalism and terrorism, considers this magazine as evidence of terrorism. He has held this position since 2011. As a result, regardless of his *majelis*, societies know him a lot from his writings. Even though his main activity is writing, he, as a common preacher, conducts many *majelis*. His followers usually upload the record of the *majelis* on YouTube. Together with Tengku Azhar, he was one of ANNAS's founders. After the ANNAS founding, he held the position of secretary of the ANNAS Central Java Branch. In numerous *majelis*, he asserts that Syiah is a heretical sect.

Islamist Movements before DSKS

Solo has faced stigmatization as a city associated with terrorism issues. Although there are also many efforts to spread moderate religion in this city.⁴⁵ This stigmatization has had a significant impact on the public's image and perception of Solo, creating challenges that need to be overcome in an effort to understand the complexity and true reality behind the label and to build a more accurate and fair image of the city. In terms of movement, Islamist movements in Solo started before

the Indonesian Independence Day. The movement can be traced back to Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI, Islamic Trade Union) as the most popular at that time. *Kiai* Samanhudi was the founder of that movement. As a well-known Muslim trader, he challenged the colonial policy that discriminated against indigenes. The organization transformed into Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union) with a broader scope of organizational ideas. Not necessarily concerned about the economic field, but also socio-political conditions.

The first militant movement, as SI could not be subsumed as a radical movement due to the colonial condition, was Darul Islam led by Ba'asyir and Sungkar.⁴⁶ After their movement, Solo has all three variants of Salafi movements, which are Salafi Purist, Salafi Haraki, and Salafi Jihadi. Salafi purist is represented by Pesantren Imam Bukhari, Pesantren al-Ukhuwah, Pesantren Ibnu Abbas as-Salafi, Pesantren Ibnu Taimiyyah, Pesantren Darussalam, Pesantren Ittiba'us Sunnah, and Al Madinah Foundation. Salafi Haraki is represented by Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki (led by Abu Bakar Baasyir), Pesantren Isykarima (led by Syihabuddin), Pesantren Ibnu Abbas Klaten (led by Muinudinillah), Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid (FKAM, Mosque Activist Communication Forum), Laskar Hisbullah, and Jamaah Ansharu Syariah. Some scholars put DSKS into this group. Then Salafi Jihadi is represented by Jamaah Ansharu Tauhid, Jamaah Ansharu Daulah, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi al-Indonisy, and other radicalist communities.

Salafi Purist continues to grow, this shows that they can coexist with other religious beliefs in society. Apart from that, with the accommodative attitude taken by the local government, Salafi Puritanists can also open themselves to several government programs. On the other hand, Salafi Haraki carries the narrative of the necessity of establishing an Islamic state and formal implementation of Islamic law. In addition, The Salafi Jihadists

legalized the use of violent methods to fight for their ideas.⁴⁷

Sweeping was the normal practice in Solo after reformation.⁴⁸ The main vigilante community conducting that action was *Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta* (FPIS, Muslim Youth Front of Surakarta). The fall of Soeharto was marked by the emergence of myriad vigilante communities. They endeavored to participate in either social or political issues in local and national contexts. Their main concern was to ban unlawful activities including ban heretical sects and implement *sharia*-based local regulations. These efforts, particularly the latest, failed to some extent due to the widespread of *abangan* communities. The result was they got less public approval.⁴⁹ FPIS is a paramilitary group organized by *jama'ah* Gumuk. This group in the end was alleged as Shi'i. *Jama'ah* Gumuk is a local Islamic group. Myriad lower-class Javanese people became members. In Soeharto's era, this group was not interested in social and political issues. The establishment of FPIS took place in the post-New Order.⁵⁰

Other communities that have a vital role are Laskar Jundullah (Soldier God Islamic vigilante group, 1999), Laskar Hizbullah (Party of God Islamic vigilante group, 1999), Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (LUIS, Muslim Vigilante group of Surakarta, 2000), and Tim Hisbah. Laskar Jundullah is part of Forum Komunikasi Aktivistis Masjid (FKAM, Mosque Activist Communication Forum). Moreover, the leader of Tim Hisbah, Sigit Qordhowi, had shot by Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88 anti-terror). Most of them then merged into one group, LUIS. FKAM was formed during the reformation crisis. This group was organized by a handful of activists of Al-Amin Mosque at Laweyan, Solo. They spread various campaigns against the ill-treatment of Muslims, such as the US military invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism framing, and liberation of Muslim oppression during the New Order. On the other hand, Laskar Hizbullah was a

paramilitary wing organized by Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party), a new Islamic party established in the Post-New Order era. These groups consolidated their strength during the riot in Poso and Ambon from 1998 to 2001. They share similar ideas, such as the implementation of *Sharia*-based law, resistance to terrorism stigma to Islam, anti-USA and capitalism, and resistance to minority allegedly heretical sects.

In terms of a political system, sometimes they challenge democracy as a system in Indonesian politics. They believed that there were many injustices within the democracy. Even though disagreed with the democratic system, they used freedom of speech and freedom of assembly which are the basic values of democracy to voice their ideas and ideology. This has been the dilemma faced by myriad democratic states when facing the uncivil societies that challenge democracy by democratic values.⁵¹

The Surakarta Sharia Council

Numerous right-wing movement actors have deep concerns about the unity of the Islamic movement so they formed a new unifying organization, which so-called DSKS. DSKS was formed on 8th March 2013 in Solo. The founder claimed that their organization is unifying Islamic organizations in Solo such as MUI, Muhammadiyah, NU, DDII, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), JAT, MMI, FPI, FKAM, LUIS, etc. The first chairman of this organization was Muinudinillah Basri. After his death, the leadership was inherited to Syihabuddin.

Muin, during the founding, claimed that this organization was formed to be a credible reference for Muslims. This means that people have a reference in asking all questions according to sharia. His organization also built a strong cooperation with

the police in order to *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong). With the police, they want to prohibit all sinful behavior in Solo. As he said:

“We prohibit wrongdoing together with the police. We give the maps, so they can work properly. If they are just silent, don't blame us if we conduct *sweeping*.”⁵²

It is totally understandable as this organization is close to vigilante or paramilitary movements that one of their main activity is conduct *sweeping*.

Parade Tauhid

One of the biggest events organized by DSKS after its founding is Parade Tauhid (Tawheed Parade). They organized this event together with MUI. Parade Tauhid was a long march from Kottabarat Mosque to Gladak on the Slamet Riyadi Highway, organized in April 2015 due to a big Christian rally involving 1,200 participants, each carrying substantial crosses, parading throughout the city.⁵³ DSKS argued that the Christian minority should not show their force. They also argued that the Christian rally was part of the crucifixion of the city of Solo. So, they need to show their force and give the message to society, particularly to Christians that Muslims never let Christians rule and dominate Solo.

The background at that time was that Joko Widodo was the mayor of Solo. His vice mayor was F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, a Christian politician. Their period should finish in 2016. But, in 2012, Joko Widodo followed the contestation in the DKI Jakarta governor election and won the election. Technically, since 2012, Rudyatmo has become the mayor of Solo.

While, in 2016, Rudyatmo joined the mayoral election. So, DSKS assumed that the Christian rally was part of the

preparation to win Rudyatmo in the next year. It was understandable that the most vital message in Parade Tauhid was to vote for the Muslim leader. They do not want Rudyatmo to be mayor in the next period. In addition, the nuance of hatred towards Christians is very pronounced. Shouts of *takbir* were echoed to magnify the existence of Islam and reduce the existence of Christianity.

In media, the committee proposed the message to welcome the holy month of Ramadan. The head of MUI, Zaenal Arifin Adnan stated that he hoped with this parade Muslims in Solo could prepare early to welcome the month of Ramadan by purifying monotheism, protecting themselves from idolatry or heretical beliefs, and all forms of immorality and evil. Islamic communities that join in this activity include Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran (MTA), Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, NU, MIUMI, FKAM, MMI, JAT, Jamaah Ansyarus Syariah (JAS), LUIS, Front Jihad Islam (FJI), Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI, Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity), Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM, Muhammadiyah Student Association), Hisbullah Sunan Bonang, FPI, Aliansi Laskar Islam Klaten, Majelis Taklim Al Ishlah, Perguruan Silat Teratai Mas, FUI, Ponpes Al Mukmin Ngruki, Pesantren Isykarima Karanganyar, Pesantren Darusy Syahadah Boyolali, Pesantren Al Kahfi Hidayatullah Mojosongo, Pesantren Takmirul Islam, Pesantren Darul Fitroh, and many more.

The masses unfurled a 2400-meter Tauhid flag, the longest in the world. This parade also featured a cavalry unit.⁵⁴ Zaenal claimed that the rally was visited by around 50,000 people. They got many orations from Muslim figures.⁵⁵ In those orations, however, orators voiced hatred towards Christians and Christian leadership.

To some extent, this rally was similar to the 411 and 212 movements in Jakarta in 2016-2017. 212 largely known as the

rally to challenge Ahok and to promote his enemy in the next DKI Jakarta governor election, Anies Baswedan. This action bore sweet fruit because Anies won the election. However, in Solo, the candidate that assumed would challenge Rudyatmo was Achmad Purnomo, the then vice mayor. Achmad Purnomo came to the rally and was promoted as the future mayor who could lead Solo to implement sharia. In the 2016 election, Achmad Purnomo was still nominated as vice mayor with Rudyatmo. They were proposed by PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), the nationalist party that was assumed as the enemy of Islam by many Islamists. Their challenger was Anung Indro Susanto and Muhammad Fajri that proposed by PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperous Party), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), Gerindra, and Demokrat. PAN and PKS are Islamic parties⁵⁶ while Gerindra and Demokrat were nationalist parties that have a close relationship with Islamist parties. In this regard, the political mission, as one of the missions of Parade Tauhid, failed as Rudyatmo won the election.

Religious Authority

The main issue so far is how DSKS has been performing as the biggest sector of socio-religious development since the organization was founded. Since its establishment, DSKS has been perceived by other organizations and has also built a good reputation so that it can have many followers and claim to be a credible organization that must be followed by Muslims. This is inseparable from the contribution of the figures in spreading the *sharia* to their followers either through *kajian* or published books. There are even numerous works written from the thoughts of Muinudinillah Basri about *Sharia* many incorporated in books, for instance, *The Beauty of Tawakal*, *Complete Prayer*

*Guide, Khatimah Khusnul, Power and Trust in the Qur'an, Between the People and the Leader, Islamic Democratic Law, Qur'anic Studies: Opportunities for Science and Ummah The Dynamics of Interpreting the Qur'an and Sunnah, the Messenger of Allah's 24-hour Dhikr and Prayer, Da'wah in a Multicultural Society A Bill of CSOs from the Islamic Da'wah Movement's Perspective Hajj Philosophy and Islamic-Based Economic Practices Ahkam as-Sama' wal Istimafil Fiqh Islamy, A Model of Economic Empowerment and Increasing the Quality of Faith and Piety in the Perspective of Islamic Wordview, etc.*⁵⁷

Another thing that makes DSKS's religious authority strong enough is DSKS tried to negotiate its authority by encouraging other offices, organizations to engage in the implementation of their works and thoughts. In accordance with the target, synergy of Surakarta Muslim Programs and also the realization of a strategic alliance of Surakarta Muslims. To help consolidate its efforts, the DSKS also coordinated with other stakeholders such as government.

However, negotiations not always smooth sailing due to religious authority is illusive, always competition in it, and measuring competition is challenging. There are not many studies that systematically evaluate and compare the religious elite structures that exist inside a nation, and even fewer that attempt to connect these elite structures to political results.⁵⁸ Of course, Islamist groups playing a political role was nothing new; religious leaders had long been entering politics or making political spheres. In this regard, the question is how does the political structure in Solo affect DSKS activities. Looking at the data above, the political structure in Solo does not actually affect DSKS directly, but it affects DSKS through the response given by DSKS. For example, when Rudyatmo ran as a candidate for mayor of Solo, DSKS responded by holding a demonstration. This action indirectly

strengthened the existence of DSKS itself. When there are no political events or issues that need to be responded to, DSKS tends to be silent so its existence in society is relatively declining.

In addition, what is more important is that the political structure of Solo is one of the factors in the emergence of this organization. The open political structure in Solo allows the emergence of complete Islamic figures along with their respective organizations. The tendency of the MUI as a quasi-official Islamic organization to the right also affects the legitimacy of the community towards this group. Coupled with the power of the PDI-P party which is always associated with the stigma of being anti-Islam and the presence of Rudyatmo as deputy mayor and mayoral candidate at that time.

Conclusion

This research describes and analyzes in depth the factors behind the emergence and development of DSKS. The role of DSKS in society has fluctuated. At certain times, they organize so many things, especially demonstrations that are quite large for a local scale that could inspire Muslims in other regions. However, at other times, its presence does not have a serious impact on the society. This is influenced by many factors. What is clear is that before the emergence of DSKS, there were at least three main influencing factors that relate to each other. The first factor is the presence of myriad Islamist figures in Solo. The most famous figure is certainly Abu Bakar Baasyir which attracted widespread public attention nationally and globally. In this research, no direct link was found between Baasyir and DSKS, but Baasyir nevertheless had influence, especially in the process of spreading Islamist ideology to young people in Solo, both through the *Pesantren* Ngruki and through other channels. The second factor is the Islamist movement that existed before.

If we trace it back further, this movement had its embryo since the pre-independence era as discussed above, from SI in pre-independence, Masyumi in early independence, to various movements in the post-New Order era. The third factor is socio-political conditions. Solo, on the one hand, is known as a PDI-P base, the nationalist and the biggest political party in Indonesia. President Joko Widodo, who was a PDI-P cadre, was born and grew up in Solo until he became Mayor of Solo for almost two terms. Now, this leadership is continued by his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, PDI-P cadre as well. On the other hand, Solo is also known as a base for *laskar* and a base for terrorism. *Laskar* is a term to depict vigilante militant Islamist movements. Minority groups that are often considered “splinter” also exist in Solo, such as Shia and Ahmadiyah, including the Chinese minority group. This diverse composition makes Solo a unique melting pot and gives birth to various large movements.

This research provides a deeper understanding of the formation process of DSKS, which can become the basis for further research or contextual policy recommendations. Apart from all that, the profile of DSKS, its movements, negotiations with modernity, negotiations with the government, political role, and prospects need to be studied more seriously in other research. Apart from that, other things such as the social and economic impact of DSKS, analysis of community perception and participation, comparison with other movements, profiles of key movement figures, analysis of inhibiting factors and challenges to the movement, influence on local government policies, gender studies, and evaluations of DSKS programs could provide further research material to understand this nascent movement. Including future projections, will a movement like this have a long life, or will it only be a temporal response to a certain phenomenon and then die swallowed by the times?

This research makes an important contribution to the literature on social movements, particularly in the context of Islamic movements in Indonesia. It can be a basis for further studies on similar movements in other regions as well. The results of this study can be used by the government and related institutions to monitor and understand Islamic social movements, so that preventive action can be taken if necessary. It can also be used to formulate policies that are inclusive and sensitive to religious issues, reduce the potential for conflict and maintain social cohesion.

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